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ABSTRACT
The purpose of creating this Multi-Hazard Mitigation Disaster Resistant University Plan
is to meet the requirements of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. This hazard mitigation
plan documents the process of creating a plan for the University of Tennessee, Knoxville,
including identifying hazards and risks associated with UTK and identifying a hazard
mitigation strategy specific to UTK that will lessen the campus’ vulnerability and make it
more resistant to disaster and more sustainable. This plan identifies goals for hazard
mitigation and risk reduction of natural and man-made hazards to UTK’s campus by
following the planning guidelines and requirements as included in FEMA’s Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Planning Guidance Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (March 2004;
Revised November 2006). This plan was created using these FEMA-recommended
guidelines of organizing resources, identifying hazards and assessing risks, developing a
mitigation plan, and adopting and implementing the plan.
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Executive Summary
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) has assembled this Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Disaster Resistant University (DRU) Plan to meet the requirements of the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. This plan documents the process of creating this plan
including identifying hazards and risks associated with UTK and identifying a hazard
mitigation strategy specific to UTK that will lessen the campus’ vulnerability and make it
more resistant to disaster and more sustainable.
Hazard mitigation is defined as action(s) taken to lessen or eliminate risk to life and
property from hazards, natural or man-made. This hazard mitigation plan was created
through the process of identifying which hazards threaten UTK, what these hazards’
effects on campus would be, how to mitigate these effects, and strategizing and
prioritizing plans to mitigate these effects. Hazard mitigation planning is beneficial to
UTK in two ways. It helps the University become less vulnerable to future disaster losses
and is necessary in order for the University to maintain its eligibility for FEMA PreDisaster Mitigation and Hazard Mitigation Grant Programs.
The Executive Summary section of this report provides a summary of the mitigation
planning process and is organized in the following way:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Background, Methodology & Process
Risk Assessment Findings
Mitigation Strategy & Action Plan
Plan Adoption and Implementation

BACKGROUND, METHODOLOGY & PROCESS
University of Tennessee, Knoxville Profile
The UTK campus has grown from 40-acres in 1826 to 556 acres today, which are
comprised of both the main campus and agriculture campus. The campus is located in
East Tennessee 35 miles northwest of the Great Smoky Mountains on hilly land. The
campus currently consists of 26,400 students, 8,300 faculty and staff, and over 300,000
alumni (University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 2007).

Scope
UTK’s DRU Plan is a plan that identifies goals for hazard mitigation and risk reduction
of natural and man-made hazards to UTK’s campus, including the main campus,
agriculture campus, and various properties located near to these two campuses. This plan
follows the planning guidelines and requirements as included in FEMA’s Multi-Hazard
Mitigation Planning Guidance Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (March 2004;
Revised November 2006).
1

Planning Process
The need was recognized for a hazard mitigation plan for UTK and was, subsequently,
primarily funded by a grant from FEMA. An advisory committee was created, which
helped contribute to this plan by attending meetings, providing information sources,
gathering data, and managing administrative details. The hazard mitigation plan for UTK
was created using FEMA’s recommended guidelines and consisted of the following four
phases:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Organize Resources
Identify Hazards and Assess Risks
Develop Mitigation Plan
Adopt and Implement Plan

RISK ASSESSMENT FINDINGS
The risk assessment for the UTK campus was completed using the guidelines provided in
the FEMA publication 386-2 Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards and
Estimating Losses. This publication states that risk assessment should be completed based
on the following four-step process:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Identify Hazards
Profile Hazard Events
Inventory Assets
Estimate Losses

Identify Hazards
A hazard identification study was completed in order to determine what hazards affect
UTK’s campus. These hazards were identified as follows:
Dam Failure
Drought
Earthquake
Expansive Soils
Extreme Heat
Flood
Hurricane
Land Subsidence
Landslide
Radiation Fallout

Severe Storm
– Hailstorm
– Heavy Rains
– Lightning
– Windstorm
Severe Winter Storm
Terrorists
Tornado
Toxic Chemical Release
Wildfire

2

Profile Hazard Events
In order to profile the severity of hazard events a frequency scale was created in order to
establish likelihood of occurrence of each of these hazard events. Each event was given a
likelihood of occurrence based on estimations of documented past occurrences of these
events obtained from previously documented local, state, and federally declared disasters,
as well as insurance claims made by UTK. This frequency scale is shown as follows:
Highly Likely: Near 100% chance of occurrence in next year, or happens every
year.
Likely: Between 10 and 100% chance of occurrence in next year, or has a
recurrence interval of 10 years or less.
Occasional: Between 1 and 10% chance of occurrence in the next year, or has a
recurrence interval of 11 to 100 years.
Unlikely: Less than 1% chance of occurrence in next 100 years, or has a
recurrence interval of greater than every 100 years.

Inventory Assets
Campus properties were gathered for each building in order to quantify the value of
buildings on campus. These values included monetary, life, and cultural or historical
values. Some of these properties specifically include building replacement values, content
values, occupancy, hazardous materials locations, and criticality of facilities.

Estimate Losses
A vulnerability assessment was conducted in order to estimate the impact each hazard
may have on the UTK campus. The vulnerability that each hazard may have on campus
was estimated based on the impact of past occurrences to the campus, the extent of the
campus that could be affected, and the possible monetary damage and life loss potential.
A vulnerability scale was created in order to quantify the vulnerability for each event and
is shown as follows:
Extremely High: Very widespread and catastrophic impact.
High: Widespread potential impact. This ranking carries a high threat to the
general population and/or built environment. The potential for damage is
widespread. Hazards in this category may have already occurred in the past.
Medium: Moderate potential impact. This ranking carries a moderate threat level
to the general population and/or built environment. Here the potential damage is
more isolated and less costly than a more widespread disaster.
3

Low: Minimal potential impact. The occurrence and potential cost of damage to
life and property is minimal.
Extremely Low: The occurrence and potential cost of damage to life and property
is very minimal to non-existent.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the risk assessment portion of this plan and includes
whether the hazard was deemed critical or non-critical. A critical hazard is one that is
addressed in the mitigation strategy portion of this plan due to either a combination of
high risk and vulnerability rating and/or no plan currently being in existence for UTK for
that specific event.

MITIGATION STRATEGY & ACTION PLAN
This section illustrates the mitigation strategy process and action plan for UTK’s DRU
Plan. The development of this mitigation strategy was completed by following Phase 3 of
FEMA’s four-phase plan and includes the following steps:
Set Planning Goals
Draft an Action Plan

Set Planning Goals
Goals and mitigation actions were developed based on the results of the risk and
vulnerability assessments and existence of current mitigation policies. Analyzing these
three areas provided the opportunity for identifying areas where improvements could be
made on current mitigation policies. These goals were to protect lives from hazards,
improve the university to mitigate losses, and maintain FEMA eligibility for grant
funding.

Draft an Action Plan
Creating a final action plan, or mitigation strategy, was able to be completed after
reviewing the planning process, risk and vulnerability assessment, and planning goals.
This action plan consists of the following projects:
Severe Storm
Put up lightning rods in certain critical locations, specifically the electrical
substation and possibly the fiber optics vault, Steam Plant Turbine Building,
Steam Plant Gear Switching Building, and Steam Plant and Addition
Devise a different plan in order to allow for redundancy of campus power supply
so that the electrical substation, or any other location, is not the primary source of
power

4

Table 1: Summary of Risk Assessment
Event
Dam Failure
Drought
Earthquake (MW
of 4-5)
Earthquake (MW
of 5-6)
Expansive Soils
Extreme Heat
Flood
Hurricane
Land Subsidence
Landslide
Radiation Fallout
Severe Storm
(Hail, High
Winds)
Severe Storm
(Lightning, Heavy
Rains)
Severe Winter
Storm
Terrorists
Tornado
Toxic Chemical
Release
Wildfire

Unlikely
Occasional

Medium
Extremely Low

Critical/NonCritical
Hazard
Critical
Non-Critical

Occasional

High

Critical

Unlikely

High

Critical

Unlikely
Occasional
Unlikely
Occasional
Occasional
Unlikely
Unlikely

Extremely Low
Extremely Low
Extremely Low
Extremely Low
Extremely Low
Extremely Low
Low

Non-Critical
Non-Critical
Non-Critical
Non-Critical
Non-Critical
Non-Critical
Non-Critical

Occasional

Medium

Critical

Highly Likely

Medium

Critical

Occasional

Low

Non-Critical

Unlikely
Unlikely

Medium
Medium

Non-Critical
Critical

Occasional

Low

Non-Critical

Unlikely

Low

Non-Critical

Likelihood of
Occurrence

Vulnerability

5

Earthquake
Design all new buildings on campus to the most current seismic code
Secure and/or protect all important utilities and mechanical equipment as best as
possible in the Hoskins Library Chiller Building, Music Chiller Building, Reese
Hall Chiller Building, and Facilities Services Maintenance Shops and Warehouse
For all other facilities vulnerable to an earthquake (as listed in section 5.0
Mitigation Strategy), do not store any items deemed valuable in these buildings or
secure these items to a wall or floor in order to minimize movement during an
earthquake that would damage valuables
Anchor all cabinets containing toxic chemicals to walls and/or floors so that
during an earthquake, movement of these chemicals is minimized and the
likelihood of spillage is decreased in the Veterinary Teaching Hospital, Plant
Sciences Biotechnology Building, Dabney-Buehler Hall, Dougherty Engineering
Building, Science and Engineering Building, Walters Life Sciences Building,
Hesler Biology Building and Greenhouse, Perkins Hall, Jessie Harris Building,
Neyland Drive Biology Annex, and the Engineering Annex
Conduct a further, more detailed analysis of possible earthquake scenarios and
how they would affect each building on campus
Dam Failure
Give alert via text message of dam failure in order to warn those people located in
lower elevation areas to quickly move to higher elevations away from the
Tennessee River.
Send emergency personnel to broadcast warning by vehicle over a loudspeaker in
areas closest to river for those people who do not have access to text messaging.
Tornado
Identify “safe” locations in highly populated buildings, such as residence halls,
student centers, and buildings containing large numbers of offices and classrooms
and then educate faculty, staff, and students on the whereabouts of these locations
and emphasize the necessity to go to them in the event of a tornado

PLAN ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION
After the development of the mitigation plan, it is ready to be formally adopted,
implemented, evaluated and revised as necessary. The purpose of adopting this MultiHazard Mitigation DRU Plan is for the University to maintain its eligibility for FEMA
Pre-Disaster Mitigation and Hazard Mitigation Grant Programs, raise awareness of the
plan, and formalize the plan’s implementation. Implementing this plan and maintaining
its goals is necessary for success of the hazard mitigation planning process. This involves
taking various actions based on priority. Plan maintenance involves updates, which
should include, if applicable, the following subjects:
Changes in vulnerability due to project implementation
Documentation of effective and/or non-effective mitigation actions
6

Documentation of new hazards
Incorporation of new data on hazards and campus risk
Incorporation of new mitigation plans and policies
Incorporation of growth and developmental changes to UTK
The update process provides an opportunity to make successes of the plan public and to
allow for public input and comments.

7

1.0 Introduction
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville has prepared this Multi-Hazard Mitigation
Disaster Resistant University Plan in ordinance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.
This plan documents the planning process, identifies natural hazards and
risks/vulnerabilities of these hazards, and creates a hazard mitigation strategy to make
UTK less vulnerable to disasters. This plan can also be used to aid in future land use and
local policy decisions.
Hazard mitigation is defined as action(s) taken to lessen or eliminate risk to life and
property from hazards, natural or man-made. This hazard mitigation plan was created
through the process of identifying which hazards threaten UTK, what these hazards’
effects on campus would be, how to mitigate these effects, and strategizing and
prioritizing plans to mitigate these effects. Hazard mitigation planning is beneficial to
UTK in two ways. It helps the University become less vulnerable to future disaster losses
and is necessary in order for the University to maintain its eligibility for FEMA PreDisaster Mitigation and Hazard Mitigation Grant Programs.

PURPOSE AND NEED
Natural and man-made disasters are the cause of hundreds of deaths and thousands of
injuries in the United States every year. These disasters also cause billions of dollarsworth of damage. Many of the effects of a disaster are expected and can be predicted.
Being able to predict these effects leads the way for eliminating some of the life loss and
monetary damages through mitigation.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has defined reducing losses from
natural disasters as one of its principle goals. Reducing these losses is done through
hazard mitigation planning and implementation of this planning. Mitigation planning has
proven effective in many areas of the United States.
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 requires that state and local governments develop
hazard mitigation plans in order to maintain eligibility for federal disaster assistance and
hazard mitigation funding. Completion of this plan will provide UTK with both of these
benefits, as well as reducing costs of disasters to the University and minimizing impacts
to daily activities on campus.

SCOPE
UTK’s Multi-Hazard Mitigation DRU Plan identifies goals for hazard mitigation and risk
reduction of natural and man-made hazards. This plan covers the UTK campus, which
includes the main campus, agriculture campus, and various UTK-owned properties
located in close proximity to the main and agriculture campuses. This plan follows the
8

Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 requirements and FEMA’s Multi-Hazard Mitigation
Planning Guidance Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.
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2.0 University Profile
LOCATION AND SETTING
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville campus is located in the city of Knoxville in east
Tennessee. The campus is adjacent to Knoxville’s downtown district. The campus
included for this plan includes the main campus and the agriculture campus, which are
separated by the CSX railroad. These two campuses are profiled in the following
paragraphs and are shown in Figure 1.
Main Campus
The University of Tennessee began as Blount College in 1794. The present Main Campus
originated in 1826 as a 40-acre tract known as “The Hill.” The Morrill Act was passed by
Congress in 1862, which granted federally owned lands to states in order to create public
agricultural and mechanical colleges. The main campus has grown from 40 acres to 556
acres. The Main Campus is bordered by Volunteer Boulevard on the West, the Tennessee
River on the south, 11th Street on the east, and roughly by Cumberland Avenue on the
north. The main campus includes facilities such as administrative, dining, housing,
mechanical, medical care, parking, police, utilities, athletics/physical education,
classrooms, laboratories, offices, data systems, radio stations, student centers, a guest
house, and libraries.
Agriculture Campus
The University of Tennessee’s Agriculture Campus is located directly to the west of the
Main Campus and is bordered by Alcoa Highway on the north, Third Creek on the east,
and the Tennessee River on the south and west. The Morrill Act passed in 1862 later
provided $400,000 worth of real estate (262 acres) to the University of Tennessee in 1869
known then as UT Farm, now referred to as the Ag Campus. It has now grown to a size
of 298 acres. The Agriculture Campus includes facilities such as classrooms, laboratories,
offices, and farm buildings (University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 2007).
Other Properties
In addition to the previous two properties, The University of Tennessee owns several
other properties included in this hazard mitigation plan. These consist of:
The Welcome Center located northwest of the Agriculture Campus on Neyland
Drive used primarily for administration and banquet purposes.
Kingston Apartments and Parking Garage located directly north of the Agriculture
Campus at 2521 Kingston Pike used for housing and parking.
Tyson Park located also directly north of the Agriculture Campus used for
athletics.
Fulton Bottoms and Storage Shed located west of the Main Campus and northeast
of the Agriculture Campus used for athletics.
10

Properties directly north of Cumberland Avenue (or the Main Campus) including
Laurel Avenue Apartments, Pool House, and Parking Garage; Child Development
Center; White Avenue Parking Garage; Clement Hall; Strong Hall; Panhellenic;
Law Complexes; White Avenue Building; White Avenue Biology Annex;
Hoskins Library; TANDEC; Jessie Harris Building; and 11th Street Parking
Garage. These properties include facilities such as housing, parking, classrooms,
laboratories, offices, dining, police, libraries, and a student center.

NATURAL SETTING
All of the campus properties are located in East Tennessee about 35 miles northwest of
the Great Smoky Mountains. The campus is located on very hilly land, which is
characteristic of East Tennessee. The subsurface conditions of the campus consist mostly
of siliceous dolomite (which is similar to limestone), some limestone, and a little shale
and sandstone. Due to the dissolution of limestone with water, karst also occurs quite
frequently across campus resulting in underground caves and the occurrence of sinkholes
appearing on the surface. Most new construction is performed using drilled shafts or
piling to the bedrock to avoid problems arising from constructing on karst (Drumm,
2007).

HISTORY
A brief history of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville written by University Historian
Milton M. Klein follows.
Blount College, the University of Tennessee’s forerunner, was established in
Knoxville in 1794, two years before Tennessee became a state. Located near the
center of Knoxville’s present business district, Blount College was nonsectarian
in character, which was unusual for an institution of higher education in that day.
The university has remained nondenominational and is said to be the oldest such
institution west of the Appalachian Divide.
From the outset, Blount College was all-male, as were most colleges at the time.
The restriction was ended in 1892 when the first women students were admitted.
The University of Tennessee thereafter was fully coeducational.
In 1807 the state legislature changed the name to East Tennessee College, and in
1826 the present site at Knoxville, the 40-acre tract known as “The Hill,” was
acquired. The college’s name changed again in 1840—to East Tennessee
University.
The Civil War forced the institution to close, and its buildings were used as a
hospital for Confederate troops and later occupied by Union troops.
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Figure 1: Map of UTK Campus
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East Tennessee University reopened after the war, and in 1869 the state
legislature selected the university as the state’s federal land-grant institution,
under terms of the Morrill Act passed by Congress in 1862. This enabled the
university to broaden its offerings by adding agricultural and engineering courses
to its curriculum, as well as military science, which the Morrill Act required.
The university has grown almost constantly since then. The medical campus,
founded in Nashville and acquired by the university in 1879, moved to Memphis
in 1911. The University of Tennessee at Martin, established in 1900 as a private
institution, became part of the University of Tennessee in 1927. The University of
Tennessee at Chattanooga was established in 1969 when the private University of
Chattanooga merged with the University of Tennessee.
The Space Institute, a graduate research and education center near Tullahoma,
opened in 1964. The Institute of Agriculture, headquartered in Knoxville, traces
its beginnings to 1869 when UT became Tennessee’s land-grant institution, and
the Institute for Public Service was founded and brought together several
government and industrial outreach programs in 1971.
Today the University of Tennessee, Knoxville has grown to a size of 550 acres with
approximately 220 buildings. Last year (2006) the university received $127 million in
research grants. The campus now has 26,400 students enrolled, 8,300 faculty and staff
working, and boasts more than 300,000 alumni.
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3.0 Planning Process
Dr. James E. Beavers and Dr. Richard Bennett, both faculty of the University of
Tennessee, were the initiators of this Multi-Hazard Mitigation Disaster Resistant
University (DRU) Plan for the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Dr. Beavers holds a
Ph.D. in Civil Engineering with a minor in Probability and Statistics. He held various
senior positions at the Department of Energy in Oak Ridge, Tennessee from 1972 to 1994
and was a director at the Center for Natural Phenomenon Engineering from 1990 to 1994.
He has chaired more than 20 national engineering committees for various organizations,
served as a member or chair on more than 80 such committees, authored or coauthored
more than 200 publications and testified before the United States Congress on eight
occasions. He is considered an international expert in earthquake engineering. Dr.
Bennett also holds a Ph.D. in Civil Engineering and has been teaching at the University
of Tennessee, Knoxville since 1983. He currently teaches for the freshman engineering
program as well as various graduate level classes including Masonry Design, Structural
Dynamics, and Finite Element Applications in Structural Engineering. He has written 38
journal articles, 27 conference proceedings, and been published in over 40 other
publications. He has been involved in numerous areas of research including Structural
Safety and Reliability, Subsidence Damage Mitigation, Masonry, and other
miscellaneous areas of research. The funding for the development of this plan was
provided by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The hazard mitigation plan for UTK was created using FEMA’s recommended guidelines
and consisted of the following four phases:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Organize Resources
Identify Hazards and Assess Risks
Develop Mitigation Plan
Adopt and Implement Plan

FOUR PHASE PLANNING PROCESS
The four-phase planning process suggested by FEMA was used and is described in more
detail as follows:

Phase 1: Organize Resources
During this phase, the development of the plan involved assessing community support,
building the planning team (advisory committee), and engaging the public. This plan also
required involvement from many resources including university and government. The
research and organization of data was primarily done by Structural Engineering graduate
student Kelli Taylor under the guidance of Dr. James E. Beavers (Research Director,
Construction Industry Research & Policy Center) and Dr. Richard Bennett (Professor and
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Associate Head, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering). The advisory
committee and other resources of importance are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
Many meetings were held during the planning process to accomplish various tasks. These
meetings and their purposes along with other various important dates are shown in Table
4.

Phase 2: Identify Hazards and Assess Risks
Phase 2 consisted of identifying hazards, profiling hazard events, assessing vulnerability
of assets, and estimating potential losses. Dr. James E. Beavers and Dr. Richard Bennett
decided which hazards, natural as well as human-caused, were applicable to UTK’s
campus by using FEMA Bluebook 386-2, their knowledge of East Tennessee’s most
common hazard occurrences, and their combined expertise in hazard mitigation. In order
to assess the risks, a very thorough and exhaustive set of data was gathered for the
purpose of comparing various aspects of each of the campus buildings. Different aspects
of hazardous events and effects during these events were compared, such as building
fragility, monetary loss, life loss, and location of hazardous materials in order to
determine which buildings were the most critical and which events were the most
destructive to campus. After comparing this data, potential losses were able to be
quantified, as well as the importance of these various losses. A more detailed account of
Phase 2 can be viewed in Sections 4.0—Risk Assessment, 4.1—Hazard Identification,
and 4.2—Vulnerability Assessment.

Phase 3: Develop Mitigation Plan
Phase 3 consisted of developing mitigation goals and objectives, identifying and
prioritizing mitigation actions, preparing an implementation strategy, and documenting

Name
Denise Barlow
Dr. James E.
Beavers
Dr. Richard
Bennett
Brian Browning
Dr. Tim Ezzell
Ken Fritts
Alan Lawson

Table 2: Advisory Committee
Organization
UTK Finance and Administration
UTK Construction Industry Research &
Policy Center
UTK Department of Civil and
Environmental Engineering
UTK Finance and Administration
UTK Community Partnership Center
East Tennessee TEMA
Knox County and Knoxville City
Emergency Management

Jeff Maples

UTK Finance and Administration

Mike Sherrell

UTK Facilities Services
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Title
Vice Chancellor
Research Director
Professor and
Associate Head
Business Manager
Director
Coordinator
Director
Senior Associate
Vice Chancellor
Executive Director

Table 3: Additional Public Resources
Name
Organization
Title
Interim Fraternity Affairs
Andrew Shafer UTK Dean of Students
Advisor
UTK Environmental Health &
Mark Smith
Director
Safety
Assistant Director for
Pam Diehl
UTK University Housing
Finance
Amy Howard
UTK Dining Services
Employee
Jim Dietrich
UTK University Center
Employee
UTK Men’s Athletic Business
Bill Myers
Budget Director
Office
UTK Department of Civil and
Jane Taylor
Business Manager
Environmental Engineering
George Chris
UTK Facilities Planning
Employee
UTK Office of Information &
Information Security
Tim MacKenzie
Technology
Official
George Lecrone UTK Telephone Services
Employee
UTK Cartographic Services
Will Fontanez
Director
Laboratory
Judy McGee
UTK Office of Risk Management
Director
Betsey
UTK Space & Facilities Services
Employee
Creekmore
Dam Safety &
Cris Hughes
Tennessee Valley Authority
Engineering Employee
Tennessee Emergency
Emergency Management
Tom Cloud
Management Agency, East
Planner
UTK Civil & Environmental
Dr. Eric Drumm
Professor
Engineering
Dr. George
Advanced Reactor
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Flanagan
System and Safety Group
UTK Tennessee Transportation
David Clarke
Director
Assistance Program
Roger Byrd
Knox County Fire Department
Fire Marshall
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Date
5/4/2005
8/8/2005
10/25/2005
1/4/2006
3/28/2006
4/26/2006
8/1/2006
10/2/2006

10/3/2006

10/17/2006

10/31/2006
11/28/2006

3/22/2007
5/1/2007
9/15/2007
9/26/2007
11/29/2007
12/10/2007

Table 4: Important Dates During Planning Process
Topic/Purpose
UT Research Office submits grant proposal to TEMA
TEMA submits grant proposal to FEMA
FEMA signs grant to approve project
UTK receives official grant from FEMA
Dr. Beavers and Dr. Bennett have first meeting with UTK Facilities
Services.
Members of Advisory Committee established
Graduate student, Kelli Taylor begins working on project
Dr. Beavers, Dr. Bennett and Kelli Taylor meet with Brian
Browning from Facilities Services to discuss good sources where
Kelli Taylor should look for information needed about campus
buildings.
Dr. Beavers, Dr. Bennett and Kelli Taylor meet to inspect progress
of information gathered about UTK campus so far and discuss future
goals
Dr. Beavers, Dr. Bennett and Kelli Taylor meet to inspect progress
of information gathered about UTK campus so far and discuss future
goals
Dr. Beavers, Dr. Bennett and Kelli Taylor meet to inspect progress
of information gathered about UTK campus so far and discuss future
goals
Kelli Taylor gives first presentation to Advisory Committee on
status of project
Meeting with Advisory Committee occurs in which committee is
updated on status of project and asked questions about uncertainties.
Identification of all campus buildings and their properties is 95%
complete. Hazard assessment is begun.
Hazard assessment process is begun.
Hazard assessment process is completed. Vulnerability assessment
process is begun.
Meeting with Advisory Committee occurs in which committee is
updated on status of project and asked questions about uncertainties.
Report is completed by Kelli Taylor; submitted to Dr. Beavers and
Dr. Bennett for review.
Final report is presented to advisory board
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the mitigation planning process. The University of Tennessee Knoxville’s current and inuse mitigation plans for various events were gathered and assessed in order to see what
events are being mitigated and if they are being mitigated suitably. For those events that
were either not being mitigated suitably or not at all, mitigation goals were determined to
lessen the effects of these hazards should they occur.

Phase 4: Adopt and Implement Plan
Phase 4 consisted of adopting and putting the Plan into practice, while monitoring and
evaluating its successfulness and progress. The strategy of implement is described in
more detail in Section 7.0—Implementation and Plan Maintenance.
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4.0 Risk Assessment
As stated by the FEMA Bluebook 386-2:
Risk assessment is the process of measuring the potential loss of life, personal
injury, economic injury, and property damage resulting from natural hazards by
assessing the vulnerability of people, buildings, and infrastructure to natural
hazards. Risk assessment provides the foundation for the rest of the mitigation
planning process. The risk assessment process focuses your attention on areas
most in need by evaluating which populations and facilities are most vulnerable to
natural hazards and to what extent injuries and damages may occur. It tells you:
The hazards to which your state or community is susceptible
What these hazards can do to physical, social, and economic assets
Which areas are most vulnerable to damage from these hazards
The resulting cost of damages or costs avoided through future mitigation
projects
In addition to benefiting mitigation planning, risk assessment information also
allows emergency management personnel to establish early response priorities by
identifying potential hazards and vulnerable assets.
This risk assessment follows FEMA-generated guidelines for Phase 2: Identifying
Hazards and Assessing Risks.
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4.1 Hazard Identification
The two primary coordinators for this project, Dr. James E. Beavers and Dr. Richard
Bennett, determined which natural and man-made hazards were most likely to occur
based on previous occurrences shown by historical data, geographical location of the
campus, and input from the advisory board during scheduled meetings. A complete list of
existing hazards in the United States was compiled using the FEMA State and Local
Mitigation Planning How-to Guide: Understanding Your Risks, as well as personal
knowledge of possible modern events that may occur. A complete list of these hazards
can be seen in Table 5. From this complete list of hazards, those chosen to be included in
the Multi-Hazard Mitigation DRU Plan for UTK were determined during various
meetings after thoroughly examining the frequency of past events occurring in the East
Tennessee region as well as future events that may possibly occur, but that have not yet
occurred.
This collection of hazards that are specific and significant to UTK’s campus was selected
based on the knowledge of past frequencies of each event, as well as how damaging the
event was in terms of life, property, and monetary loss. Events that have occurred
infrequently or never, such as land subsidence and radiation fallout, were included in this
study because a real possibility exists that they may occur sometime in the future,
however unlikely the possibility. Events that are considered completely inapplicable to
UTK’s campus such as avalanche, tsunami, volcano, etc. due to geographical location
were not considered, and, therefore, were not included in the list of hazards to be
analyzed. While a pandemic (West Nile Virus, bird flu, etc.) is an applicable event to
UTK it will not be included in the applicable hazards for this report because the
University has developed an independent plan for this event. It is included as a subset of
the Campus Emergency Preparedness Plan.
TEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Plan for the State of Tennessee states, “…windstorms may
be considered as part of a symbiotic relationship or concurrent events with Severe
Storms. Consequently, it is relatively impossible to discern or define where one begins
and the other ends. Therefore, the State of Tennessee, while clearly understanding
windstorms may be a separate hazard, elected to consider windstorms and the historical
significance of such events along with priority hazards.” The same is true of lightning
and hailstorms in Tennessee—they almost never occur without the existence of a severe
storm. Therefore, the same approach is taken with UTK’s Multi-Hazard Mitigation DRU
Plan. It is impractical to consider a hailstorm, lightning, or windstorm event as a separate,
singular event to be analyzed, therefore, all of these events are grouped together in a
category along with heavy rains called Severe Storm. A final, complete list of hazards
considered for UTK’s project follows.
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Table 5: List of Hazards
Applicable/Not
Hazard
Applicable to UTK
Avalanche
Not Applicable
Coastal Erosion
Not Applicable
Coastal Storm
Not Applicable
Dam Failure
Applicable
Drought
Applicable
Earthquake
Applicable
Expansive Soils
Applicable
Extreme Heat
Applicable
Flood
Applicable
Hailstorm
Applicable
Hurricane
Applicable
Land Subsidence
Applicable
Landslide
Applicable
Lightning
Applicable
Pandemic
Applicable
Radiation Fallout
Applicable
Severe Winter Storm
Applicable
Terrorists
Applicable
Tornado
Applicable
Toxic Chemical Release Applicable
Tsunami
Not Applicable
Volcano
Not Applicable
Wildfire
Applicable
Windstorm
Applicable
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Dam Failure
Drought
Earthquake
Expansive Soils
Extreme Heat
Flood
Hurricane
Land Subsidence
Landslide
Radiation Fallout

Severe Storm
– Hailstorm
– Heavy Rains
– Lightning
– Windstorm
Severe Winter Storm
Terrorists
Tornado
Toxic Chemical Release
Wildfire

A frequency scale, or scale for likelihood of occurrence, was established in order to
evaluate the likelihood of future occurrences of each of these hazard events. The
estimated frequency of a hazard event is classified into one of the following categories:
(It should be noted that the same scale has been used by the University of Colorado,
Boulder’s Multi-Hazard Mitigation DRU Plan.)
Highly Likely: Near 100% chance of occurrence in next year, or happens every
year.
Likely: Between 10 and 100% chance of occurrence in next year, or has a
recurrence interval of 10 years or less.
Occasional: Between 1 and 10% chance of occurrence in the next year, or has a
recurrence interval of 11 to 100 years.
Unlikely: Less than 1% chance of occurrence in next 100 years, or has a
recurrence interval of greater than every 100 years.
Each hazardous event analyzed in this project was classified into one of these frequency
categories based on estimations of documented past occurrences of these events. These
documented frequencies were obtained from previously documented local, state, and
federally declared disasters, as well as insurance claims made by UTK for various
reasons.

DISASTER DECLARATION/INSURANCE CLAIMS
This section contains information regarding Disaster Declarations and Insurance Claims
for the University of Tennessee, Knoxville campus and surrounding areas.

Disaster Declarations
The state of Tennessee has experienced 20 federally declared disasters since 1991. A list
of these disasters is shown in Table 6. The total cost of each of these disasters is shown
along with the funds granted by the U.S. government in parentheses. Also, Figure 2
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shows the percentage of these disasters since 1991 involved in federal disaster
declarations, with severe storms and flooding being the greatest majority of disaster
causes in Tennessee.
Knox County specifically was a part of the May 8, 2003 event disaster declaration and
the June 12, 2000 event. For the May 8, 2003 event Knox County received individual
assistance, which is government assistance to individuals and homes. For the June 12,
2000 event Knox County received public assistance, which is government assistance to
State and local governments for damaged public facilities.
Disaster declarations are made by county, so it is not possible to state whether or not
UTK has specifically made a disaster declaration. However, in Knoxville there is usually
one disaster declaration about every other year due to flooding, ice and snowstorms,
and/or tornadoes. However, in all the disaster declarations for Knox County, UTK has not
been involved in any of damage claims (Tennessee Emergency Management Agency,
2004).

Insurance Claims
In order to better evaluate the severity of past hazard events to estimate the severity and
likelihood of future hazard events, insurance claims made by UTK were gathered and
compared. A table containing insurance claims made by UTK over the past ten years is
shown in Table 7. This information was obtained from the UTK Risk Assessment Office
and includes where and when the disaster occurred, as well as what the disaster was and
how much insurance was paid out for the event. UTK has a deductible of $25,000, so
some events costing less than $25,000 were not reported. In these cases the University
took care of them independently.
Shown in Figure 3 is an illustration of the number of different types of damage claims
made by UTK. Water and fire are the most frequently occurring causes of damage for the
campus. Figure 4 shows the monetary damages caused by these different types of
disasters. These monetary figures do not include claims not yet completed, claims under
the $25,000 deductible, or damages handled by other outside resources such as a
contractor or water company. This figure shows that water and fire have been the most
expensive types of damage for the university (McGhee, 2007).
The following sections contain more detailed discussions of the hazard events chosen to
be evaluated for UTK’s hazard mitigation plan.
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Table 6: Federal Disaster Declarations in Tennessee Since 1991
Declaration Date
Event
Cost ($ million)
April 6, 2006
Severe Storms and Tornadoes
Not Available
October 7, 2004
Severe Storms and Flooding
Not Available
Heavy Rains, High Winds, Severe
July 29, 2003
36.8 (5.0)
Storms
May 8, 2003
Flooding, Severe Storm, Tornado
38.5 (6.2)
March 20, 2003
Winter Storm, Flooding
5.9 (0.45)
November 13, 2002 Flooding, Severe Storm, Tornado
4.1 (0.75)
April 5, 2002
Flooding, Severe Storm
8.7 (1.7)
August 15, 2001
Severe Storm, Flooding
3.5 (0.9 )
June 12, 2000
Flooding, Severe, Storm, Tornado
3.7 (0.53)
May 12, 1999
Severe Storm, Tornado, Flooding
5.6 (1.2)
January 19, 1999
Severe Storm, Tornado, High Winds
17.4 (1.8)
January 15, 1999
Ice Storm
12.3 (2.4)
July 23, 1998
Severe Storm
4.2 (0.82)
April 20, 1998
Tornadoes
36.2 (4.0)
January 13, 1998
Flooding
28.5 (4.1)
April 2, 1997
Severe Storms, Tornadoes
1.4 (0.4)
March 7, 1997
Severe Storms, Flooding
7.4 (1.1)
June 14, 1995
Tornadoes, Floods
1.0 (0.19)
April 14, 1994
Storms, Floods
4.6 (0.98)
February 28, 1994
Winter Storm
64.7 (9.4)
June 21, 1991
Severe Storms, Flooding
4.8 (0.6)
January 4, 1991
Severe Storms, Flooding
4.7 (0.7)
Total
294.0 (43.22)
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Federally Declared Disasters in TN
High Wind
4%
Ice/Winter Storm
7%
Severe Storm
36%

Tornado
20%

Flooding
33%

Figure 2: Federal Disasters in Tennessee
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Building
Dougherty Engineering
Building
White Avenue Parking
Garage
Dougherty Engineering
Building
UTK Botany Research
(Gatlinburg)
Various Buildings

Table 7: UTK Insurance Claims
Disaster
Loss Date Insurance Paid
Flood caused by
5/9/2007
Claim still open
water line burst
Building damage
due to automobile
10/29/2006
$5,115.88
accident
Fire loss
Windstorm damagetrees down on
building
Flood-storm
damage
Small roof fire
(caused by
contractor)
Flood standpipe
turned on
Contractor left
water faucet on
causing flood

10/17/2006

Claim still open

10/16/2006

$19,000.00

8/4/2006

Claim still open

7/12/2006

$900.00 (paid by
contractor)

5/28/2006

$80,515.55

5/25/2006

$81,392.58

Steam release
malfunction

4/17/2006

$191,034.55

Bakery fire

7/4/2005

$108,761.23

Water damage to
mural

5/20/2005

Ceiling collapsed

5/9/2005

Heating coil in air
handler burst

12/15/2004

Alpha Gamma Rho
Fraternity House

Storm damage
water & roof

6/17/2004

Student Recreational
and Fitness Center

Sprinkler head
malfunction

3/21/2004

$144,482.00

7/16/2003

Handled by
Knoxville
Utilities Board
(KUB)

Dougherty Engineering
Building
Reese Hall
Clement Hall
Plant Sciences
Biotechnology
Building
Presidential Court
Building
Carolyn Brown
University Center
(Smokey's Cafeteria)
Alumni Memorial
Building
Humanities and Social
Sciences Building

Alumni Memorial
Building

Water main burst
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Under $25,000
deductible
$17,385.00
Under $25,000
deductible
Handled by
fraternity's
insurance

Table 7, cont.
Building

Disaster

Loss Date

Walters Life Sciences
Building

Contents loss in
cold room

7/1/2003

Sigma Phi Epsilon
Fraternity House

Fire damage to
contents

6/12/2003

Transportation
Services (Motor Pool)
Carriage House
Dabney-Buehler Hall

Water damage due
to contractor
Fire loss
Fire loss

Health, Physical
Education, and
Recreation Building
Sutherland Avenue
Apartments (Storage
Shed)

Insurance Paid
$7,175.28

8/2/2002
7/20/2002

Handled by
fraternity's
insurance
Handled by
contractor
$525,839.18
$55,393.84

Computer theft

11/4/2000

$13,587.00

Fire loss

9/5/2000

$13,444.00

Water damage

5/13/1999

$1,000.00

Fire loss

10/29/1998

$3,591.24

Pasqua Nuclear
Engineering Building

Theft

6/14/1998

$1,914.00

Married Student
Housing
Dabney-Buehler Hall
Dougherty Engineering
Building

Flood damage due
to storm
Fire loss
Chemical
Engineering theft

5/21/1998

$98,405.56

3/30/1998

$120,852.59

8/24/1997

$16,409.20

Dabney-Buehler Hall
Stokely Management
Center
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10/2/2002

Damage Claims by UTK
12

Number of Claims
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Extreme
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Fire

Water
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Figure 3: Types of Insurance Claims Made by UTK

Value of Damage Claims
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Figure 4: Monetary Worth of Insurance Claims
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DAM FAILURE
A total of 76 major dams exist in the Tennessee and Cumberland watersheds. Of these
dams, 49 are owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 11 of which
are located upstream from Knoxville. The six largest of these dams were the only ones
considered of the TVA-operated dams because they are the only ones that have the
potential to affect the UT campus in Knoxville under certain failure scenarios. One other
major non-TVA-regulated dam in close proximity to the UTK campus was also
considered (the only non-TVA-regulated dam upstream and near to Knoxville). All of the
dams taken into account are shown in Table 8 (Hughes, 2007).
Tom Cloud, an Emergency Management Planner with TEMA East stated, “There are no
state regulated dams or unregulated farm ponds that pose a risk to UTK;” as well as,
“There are no US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) projects that directly affect UTK.”
Tom Cloud also stated, “There is only one Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) regulated dam that is distantly upstream from UTK (Walters Dam on the Pigeon
River operated by Progress Energy), and it does not pose any significant risk to UTK.”
With regard to the TVA maintained dams, six do have the potential to affect UTK under
certain scenarios. Exact flood inundation maps exist for these varying failure scenarios;
however, TVA considers these maps to be highly sensitive and not for public distribution
of any sort, including this report. However, a description of the effects on the campus is
permitted (Hughes).
TVA divided the flood inundation areas into two zones—Zone A and Zone B. For flood
waters to reach the levels shown by the different zones on the map, different scenarios
would have to occur. The water levels would reach the extents of Zone A if only one
event included in its possible scenarios were to occur. The water levels would reach the

Dam
Cherokee Dam
Douglas Dam
Fort Patrick
Henry Dam
Boone Dam
South Holston
Dam
Watauga Dam
Walters Dam

Table 8: Dams Upstream from Knoxville
River
City
Holston River
Jefferson City, TN
French Broad River
Sevierville, TN
South Fork Holston
Kingsport, TN
River
South Fork Holston
Kingsport, TN
River
South Fork Holston
Bristol, TN
River
Watauga River
Elizabethton, TN
Pigeon River
Waterville, NC

29

Regulated By
TVA
TVA
TVA
TVA
TVA
TVA
FERC

extents of Zone B also if only one event included in its possible scenarios were to occur.
The extents of Zone A reach out farther than Zone B because it is the most severe
flooding due to dam failure that can ever possibly occur. Flooding into Zone A has an
extreme unlikelihood of ever occurring, and flooding into Zone B has a moderate
unlikelihood of occurring. These scenarios are described as follows:
Zone A:
Douglas failure in Possible Maximum Flood (PMF)
Douglas PMF without dam failure
Cherokee failure in PMF
Watauga failure in PMF
South Holston failure in PMF
Zone B:
Douglas failure—nonflood condition
Cherokee failure—nonflood condition
Cherokee PMF without dam failure
Watauga PMF without dam failure
South Holston PMF without dam failure
Boone & Fort Pat. failure in PMF
Boone & Fort Pat. PMF without dam failure
A Possible Maximum Flood, or PMF, is the largest flood that can ever possibly occur in
the future, which is highly unlikely (having about a 1 in a million chance of occurring),
but is still considered to ensure that structures designed for the PMF will also withstand
all other lesser floods. Of all of the campus buildings considered for this project, 14% of
these buildings are located within flood Zone B. Zone A (which contains the buildings of
Zone B also) contains 37% of campus buildings. Although this is a significant percentage
of buildings, the majority of these buildings are either smaller in size than others on
campus or do not have high value in terms of money and life loss. A few select buildings
that fall within these flood zones, however, are quite important in the logistics and
research (content values) areas. A more detailed discussion of how dam failure could
affect these specific buildings is located within Section 4.2—Vulnerability Assessment.
Past Occurrences
Floods occurred in the in the 1920s and 1930s, but these were before TVA’s dam projects
upstream and immediately downstream from Knoxville were completed in the late 1930s
and 1940s. These dam projects have prevented any subsequent flooding to affect
Knoxville. Also, there has never been a failure of any of the TVA dams located upstream
from Knoxville and the UT campus (Hughes 2007).
In conclusion to the information obtained regarding the magnitudes of any of the seven
dams failing, if any of the non-TVA dams were to fail, water levels would not rise
enough to flood the UTK campus. As far as the TVA dams are concerned, if one or some
were to fail according to the TVA scenarios, buildings on campus would be affected.
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However, as stated previously, the chances of any of these scenarios occurring is highly,
highly unlikely.
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Unlikely

DROUGHT
Extreme or severe droughts occur in Tennessee approximately once every 15 years
(Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, 2002). Other varying degrees of droughts
do occur throughout the year. Their varying degrees created and used by the National
Weather Service’s Climate Prediction Center are as follows:
Extreme Drought
Severe Drought
Moderate Drought
Near Normal Conditions
Unusual Moist Spell
Very Moist Spell
Extremely Moist
Extreme drought is the driest condition and extremely moist is the wettest.
Past Occurrences
The National Weather Service’s Climate Prediction Center gives weekly drought
information since 1998 for various divisions in the United States. Gathering information
from this database gives past drought occurrences in Knoxville since 1998 shown in
Figure 5. The drought raw data can be viewed in the appendix. As shown in the figure,
Knoxville experienced either near normal conditions or above average moisture 84% of
the last 11 years that the data was gathered. Of the other 16%, which were times of
drought conditions, only 5% were extreme or severe droughts (United States National
Weather Service Climate Prediction Center, 2007).
It should be noted that the most recent drought of 2007 has been one of the longest and
most severe droughts in recent history. As shown in the drought raw data in the appendix,
in 2007 no unusual moist spell, very moist spell, or extremely moist conditions existed
for any week in 2007. Only near normal conditions or varying degrees of drought existed
throughout the entire year.
With Tennessee having an average of about one extreme or severe drought every 15
years, this puts a drought event in the “occasional” category. This may seem like an area
of high concern due to the small recurrence interval. However, TVA has water storage in
case of this event occurring, and the effects of a drought are not likely to be lifethreatening.
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Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Occasional

EARTHQUAKE
FEMA’s State and Local Mitigation Planning How-to Guide: Understanding Your Risks
states to determine if UTK is located in an area of high seismic risk. An area with any
seismic risk is defined in the handbook as an area with 3% g peak acceleration or more.
Using a map acquired from USGS, shown in Figure 6, it was determined that Knoxville,
shown as a black dot in the map is located in a region of 8-16% g, which is an area of
medium seismic risk. Therefore, an earthquake event was considered to be an event of
interest, due to the level of seismic risk.
To determine a more precise measurement of hazard for the UTK campus, a Peak Ground
Acceleration (PGA) value was found for a 10% chance of being exceeded over 50 years
using the USGS website and latitude/longitude of the center of UTK’s campus. A peak
ground acceleration is a measure of the ground movements during an earthquake, and
finding this value for a probability of 10% that this event will occur in 50 years is a
commonly used earthquake measurement and is recommended by FEMA for mitigation
planning. The USGS website gave a value of 8.81% g, which gives a more precise

Knoxville Drought Conditions
Extreme Drought
3%
Severe Drought
2%

Extremely Moist
13%

Moderate Drought
11%

Very Moist Spell
8%

Unusual Moist Spell
7%

Near Normal
56%

Figure 5: Knoxville Drought Data Since 1998
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number than the range of 8-16% g determined from Figure 6. This shows that UTK is on
the lower end of the medium risk spectrum.
It was determined that different magnitudes of earthquakes have varying degrees of
likelihood of occurrence; therefore, earthquake events were divided into two categories—
Mw of 4 to 5 and Mw of 5 to 6, where Mw is the moment magnitude.
Past Occurrences
Over twenty-five earthquakes are known to have been felt in Knox County over the past
200 years. Table 9 shows a historical list of earthquakes, which are listed with the
estimated intensity (using the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale shown in Table 10) that
was actually felt in Knox County—not at the origin of the earthquake. Of these 25
earthquakes, only 6 have been strong enough to cause structural damage (those over an
intensity of V). The earthquakes that did cause some damage, only caused mild damage
in most cases as seen from the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale. Significant earthquake
events denoted with an asterisk (*) in Table 9 are described in greater detail later in the
report (McClain and Myers, 1970).
November 28, 1844-In Knoxville bricks were thrown from the top of a chimney,
and one chimney in the county was thrown down. In Blount County (an adjacent
Tennessee county), bricks were displaced from several chimneys and houses.
May 31, 1897-This Giles County, Virginia earthquake was the largest recorded
earthquake in the Appalachian region. The intensity at the epicenter was estimated
to be VIII, but this was over a small region. The intensity was reduced to VII
outside the epicenter and inside an 8000 square mile area. The intensity in
Knoxville was reduced further to a V. The Knoxville Journal and Tribune
reported that the only damage in the city was the toppling of a chimney in West
Knoxville. The paper said “This will amount to but a few dollars.”
March 28, 1913-In Knoxville bricks to fell from chimneys, pictures to fell to the
floor, heavy furniture was overturned, and fire alarms were activated. The
Knoxville Journal and Tribune read as follows:
A few bricks were shaken from the top of the home of W.P. Chandler on
Second Street, falling into a neighboring yard. It was also reported that two or
three chimneys in North Knoxville had toppled over. At Sterchi Bros. store on
Gay Street, several pieces of shelving toppled over, and out on Richards
Street, a chimney gave way, the bricks tumbling down. It was also reported
that the shock wave was unusually severe out on the Sevierville pike, at
Shook’s Gap, and that at several homes in that vicinity chimneys had tumbled
down. Also two or three are said to have fallen at homes just beyond the end
of the Sevierville Pike car line. Constable W. A. Chanaaberry reported that
two feet of the chimney at his residence at 715 East Cumberland Avenue had
toppled off and his horse, in the barn, had been knocked down. The iron bars
of a sign on Union Avenue were bent and much of the plastering in the
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auditorium fell off. Pictures fell from the walls of the home of Dr. Harrill,
dentist, on Union Avenue. A stovepipe in the home of Chas. H. Smith, on
West Clinch Avenue, fell, and several ladies, guests of Mrs. Smith at the time,
were given a severe fright.
This excerpt just gives a firsthand account showing that the only damages
encountered were bent bars, toppled chimneys, shelving, pictures, a stovepipe and
a horse. No structural damage occurred.
January 16, 1918-Hundreds of dollars worth of pane glass were shattered, as
reported by The Knoxville Journal and Tribune. The newspaper attributed the
earthquake to using 100 sticks of dynamite to break up an ice jam in the river. No
damage besides the loss of window panes was reported.
September 7, 1956-This earthquake was one of the largest earthquakes in Knox
County. Chimneys were thrown down, plaster was knocked from walls, and
windows were shattered. Broken window glass and shattered dishes were reported
from Asheville to Middlesboro, Tennessee. No major damage was reported,
however.
April 15, 1960-People were awakened as this earthquake occurred at 5:12 a.m.
The Knoxville News-Sentinel tells of people who described the earthquake as
jolting their house and causing their windows to quiver. No damage was reported.
November 30, 1973- Small cracks were formed in walls in Knoxville. A
horizontal crack near the base of a wall at the University Hospital emergency
room was created. People reported items being overturned in their homes. One
resident said the earthquake knocked a picture off the wall, a vase off a table, and
turned over an alarm clock. Another resident said the earthquake knocked the
plug to a water heater out of its socket, caused her wardrobe doors to fly open,
and knocked bricks out of the chimneys of two houses. There was a report by a
resident of their foundation being cracked and cinder blocks (sic) being loosened
in the basement wall. Two earthquake related injuries were reported—one by a
woman who fell down the stairs during the earthquake and broke her leg and
another by a man who suffered a foot injury when he ran into a door while going
to check on his children during the earthquake. The Knoxville News Sentinel
summarized the earthquake by saying “Chimneys were cracked, dishes broken,
but no major damage was reported.” Also, during the time of this earthquake, Dr.
Beavers (initiator and committee member of UTK’s Multi-Hazard Mitigation
DRU Plan) was in charge of strong motion monitoring at the Department of
Energy complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. At the Y-12 Security Complex one
instrument recorded 0.025 g of motion on the second floor of one building
indicating that the peak ground motion was at least 0.01g 25 miles from the
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Figure 6: Seismic Risk Map
(Source: United States Geological Survey)
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Date
1811 and 1812
Nov 28, 1844*
Nov 12, 1875
May 25, 1877
Nov 16, 1877
Aug 25, 1884
May 31, 1897*
Mar 5, 1904
Mar 28, 1913*
Aug 3, 1913
Mar 5, 1917
Jan 16, 1918*
Jun 22, 1918
Oct 16, 1930
Mar 4, 1941
Jun 6, 1947
Jun 19, 1950
Jan 6, 1955
Jan 12, 1955
Jan 25, 1955
Sep 7, 1956*
Apr 15, 1960*
Aug 24, 1966
Nov 30, 1973*
Feb 14, 1984*
Mar 27, 1987*

Table 9: Earthquakes Felt in Knox County
Location
New Madrid, Missouri
Knoxville
Knoxville
Knoxville
Western NC and East TN; felt at Knoxville and
Murphy, NC
Knoxville
Giles County, Virginia
Maryville
Knoxville
Knoxville
Knoxville
Knoxville
Near Lenoir City
Knoxville
Knoxville
Knoxville
Alcoa; felt in Knoxville
Bristol; felt by few on upper floor of tall buildings in
Knoxville
Blount and Knox counties; felt at Blue Grass and
Maryville
Knoxville
Knoxville
Near Knoxville
Knoxville
Alcoa-Maryville
Knoxville
Greenback, Loudon County
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Intensity
Unknown
VI
III-IV
III-IV
III-IV
IV
V
V
VII
IV
III
V
IV-V
III-IV
III
III
IV
IV
IV
IV
VI
V
IV
VI
VI
VI

Table 10: Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale
Intensity
Effects
I
Not felt except by a very few under especially favorable circumstances.
Felt only by a few persons at rest, especially on upper floors of buildings.
II
Delicately suspended objects may swing.
Felt quite noticeably indoors, but many people do not recognize it as an
III
earthquake. Vibration like passing of truck. Duration estimated.
During the day felt indoors by many, outdoors by few. At night some
awakened. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound.
IV
Sensation like heavy truck striking building. Standing cars rocked
noticeably.
Felt by nearly everyone, many awakened. Some dishes, windows, etc.,
broken; a few instances of cracked plaster; unstable objects overturned.
V
Disturbances of trees, poles, and other tall objects sometimes noticed.
Pendulum clocks stop, start, change rate.
Felt by all, many frightened and run outdoors; persons walk unsteadily.
VI
Small bells ring. Some heavy furniture moved; a few instances of fallen
plaster or damaged chimneys. Damage slight.
Everyone runs outdoors; difficult to stand. Noticed by persons driving
cars. Damage negligible in buildings of good design and construction;
VII
slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable in poorly
built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken.
Steering of cars affected. Damage slight in specially designed structures;
considerable in ordinary substantial buildings, with partial collapse; great
in poorly built structures. Panel walls thrown out of frame structures. Fall
VIII
of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture
overturned. Sand and mud ejected in small amounts. Changes in well
water.
General panic. Damage considerable in specially designed structures;
well designed frame structures thrown out of plumb; great in substantial
IX
buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations. Ground
cracked conspicuously. Underground pipes broken.
Some well-built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame
structures destroyed with foundations; ground badly cracked. Rails bent.
X
Landslides considerable from river banks and steep slopes. Shifted sand
and mud. Water splashed over banks.
Few, if any, masonry structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed.
XI
Broad fissures in ground. Underground pipelines completely out of
service. Earth slumps and land slips in soft ground. Rails bent greatly.
Damage total. Practically all works of construction are damaged greatly
XII
or destroyed. Waves seen on ground surface. Line of sight and level are
distorted. Objects are thrown into the air.
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epicenter, which is an amount of shaking to cause objects to rattle and people to
get scared. Usually 0.15 g of motion is the amount needed to cause structural
damage, so the 0.025 g is not destructive enough for structural damage (Beavers 9
Aug 2007).
February 14, 1984-This earthquake was one of the most recent and largest
intensities felt in Knoxville—a VI. Windows were broken in Blaine and New
Market (20 miles and 25 miles, respectively, northeast of Knoxville). No
structural damaged occurred.
March 27, 1987-This earthquake, also an intensity of VI, caused cracks in
chimneys and foundations at Greenback, Friendsville, Louisville, and Tallassee.
This earthquake occurred at 2:29 a.m. and resulted in about 150 calls to the new
911 center, with most callers just curious as to what had happened. No severe
structural damage was reported.
Thus, in over 150 years of recorded history in Knox County, there has been no significant
structural damage from an earthquake. Reported injuries have been limited to two minor
injuries. Some chimneys have fallen over, windows have been broken, things have fallen
off shelves, pictures have fallen off of walls, but the earthquakes have caused more panic
than actual damage. All of these earthquakes occurred when there were no seismic design
requirements, and the damages were all still minor (Stover and Coffman, 1993).
One earthquake scenario of concern, however unlikely, that must be mentioned is an
earthquake originating in the New Madrid fault zone. This fault zone is located near the
Mississippi River in Missouri, Arkansas, and Tennessee. Any earthquake originating here
is likely to be extremely powerful, and its effects will most likely reach Knoxville. The
largest recorded earthquake from this fault line was a series of four large earthquakes
occurring in 1811 and 1812 at a distance of 320 miles from the UTK campus. These
earthquakes were the strongest ever to occur in North America, estimated to be a XII on
the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale. Damage was reported as far away as Washington,
DC. The shaking caused church bells in Boston to ring. Land rolled in visible waves. The
Mississippi River was forced to change its course. Reelfoot Lake was formed. Other
earthquakes in the zone of lesser magnitude occurred in 1843 and 1895. In 1843 the
intensity VIII earthquake caused considerable shock to be felt in Knoxville, but no
damage occurred. In 1895 the intensity VI earthquake caused shock to again be felt in
Knoxville, but no damage was sustained (United States Geological Survey, 2007).
As shown in Figure 7 an earthquake affects a much larger area around the New Madrid
fault zone than an earthquake of a similar magnitude on the west coast. This is due to the
differences in the geology on the eastern part of the country. In Figure 7 the area near the
epicenters represents damage to buildings, while the surrounding area represents shaking
felt, but little damage to objects.
Scientists estimate with a probability of over 90% that a magnitude 6 to 7 earthquake will
occur sometime in the next 50 years in the New Madrid zone. When this does occur,
many more structures will be damaged than have been in the earthquakes out west
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Figure 7: Variances in Earthquake Effects Across United States
(Source: United States Geological Survey)

because the structures around the New Madrid fault zone are not designed to withstand
earthquakes, while the ones out west are. If a greater magnitude earthquake occurs,
structural damage could be caused in Knoxville and, thus, the UTK campus. Also, since
the earthquake waves will travel underground for such a long distance, the period of the
waves would become quite long (meaning the oscillations would occur at greater time
intervals apart) because they would have a longer time to dissipate and would probably
be between 1.5 and 2 seconds. For periods of this length, taller buildings are most
affected and would definitely cause swaying of some of UTK’s taller buildings. While an
earthquake in the New Madrid fault zone with a magnitude greater than 7 is not likely to
occur soon, it will probably occur one day, and the campus must be prepared to deal with
its results (United States Geological Survey, 2007).
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Mw of 4-5, Occasional; Mw of 5-6, Unlikely

EXPANSIVE SOILS
Expansive soils are those that have a volume increase when they get wet and shrink when
they dry. They can cause damage to foundations, slabs, roads, sidewalks, pipelines and
sometimes cause buildings and their components to crack. Expansive soils usually
contain high amounts of clay, which is not usually the case in East Tennessee. The
subsurface conditions of East Tennessee primarily consist of limestone, dolomite, shale,
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and sandstone. Figure 8 shows a map of the United States depicting areas containing
varying degrees of expansive soils. Knoxville is located in the category of
“Nonexpansive: The Occurrence of Expansive Materials Is Extremely Limited.”
Past Occurrences
No occurrences of damages due to expansive soils have occurred at the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville.
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Unlikely

EXTREME HEAT
Episodes of extreme heat are most detrimental to the elderly, children, and people who
have no access to a cooling source during this episode. Prolonged periods of extreme heat
are rare in Tennessee, typically occurring only about once every 20 years. However, they
do occur at times, so the University must be prepared to handle these periods when they
do arise.
Past Occurrences
Some major historical occurrences of extreme heat events in Tennessee follow:
1980-A severe heat wave resulted in a total of 156 heat-related deaths. Ten were
in Nashville, 16 in Chattanooga, 88 in Memphis and 42 in other cities. During the
most extreme time of the heat wave, Memphis exceeded 100ºF for 33 days. On
July 13 the temperature was at its worst, reaching 108ºF.
1952-During three different occasions throughout the year, the temperature
exceeded 100ºF, resulting in 38 heat-related deaths. During each of these three
occasions, each one consisted of three to eight consecutive days of severe heat.
1930-In Decatur County on the dates of July 29th and August 9th of this year the
temperature reached 113ºF, which is the highest temperature ever recorded in
Tennessee (Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, 2004).
Some more recently occurring events involving extreme heat in Knox County are as
follows:
July 16, 1995-One homeless man died as a result of the extreme temperatures in
Knoxville.
June 27, 1998-Neighbors discovered one man deceased on this morning in his
home in a low-income, high-crime area. He lived on a fixed income and thus did
not turn on the air conditioning for fear of not being able to pay the electric bill.
He also did not open the windows out of fear of living in a high-crime area. He
was discovered in his house with no windows open and a small fan blowing.
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Figure 8: United States Areas of Expansive Soils
(Source: Army Corps of Engineers)
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June 28, 1998-Neighbors discovered a deceased woman on this afternoon in her
home in a low-income, high-crime area. She also lived on a fixed income and thus
did not turn on the air conditioning or open any windows (National Climatic Data
Center, 2 Aug 2007).
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Occasional

FLOOD
Some of the worst disasters in Tennessee history have been due to flooding (over 50% of
Tennessee’s federally declared disasters since 1991 involve flooding), so this hazard
event was initially an area of priority. The University of Tennessee, Knoxville campus is
located directly north of the Tennessee River; therefore, this close proximity to the river,
as well as several creeks, warranted consideration of the possibility of flooding, primarily
due to heavy rain or snowmelt. The UTK campus does have a chance of flooding, due to
its location, but it is not likely because Knoxville is located in a region of lower annual
precipitation than other areas of Tennessee shown in Figure 9. Knoxville is denoted by
the dot.
In order to determine if the UTK campus is in an area of risk of flooding from the base
flood (also known as the 100-year flood, which is a flood that has a 1% chance of
occurring in any one year) a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) was obtained from
FEMA and is shown in two separate figures. The eastern side of campus is shown on the
left half of Figure 10 and is the portion of the map to the north of the Tennessee River.
The western side of campus is shown on the right half of Figure 11 and comprises of the
area to the right of the northern-most tip of the Tennessee River. This map mostly just
shows the Agriculture campus. The various levels of flooding are broken down into
Flood Zones designated by FEMA. Descriptions of these various flood zones are shown
in Table 11.
As seen in the FIRM all areas of flooding for the UTK campus lie within the categories X
or AE. As shown by the legend on the maps, category AE includes the extents that the
base flood would reach and is a high-risk area. However, zone AE does not reach hardly
any campus buildings, so if it was to occur (which it probably will, having a 26% chance
of occurring in 30 years), not much would be affected. The other flooding areas are
encompassed by the shaded and unshaded portions of zone X. The shaded portions of
zone X show areas of either 0.2% chance of flooding per year, areas of 1% chance of
flooding per year with the flood depth being less than 1 foot or drainage area less than 1
square mile, or areas protected by levees. The unshaded portions of zone X show areas
that are outside the 0.2% annual chance of flooding, meaning that they have an even
lower likelihood of occurring than the shaded zone X portions. All of this means that
floods in zone X have either a low likelihood of occurring if they even occur at all, and if
they do occur, their extents are not severe. These areas in zone X are moderate- to lowrisk areas and also do not reach hardly any campus buildings. The estimated extents of
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Figure 9: Average Annual Precipitation in Tennessee
(Source: Tennessee Emergency Management Agency)
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Figure 10: FIRM for Eastern Part of UTK Campus
(Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency)
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Figure 11: FIRM for Western Part of UTK Campus
(Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency)
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Risk

Moderate to
Low Risk
Areas

High Risk
Areas

Table 11: FEMA Flood Zone Designations
Zone
Description
Areas outside the 1-percent annual chance floodplain,
areas of 1% annual chance sheet flow flooding where
average depths are less than 1 foot, areas of 1% annual
B, C,
chance stream flooding where the contributing drainage
and
area is less than 1 square mile, or areas protected from the
X
1% annual chance flood by levees. No Base Flood
Elevations or depths are shown within this zone.
Insurance purchase is not required in these zones.
Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding and a 26%
chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage.
A
Because detailed analyses are not performed for such
areas; no depths or base flood elevations are shown within
these zones.
Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding and a 26%
AE, chance of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. In
A1- most instances, base flood elevations derived from
A30 detailed analyses are shown at selected intervals within
these zones.
Areas with a 1% annual chance of shallow flooding,
usually in the form of a pond, with an average depth
ranging from 1 to 3 feet. These areas have a 26% chance
AH
of flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Base flood
elevations derived from detailed analyses are shown at
selected intervals within these zones.
River or stream flood hazard areas, and areas with a 1% or
greater chance of shallow flooding each year, usually in
the form of sheet flow, with an average depth ranging
AO from 1 to 3 feet. These areas have a 26% chance of
flooding over the life of a 30-year mortgage. Average
flood depths derived from detailed analyses are shown
within these zones.
Areas with a temporarily increased flood risk due to the
building or restoration of a flood control system (such as a
levee or a dam). Mandatory flood insurance purchase
AR requirements will apply, but rates will not exceed the rates
for unnumbered A zones if the structure is built or
restored in compliance with Zone AR floodplain
management regulations.
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Table 11, cont.
Risk

Zone

A99

V
High RiskCoastal Areas
VE,
V1 30

Undetermined
Risk Areas

D

Description
Areas with a 1% annual chance of flooding that will be
protected by a Federal flood control system where
construction has reached specified legal requirements. No
depths or base flood elevations are shown within these
zones.
Coastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and
an additional hazard associated with storm waves. These
areas have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30year mortgage. No base flood elevations are shown within
these zones.
Coastal areas with a 1% or greater chance of flooding and
an additional hazard associated with storm waves. These
areas have a 26% chance of flooding over the life of a 30year mortgage. Base flood elevations derived from
detailed analyses are shown at selected intervals within
these zones.
Areas with possible but undetermined flood hazards. No
flood hazard analysis has been conducted. Flood insurance
rates are commensurate with the uncertainty of the flood
risk.
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flooding based on the FIRMs shows that flooding overall is not a high-probability
occurrence, and the areas affected if flooding does occur are not large.
Past Occurrences
During the past 146 years, severe floods have occurred in Tennessee for 51 of these
years. Some of the floods occurring in Tennessee are described as follows:
December 19, 1990 to January 4, 1991-Six people were killed, and the President
signed a federal disaster declaration for Tennessee to provide disaster assistance
to 22 counties.
February 15-20, 1990-The Tennessee cities of Copperhill (in Polk County) and
Chattanooga (Hamilton County) were damaged by the floods. Several deaths
occurred and thousands were forced to evacuate their homes.
1989-The high rainfall during this year caused damage to Rhea County. No deaths
or injuries occurred from this flooding. Also during this year there was flooding in
East Tennessee from the rainfall effects of Hurricane Hugo.
Mid-March 1973-This was the most destructive flood on the Tennessee River, as
well as its tributaries. Few deaths occurred, but evacuations were necessary, and
damages were great, estimated at $50 million.
March 4-19, 1963-Three different storms occurred over the Appalachian
Mountains as far south as Alabama to as far north as West Virginia, causing
flooding all along its path. Fifty counties in Tennessee sustained damages
including 1,000 damaged bridges, 500,000 damaged acres of cropland, 100,000
damaged acres of winter crops, 1,500 killed livestock, and 3,000 damaged or
destroyed homes.
August 4-5, 1938-Around Webb Mountain (near Sevier County) about 11 inches
of rainfall over a 27 square mile area in 3 to 4 hours caused a flash flood. Extreme
runoff and erosion were created, killing eight people.
January 18, 1935-Heavy rain along the Obion River in West Tennessee caused
water to rise rapidly, quickly breaking levees. The swiftness of the storm caused
many families to be unable to escape the rising water, and they were forced to
climb to roofs and trees. Later that day, the temperature dropped, causing four
inches of snow and deaths from exposure. A total of 19 fatalities occurred from
the mentioned exposure as well as drowning. Sixty-one people sustained ailments
due to the exposure, such as frostbite. Property loss, such as livestock, animal
food, and household items, was hundreds of thousands of dollars, which would be
millions of dollars in today’s inflated dollars.
March 21-23, 1929-This flooding of the Emory River at Harriman was one of the
harshest floods of its size ever in the east United States. In 3½ hours the water
levels in the river rose 22 feet. Every stream in the area flooded, and every town
along the river was flooded. Forty people were killed, and property loss was over
$10 million, which would exceed $100 million in today’s dollars.
1927-The flood on the Ohio, Mississippi, and Cumberland rivers, along with their
tributaries, was one of the worst floods in United States history and was the
second worst flood in Tennessee history. Some areas in the region received over
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24 inches of rain over nine days. Before this rainfall, the ground was already
saturated due to rains late in the previous year, so this extra rain just exacerbated
the flooding. Levees long the Mississippi River broke in 45 locations. The
damages included 162,017 damaged houses, 41,487 destroyed buildings, 200 to
500 fatalities, and $124,648,545 in agricultural losses.
June 1924-Flash flooding occurred in Carter County over a total 150 square mile
area. Rainfall reached 15 inches, which created an 8-10 foot high wall of water.
When this water wall plunged down a narrow valley, two homes were completely
destroyed and nine people were killed, contributing to 11 total fatalities
(Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, 2004).
Knox County specifically has experienced two major floods since 1950. Knoxville also
experienced significant floods in 1808, 1867, and 1939 when the Tennessee River
flooded.
Some more recent floods, while less severe, have occurred in Knoxville and are listed in
Table 12. The descriptions of each flood are as described by the National Climatic Data
Center (NCDC).
The University of Tennessee experiences some flooding every year. An area of particular
concern from flooding is Third Creek. The campus does not have a high likelihood of
flooding from this creek, however, it may be impacted. Storm water runoff is most likely
to cause flooding of the campus. Lake Avenue on campus has had some serious problems
from flooding in the past due to stopped up storm drains and subsequently has caused the
University to lose money. Some of the total monetary losses each year for UTK due to
flooding are shown in Table 13 (National Climatic Data Center, 19 July 2007).
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Unlikely

HURRICANE
As defined by FEMA, a hurricane is a category of tropical cyclone characterized by
thunderstorms and defined surface wind circulation. Hurricanes develop over warm
waters and are caused by the atmospheric instability created by the collision of warm air
with cooler air. Two types of hurricanes exist—wet and dry. Wet hurricanes comprise
mostly of rain and flooding and generally affect both coastal and inland areas, while dry
hurricanes consist of mostly wind and usually affect only coastal areas.
Knoxville is not located directly on a coastline. The closest distance from Knoxville to
the Atlantic Ocean (the nearest coastline) is approximately 315 miles. However, a
hurricane can reach inland as far as 400 miles. Knoxville is located within the reaches of
a hurricane, but at this distant range the effects of the hurricane would likely be very
weakened. Since Knoxville is quite far inland, the majority of these weakened effects
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Date
8/20/93
12/4/93
2/10/94
2/11/94
3/27/94

4/15/94

5/9/95

4/21/97

7/1/97

4/17/98

4/18/98

Table 12: Reported Floods in Knox County
Type
Damage
Description
2 inches of rain flooded a few roads and
Flash Flood
$5K
underpasses.
Flash Flood
$1K Several roads were flooded.
Flash Flood
$5K Not Available
Flash Flood
$1K Not Available
Flash Flood
$50K Not Available
Heavy rainfall produced flash flooding
across the southeast corner of Tennessee.
Numerous roads were closed because of the
Flash Flood
$50K
flash flooding. Some rock and mud slides
occurred as well. An apartment complex
was flooded in Knox County.
Several roads were closed due to flooding.
Flash Flood
$5K One family was trapped in their car on one
of these roads.
Heavy rain over several hours resulted in
Flash Flood
$0K flash flooding. Parts of I-40 were
underwater.
Flash flooding in the Shipetown area
resulted in a tractor trailer and several cars
stalling in flooding from Flat Creek along
Flash Flood
$0K
Mine Road. Several individuals, including
the tractor trailer driver, had to be rescued
from their vehicles.
Long-lived heavy rain event caused
evacuations of apartments throughout the
Flood
$0K
county. Numerous roads underwater and
impassable throughout county.
Urban/Small
Road near West Town Mall flooded. 2
$0K
Stream Flood
inches of rain per hour near Karns.

5/7/98

Urban/Small
Stream Flood

5/21/98

Urban/Small
Stream Flood

Flooding on Emory Road and Norris
Freeway.
TV meteorologist reported flooding in Duck
Pond area of Fountain City. Storm spotters
reported 10 inches of water on Merchant
$0K
Drive near Red Lobster. Broadway and
Dutch Valley Road flooded. Water across I275 near Baxter.
$0K
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Table 12, cont.
Date

Type

Damage

Description
Storm spotter reported junction of John
$0K Sevier and Asheville Highway was flooded
up to car bumpers.

5/21/98

Urban/Small
Stream Flood

6/1/98

Urban/Small
Stream Flood

$0K Several roads still flooded and impassable.

6/1/98

Urban/Small
Stream Flood

Alcoa Highway near the Navy/Marine
$0K Corps Reserve Center was impassable due
to water across the road.

6/2/98

Urban/Small
Stream Flood

$0K Numerous streets closed due to flooding.

6/2/98

Urban/Small
Stream Flood

$0K

7/11/99

Flood

$0K

4/4/00

Flood

$0K

8/30/01

Urban/Small
Stream Flood

$0K

1/23/02

Flood

$0K

3/17/02

Flood

$5M

Apartment building evacuated due to
flooding at Knox Lane and Fair Drive.
Widespread showers and thunderstorms
with heavy rain caused flooding problems
throughout much of East Tennessee. In
Knox County many cars were stranded in
flooded underpasses.
Many roads impassable.
Many roads in the Cedar Bluff, Cross Park
and Bridgewater areas were flooded and
closed. Several persons had to be evacuated
from cars.
Prolonged heavy rain throughout the day
resulted in numerous road closings across
much of central East Tennessee.
Widespread flooding occurred across most
of East Tennessee with the hardest hit
counties in central East Tennessee including
Bledsoe, Meigs, Roane, Rhea, Loudon,
Blount, Knox, and Sevier Counties. Rainfall
totals between five and eight inches were
reported in 36 hours. Numerous major
rivers flooded including the Clinch, Powell,
Sequatchie, and Pigeon Rivers.
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Table 12, cont.
Date

Type

Damage

3/17/02

Flash Flood

2/14/03

Flood

2/16/03

Flash Flood

$0K

2/21/03

Flood

$0K

4/10/03

Flood

$0K

$0K

$18.1M

Description
Widespread flooding occurred across most
of East Tennessee. Rainfall totals between
five and eight inches were reported in 36
hours. Total damage estimates were
calculated to be over 5 million dollars.
Four day rainfall totals of two to eight
inches fell across east Tennessee, with the
highest amounts occurring across the
Cumberland Plateau and adjacent valleys
areas. This rainfall combined with a melting
snowpack (reports of up to a foot in the
higher elevations) to produce widespread
flooding of rivers and streams with
numerous mudslides also reported (one
notable mudslide pushed an apartment
complex off its foundation in Knox
County). The Powell, Clinch and Holston
rivers measured the most significant rises
with Claiborne, Rhea and Knox counties
reporting the most significant damage.
Seventy roads reported to be flooded with
some closed. One injury reported in an
apartment complex which was destroyed by
a mudslide.
With the ground already saturated from the
previous week's rainfall, three day rainfall
totals of one to three inches created some
flooding of streams and rivers as well as
several mudslides across east Tennessee.
Rivers which rose above their flood stages
included the South Chickamauga, Clinch,
Powell, Holston, Pigeon, French Broad and
Sequatchie rivers.
Seven day rainfall totals of three to five
inches were reported across central east
Tennessee and northeast Tennessee, with
one to three inches occurring on the 10th.
Several secondary roads across the area
were flooded with several rivers
experiencing some minor flooding including
the Clinch, French Broad, Holston, Pigeon
and Powell rivers.
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Table 12, cont.
Date

Type

Damage

Description

Kingston Pike and Gleason Road flooded
$2.8M and closed. Some sinkholes filled to
overflowing, minor mudslides.

5/5/03

Flash Flood

6/14/04

Flash Flood

$10K

6/17/04

Flash Flood

$300K

7/6/05

Flash Flood

$0K

8/4/06

Flash Flood

$0K

9/23/06

Flash Flood

$0K

9/23/06

Flash Flood

$0K

9/23/06

Flash Flood

$0K

Car submerged on Kingston Pike as flash
flood waters invaded area.
"Shoulder deep" water covered the parking
of an apartment complex in Bearden,
covering some vehicles and invading
several units. Also, water filled the parking
of a popular restaurant in Bearden,
completely submerging several vehicles.
Three feet of water on Interstate 40 at
Papermill Road.
Thunderstorm rains produced four feet of
water at the intersection of Cumberland and
Poplar Streets in Knoxville.
Water ran into basements in the Cedar Bluff
area from thunderstorms with extremely
heavy rain.
A stationary thunderstorm complex
produced over two inches of rain on one
hour, creating flooding which made several
roads impassable in the Cedar Bluff area.
Flooding from stationary thunderstorms
caused flooding of streets in downtown
Knoxville and in the west end of the county.
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Table 13: Dollar Loss for University of Tennessee Due to Flooding
Year
Gross Dollar Loss
1994
$113,034
1995
$315,887
1996
$118,417
1997
$148,683
1998
$270,364
1999
$286,078
2000
$80,824
2001
$117,106
2002
$55,334
2003
$1,133,691
Average
$263,942

would be rain. The worst effects that this increased rain would likely have on the UTK
campus would be flooding of existing bodies of water. This event would essentially be
the same as a flood event for the campus. For a more detailed discussion on the possible
flooding effects, refer to the “Flood” section of this report.
Also, some of the high winds from the coast of the storm could reach Knoxville if the
storm was severe enough. The wind effects from a dry hurricane are comparable to a
windstorm event. For a more detailed discussion on the effects of this wind, refer to the
“Tornado” section of this report.
Past Occurrences
Information from the National Hurricane Center’s website reported that there have been
35 hurricanes to affect Knox County since 1896, which is an average of about one
hurricane every three years. The details of these hurricanes are displayed in Table 14.
Notable is the fact that the highest wind speed Knox County has experienced due to a
hurricane is 55 mph, which is lower than ASCE 7 Building Standard’s requirement that
buildings be designed for wind speeds of 90 mph.
Some of the most damaging hurricanes to affect Knoxville include Hurricanes Ivan,
Andrew and Katrina. In Tennessee these hurricanes did not cause any casualties, but they
did produce monetary damage. A more detailed history and profile of these hurricanes
follows.
Hurricane Ivan was a Category 5 (the most extreme) hurricane and is the strongest
hurricane recorded to affect Knoxville. Hurricane Ivan passed as close as 45 miles to the
east of Knoxville as displayed in Figure 12.This hurricane generated 3-7 inches of rain
throughout the eastern Tennessee Valley (containing Knoxville), causing flash floods and
power outages. Around 15,000 people were left without power in the state of Tennessee,
which is only 0.5% of the 2.9 million people who normally have electricity. However,
15,000 is a significant number of people to be without power. Ivan also damaged a 2654

inch natural gas pipeline operated by Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.. The hurricane caused
tornado damage all throughout the Southeastern United States, although none actually
occurred in Tennessee. Ivan was responsible for 124 deaths, again, none in Tennessee
(United States Department of Energy, 2004).
Hurricane Andrew was a Category 4 hurricane, and has been recorded as the second most
expensive natural disaster in United States history, causing nearly $25 billion in damages.
It produced about 3 inches of rain in Tennessee and also caused tornadoes throughout the
Southeast, although none occurred in Tennessee. Hurricane Andrew caused 65 deaths
(none in Tennessee) (National Hurricane Center, 24 June 2007).
Also affecting Knoxville was Hurricane Katrina, causing total damages throughout the
country of $200 billion. This hurricane was one of the most devastating natural disasters
in the history of the United States. Tennessee was not affected nearly as much as other
states, such as Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi. The path of Hurricane Katrina was
more in Middle and Western Tennessee rather than East Tennessee where Knoxville is
located. However, some effects were felt in Tennessee. Rainfall of 4 to 8 inches fell over
parts of the Tennessee Valley and wind gusts of up to almost 50 mph were measured in
East Tennessee. Aside from the meteorological effects the hurricane had on Tennessee, it
also affected the population. Over 16,000 refugees evacuated southern states to relocate
into Tennessee, and UTK housed a number of student refugees from other universities
forced to close due to the hurricane (National Hurricane Center, 25 June 2007).
All of these systems described did not produce the damage anywhere near seen in coastal
areas because of the distance of Knoxville from the coast. By the time the storms had
reached Knoxville, they were weakened; however, while they did not produce excessive
amounts of damaging winds, they did all bring above average amounts of rain, which
caused some flooding. This flooding due to hurricane events was distinguished as an area
of concern, which is why hurricane events were included in the list of hazard events for
the UTK campus.
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Occasional

LAND SUBSIDENCE/KARST
Karst is a common underground condition in East Tennessee resulting in ground fissures,
sinkholes, underground streams, and caverns. Most of Tennessee’s geography contains
some karst, but East Tennessee is one of the areas in Tennessee containing more karst
than others. East Tennessee also suffers more sinkholes than other parts of the state.
Sinkholes are the main area of concern regarding the effects of karst because they are
what cause structural damage. The prevalence of sinkholes in East Tennessee is
illustrated in Figure 13, with a lower sinkhole index indicating more sinkholes. Boring
logs specifically taken from the UTK campus indicate that it is constructed on
underground caves.
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Table 14: Hurricanes Affecting Knox County
Wind Speed in Knox
Name
Date
County (mph)
None
July 8, 1896
30
None
July 9, 1896
30
None
October 10, 1905
25
None
October 11, 1905
25
None
September 18, 1906
30
None
September 5, 1915
45
None
September 5, 1915
30
None
August 15, 1928
30
None
August 16, 1928
30
None
October 17, 1932
20
None
October 18, 1932
20
None
October 18, 1932
15
None
June 18, 1934
35
None
August 18, 1939
25
None
August 13, 1940
35
None
August 14, 1940
35
Eloise
September 23, 1975
55
Eloise
September 24, 1975
30
Eloise
September 24, 1975
20
Danny
August 17, 1985
30
Danny
August 18, 1985
25
Andrew
August 28, 1992
20
Opal
October 5, 1995
30
Bill
July 2, 2003
20
Frances
September 8, 2004
25
Ivan
September 17, 2004
25
Ivan
September 17, 2004
20
≈50 in Monroe County
Katrina
August 30, 2005
(nearby county)
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Figure 12: Hurricane Ivan Path
(Source: National Hurricane Center)

Figure 13: Sinkholes Throughout Tennessee
(Source: Shofner, Mills, and Duke)
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Past Occurrences
There have been numerous incidents of damage due to karst on the UTK campus. Some
noteworthy past land subsidence events and preventative measures are as follows:
Outdoor Pool at the Aquatic Center—A void opened up under an older pool,
tearing the bottom of the pool out and completely emptying the entire pool. Tens
of thousands of gallons of pool water were dumped into the ground, but it was
never determined where this water went. The pool had to be totally replaced with
the pool that is currently at the Aquatic Center
ROTC Building—This was an old building, which used to be beside a football
practice field. It was a rectangular shaped building built over the tip of a ridge of
underlying rock. Since this building’s middle coincided with the ridge of the rock,
the edges of the building settled differentially and the building cracked down
middle.
Intersection of Henley and Main Street—In 1936 a massive sinkhole opened up
and engulfed a car. The same hole has reopened in 1951, 1962, and 1998, causing
broken pipe lines.
Neyland Stadium—During the replacement of some artificial turf here, several
rainstorms came and eroded soil (unprotected from the artificial turf) in the
northwest corner of the stadium into an underground void. The rainwater
essentially cleaned off the soil on top of the underlying rock. After this event, the
void was filled up with a soil and concrete mixture.
11th Street Parking Garage—During construction at least three instances of soil
being completely washed away from bedrock into a cave occurred in the same
manner as the incident in Neyland Stadium.
Circle Park—During construction of this building a cave was discovered lying
underneath the future building’s footprint. The top of the cave was blown off with
dynamite and filled with concrete to prevent any collapses.
Thompson Boling Arena—A significantly-sized cave was discovered on the
southern side of this building that could have possibly sunk in sometime in the
future and was repaired before any damage occurred.
Andy Holt Avenue—Various sinkholes in the past have opened up and caused
busted pipes. Knoxville is an old city and has lots of old pipes that are likely to
break due to the stress of a sinkhole.
Cumberland Avenue—Various sinkholes here also have caused broken pipes.
(Berry, 2007)
Hoskins Library—Extensive settlement due to a five year drought occurred in the
shrinking soil underlying the Kefauver wing of this building, causing very large
cracks in walls and ceilings. The area of the building that is experiencing
cracking, including one elevator, was closed to students. The building is currently
being repaired with the $1.5 million that UTK has budgeted for the project
(Dunlap, 2007).
No significant damages have occurred to anything on campus from land subsidence. All
of the damages have been minor, such as building cracks or pipe bustings, as opposed to
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building collapses. Underground cave-ins will definitely occur in the future, as the
campus is filled with them. However, the underground caves that underlay UTK’s
campus are smaller in diameter compared to others over the country, usually being only 4
to 5 feet in diameter. (Berry, 2007)
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Occasional

LANDSLIDE
The UTK campus is located in the mountainous and hilly East Tennessee region, where
landslides are prone to occur due to the inclines of the topography. For this reason, a
landslide event was included in the list of possible events that could affect UTK.
Although the campus is located in a region of widely sloping topography, the campus
itself does not contain many areas of steeply sloping soil. The primary areas on campus
with the greatest slope include a 45º natural slope beside the Pasqua Nuclear Engineering
Building and some steep fill soil slopes (also approximately 45º) on the west side of
campus near the tennis courts, which are included in the topographic map of campus in
Figure 14. However, these primary areas and most other lesser sloping areas are
underlain by rock and are very stable (Drumm, 2007).
Past Occurrences
There have been no past occurrences of landslides on the UTK campus.
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Unlikely

RADIATION FALLOUT
Radiation fallout is not an event of high occurrence anywhere in the United States,
however, it was considered due to the fact that the UTK campus is located about 30 miles
to the east of the Department of Energy’s largest science and energy laboratory, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). In 1943 ORNL was the location for the separation
of plutonium for the Manhattan Project during World War II to essentially create the
world’s first atomic bomb. It currently has an annual budget of $1.06 billion (Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, 2007).
One location of particular interest is the Y-12 National Security Complex, which is a
United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration facility
located near ORNL. This facility manufactures nuclear weapons components, performs
reliability and maintenance testing on existing nuclear weapons, and also contains highly
enriched uranium. Therefore, the possibility of radiation fallout on the UTK campus was
considered a possible event due to the close proximity of the Y-12 nuclear facility.
Another location considered was the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, a TVA-owned and
-operated plant. This nuclear plant has a 50 mile radius “planning zone” surrounding it,
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Figure 14: Topographic Map of UTK Campus
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which contains all areas that might be affected by radiation release. UTK is outside this
50 mile planning zone, therefore, effects from an event at Watts Bar would be negligible
in Knoxville.
Other threats from radiation release could be at locations other than nuclear plants,
including “dirty” bombs created from a radiological theft and then released at any
location on campus. However, all radioactive material is accounted for by a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) license and any loss of stolen material would be reported
immediately. Another threat for radiation release would be the transport of radiological
materials on an Interstate or other road in which the vehicle was involved in an accidental
crash, releasing harmful materials. However, before most radiological transports, an
accidental release scenario is usually taken into account, and the material is packaged
very resiliently, thus probably not affecting the campus. Both of these threats are very
unlikely to occur because they have such rigid restrictions around them (Flanagan, 2007).
Past Occurrences
There have only been several past occurrences of radiation releases at ORNL—most of
them minor and contained on the ORNL or Y-12 sites. However, in two events, this was
not the case. On May 15, 2004 radiation was released into an area not contained by
ORNL and out in the public. On June 16, 1958 an even worse event occurred. This event
was a criticality accident, which is caused when a nuclear chain reaction accidentally
occurs, releasing highly dangerous neutron radiation. These events along with other less
serious events are described more in detail as follows:
June 16, 1958—At Y-12 a criticality accident occurred, caused from highly
enriched uranium being mixed in an unsafe container. Eight men were
hospitalized, some having acute radiation sickness characterized by nausea,
vomiting, skin burns, bleeding gums, and fatigue. All but two of the victims are
now deceased, many from cancer, neurological disorders and other ailments they
claimed (though not officially proven) to have been caused by their radiation
exposure. The radiation did not leave the area of the plant. This is the only
criticality event ever to occur at Y-12 (Munger, 2006).
1970s-Radioactive material was released into the White Oak Creek, which runs
through ORNL burial grounds for radioactive waste. This creek eventually
connects with the Clinch River and then empties into Watts Bar Lake, a source of
drinking water. Current testing shows that radioactivity levels are too low to
affect anyone who lives near or uses these water sources (Flanagan, 2007).
September 7, 1993—At ORNL several tubes containing iridium (a radioactive
material) ruptured releasing radioactive material. The radiation was contained and
exposure to workers was very low (Munger, 1993).
December 8, 1999—At Y-12 a chemical explosion of sodium potassium liquid
occurred, injuring 11 workers including one who was severely burned. Lockheed
Martin Energy Systems, the manager of Y-12, was blamed with failing to
correctly identify the hazards of explosion of the sodium potassium and also did
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not correctly train workers on how to clean up a chemical spill. For these reasons,
Lockheed Martin was fined $1 million (Munger, 2000).
October 6, 2003—In Building 2026 of ORNL, nuclear materials were spilled
when a clogged waste drain overflowed. Two workers were exposed to radiation
when they rushed to clean up the mess before assessing the hazard of the
situation. They also did not regard radiation alarms by leaving. They were not
exposed to high levels of radiation and also were not exposed for long. UTBattelle (manager of ORNL) paid $55,000 in fines for this safety blunder
(Munger, 2004).
May 15, 2004—A truck hauling radioactive waste to its disposal site leaked
several drops of this liquid material (strontium 90) over a 25-foot stretch of
Highway 95. This section of highway was shut down and the radioactive sections
of pavement were torn up and repaved with new, non-radioactive asphalt. About
150 people had to work continuously to test the radiation, determine contaminated
areas, and repave the road to clean up this spill. The estimated cost of cleanup of
this spill is between $1 million and $2.5 million. No negative health effects or
injuries due to this spill have been reported. The contractor at fault from this spill,
Bechtel Jacobs Co., was fined $250,000 (Mitchell and Munger, 2004).
Despite all of these occurrences of radiation release in Oak Ridge, no known radiation or
nuclear waste has affected the UTK campus in the past. The chances of an event
occurring that could harm the UTK campus are extremely small. In order for radiation to
be released to affect the campus, a sabotage event would most likely have to occur to
intentionally release large amounts of nuclear material from the Y-12 facility. For this
material to reach the campus, wind conditions would have to be precise. If the material
finally did reach campus, no negative health effects would be present because the
radioactive material would likely be dispersed as it approached Knoxville, making the
radiation levels only slightly above what is already present. The threat of a radiation
event affecting UTK is extremely low (Flanagan, 2007).
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Unlikely

SEVERE STORM
A severe storm for the purposes of this report is defined to be a storm that contains any or
all of the following:
Hail
Heavy Rains
High winds
Lightning
While it is impractical to consider any of these event as a separate, singular event to be
analyzed (excluding heavy rains, for which the effects are described more in detail in the
Flooding section of this report), for the sake of illustrating the level at which any of these
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events specifically can affect Knoxville, a discussion of past occurrences is provided in
the following section.
Also, a more extensive paper on the specific event of hailstorms throughout the United
States has been developed by State Farm Insurance Company. It is published by the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)-2008.
Past Occurrences
A total of 203 severe thunderstorms and accompanying high winds have been reported by
the NCDC to affect Knox County since 1950. This is an average of almost 4 severe
storms per year, which is a high frequency of occurrence. It would be impractical to list
all 203 of these storms, but a listing of some of the stronger and more damaging storms as
obtained from the NCDC website follow. The monetary damages listed are not exclusive
to Knox County. They include total damages throughout the extents of the storm.
$2 million in damages (October 5, 1995)-A large part of East Tennessee
experienced high winds from the remnants of Hurricane Opal. Wind speeds at the
higher elevations of the Appalachians were measured at 70 mph while 40-50 mph
gusts were common at the lower elevations. Trees and power lines were down
over much of the region. The greatest damage occurred in Hamilton County
where damage was estimated in excess of $1 million. Over 20 thousand homes
were without power as a result of the storm. Over 70 miles of the Appalachian
Trail was closed due to trees being down.
$610,000 in damages (December 1, 2006)-Wind speeds measured at 77 mph
caused numerous trees and power lines to go down throughout East Tennessee.
$500,000 in damages (May 24, 1996)-Trees and power lines went down and
some very minor injuries were reported. The stage set and lighting equipment of a
county music singer was severely damages. Hail the size of ping pong balls was
reported.
$500,000 in damages (January 28, 1994)-Numerous trees were blown down and
roofs were blown off all throughout southeast corner of the Tennessee. A building
containing 6 helicopters was destroyed in Maryville, which is in very close
proximity to Knoxville.
$75,000 in damages (July 4, 1997)-Trees were blown down from the Concord
area to Chapman Highway, which contains the UTK campus. A section of roof
was blown off a building at Baptist Hospital (National Climatic Data Center, 3
Aug 2007).
A total of 83 hail events have been reported in Knox County since 1950. A breakdown of
the decade in which these events occurred is shown in Figure 15. These hail events
produced hail with an average diameter of 1.15 inches (29.2 mm) and caused reported
damages of over $56,000 dollars since 1950 (National Climatic Data Center, 19 July
2007).
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Knox County Hail Events
1960s
6%

1970s
2%
1980s
2%

2000s
36%

1990s
54%

Figure 15: Knox County Hail Events

An average of 62 people are killed every year by lightning in the United States (National
Weather Service, 2007). The most recent major lightning events reported in Knox County
were on September 1, 1995 and August 4, 2006. During the 1995 event lightning struck a
house at 11:30 pm and caused $40,000 worth of damage. During the 2006 event,
lightning struck an apartment building on Middlebrook Pike at 2:50 pm and caught the
roof on fire. Several units were damaged, and one was destroyed causing $25,000 worth
of damage (National Climatic Data Center, 19 July 2007).
For a detailed discussion of the effects of high winds on the UTK campus, refer to both
the “Tornado” and “Hurricane” sections of this report. Also, for a detailed discussion of
heavy rains on the campus, refer to the “Flooding.”
While the likelihood for a severe storm is at least one storm per year (making it a highly
likely event), some of its effects, hail and high winds, only have an occasional likelihood
of occurrence. Heavy rains and lightning, on the other hand, have a highly likelihood of
occurrence.
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Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Occasional (Hail and High Winds); Highly
Likely (Heavy Rains and Lightning)

SEVERE WINTER STORM
A severe winter storm consists of an assortment of events, including snowstorms and ice
storms. Snowstorms can be hazardous due to limited visibility and maneuverability while
driving, people being trapped in buildings and cars, inability of emergency services to
respond to emergencies due to road blockage, and caving of roofs and power lines. Ice
storms can impede driving, as well as cause above-ground power and telephone lines to
collapse, leaving the campus or parts of campus with no electricity or phone service.
Figure 16 shows the drastic effects ice can have on power lines.
Past Occurrences
On average, one winter storm has occurred every five years in Tennessee. In 1993 a
winter storm occurred in Eastern Tennessee, causing 18 fatalities and $18 million in
damages. In 1994 a winter storm covered two-thirds of Tennessee, causing $100 million
in damages.
Twenty-five snow and ice storms have been reported for Knox County since 1950. These
storms have caused a total of $501,000 worth of damage in the county, but caused no

Figure 16: Power Lines During Ice Storm
(Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)
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reported deaths or injuries. A list of these storms can be seen in Table 15 (Tennessee
Emergency Management Agency, 1 July 2007).
One ice storm and one snowstorm have affected the UTK campus in the past 25 years.
The ice storm occurred in February of 1994 causing a total of $500 million worth of
damages, 1 death and 770,000 people without electricity in various southeastern states.
The damage was the 2nd worst in the country (behind Mississippi) (Lott and Sittel, 2007).
The snowstorm affecting campus occurred March 12-13, 1993. Snow depths averaged 15
inches in Knoxville and as much as 30 inches in the nearby Great Smoky Mountains.
Forty-thousand people were without power for several days in Knoxville (the largest
power outage in Knoxville’s history), and all the major interstates north of Atlanta were
closed. The total number of people killed by the storm was 270, five of those being in
Knoxville (Brown, 2003).
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Occasional

TERRORISTS
While terrorism events throughout the majority of the United States are quite unlikely,
they must be considered due to their random and unpredictable nature. The risk is always
present for various extremist individuals to be displeased with university research,
policies, or happenings and to show this displeasure with violence. Various specific
terrorist acts of concern for UTK include plane crashes into buildings, bombings on large
congregations of people (such as sporting events, residence halls, large office buildings,
large auditoriums, and student centers), gunfire, and chemical releases.
Past Occurrences
Most acts of terrorism in the United States are directed towards government buildings
and officials. The most notable of these terrorist acts would be the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, otherwise known at the “9/11 attacks,” in which about 3,000 people
were killed when four airline jets were hijacked. Two planes were intentionally crashed
into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, one crashed into the Pentagon, and the
last plane was unintentionally crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. While most terrorism
acts are not this severe and are focused on government, some have occurred in schools
and universities. There have been 23 shootings in colleges and universities throughout the
United States. Some of the more damaging school shootings in U.S. history are as
follows:
University of Texas-On August 1, 1966 Charles Whitman killed 14 people and
wounded 31, while shooting a rifle from an observation deck. He killed his wife
and mother before going on his shooting rampage, which ended in him being
killed by police. During his autopsy it was discovered that he had a brain tumor,
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: Severe Winter Storms in Knox County
Date
Type
Description
Much of East Tennessee received snow. The
mountains were the hardest hit areas with up to 20
12/20/1993
Snow
inches of snow reported. Several roads were closed
due to the snow.
Up to 2 inches of snow fell on parts of Northeast
1/14/1994
Snow
Tennessee.
A major ice storm hit much of Tennessee. Numerous
trees were knocked down. Many of these trees took
2/9/1994
Ice Storm
down power lines as well. About 770,000 people in
the state lost power for some period of time.
A strong low pressure system from the Gulf Coast
region brought up to one foot of snow to parts of East
Tennessee. Numerous trees and power lines fell.
1/6/1996
Winter Storm Many roads became impassable shutting down
schools and businesses across the area. Numerous
auto accidents occurred. There were also isolated
incidents of collapsed roofs.
Heavy snow accumulations of 4-8 inches caused
numerous power outages and car accidents.
1/11/1996 Winter Storm
Numerous trees fell as well. Schools and businesses
were closed.
Snowfall amounts across Knox County were 6-8
inches. Numerous minor traffic accidents were
reported though no major accidents. Some specific
snow amounts reported were: West Knox Marina,
2/2/1996
Winter Storm
Hamblen County Boat Dock, and Rhea County Boat
Dock reported collapsed roofs due to the weight of
the snow and a number of boats were damaged or
sunk.
A strong upper level disturbance brought heavy snow
showers to the area resulting in widespread icy roads
12/18/1996 Winter Storm and hazardous driving conditions. Across northeast
Tennessee, amounts were generally from 1-2½
inches.
An arctic cold front and associated upper level
disturbance swept through the southern
Appalachians. Snowfall amounts were 1-3 inches in
1/10/1997 Winter Storm
southeast Tennessee, 2-4 inches across the northern
Cumberland plateau and central east Tennessee, and
3-5 inches in northeast Tennessee.
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Table 15, cont.
Date

Type

12/30/1997 Winter Storm

2/4/1998

12/22/1998

Winter Storm

Ice Storm

1/6/1999

Winter Storm

3/13/1999

Winter Storm

1/22/2000

Winter Storm

12/2/2000

Winter Storm

Description
A series of fast-moving upper level disturbances
caused heavy snow shower activity across East
Tennessee. Amounts were generally 2-5 inches, with
locally higher amounts in higher elevations.
A strong storm system over the southeast dumped
generally 2-5 inches across the southern Cumberland
Plateau. Across the northern part of the Plateau, 6-12
inches fell. As many as 50,000 customers were
without power.
The ice storm left minor accumulations of ice in
valley locations due to warm ground temperatures.
Most of the ice was on trees and bridges. Most roads
were only wet. In higher elevations, the ice was much
heavier.
Generally less than 2 inches of snow fell across East
Tennessee, resulting in numerous school closings and
traffic accidents.
A very wet weather system brought heavy amounts of
rain to East Tennessee. Heavy rain began early
Saturday morning, changed to heavy snow in some
places during the day Saturday, back to rain Saturday
night, then finally to snow Sunday night. There were
also isolated reports of freezing rain. Rainfall
amounts across much of East Tennessee was 1-2
inches. Snowfall amounts in northeast Tennessee
averaged 1-3 inches.
Generally 2-4 inches of snow fell across central and
northeast portions of East Tennessee, with only a few
reports of amounts in the 1-2 inch range and 4-5 inch
range. In southeast sections of East Tennessee,
generally a mixture of sleet and freezing rain fell,
with ice accumulation around 1/8 of an inch.
Widespread snow fell across East Tennessee.
Amounts varied widely. In northeast Tennessee,
snowfall amounts averaged 1-3 inches, with a few
spots in the mountains reporting 2-4 inches. In central
East Tennessee, amounts ranged from 1-3 inches,
with a few isolated reports of 3-5 inches. In southeast
Tennessee, amounts were a bit heavier. Snowfall
amounts averaged 2-4 inches, with a few places
reporting 3-5 inches.
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Table 16, cont.
Date

Type

12/18/2000 Winter Storm

Description
Widespread light snow fell across East Tennessee.
Amounts in counties in the valley generally ranged
from 1-2 inches. In the higher mountain elevations,
amounts were a bit higher, averaging 2-4 inches.
Low pressure moved northeast across the southern
Appalachians, bringing light snow to the region.
Across most of East Tennessee, amounts were under
1 inch.
Winter storm brought a wide range of amounts to
East Tennessee. In central East Tennessee, amounts
were generally 2-4 inches, with a few spots receiving
as much as 5 inches, and as little as a half inch.
A storm system moved from the southern plains
across the Tennessee Valley of Alabama into the
southern Appalachians bringing snowfall amounts
ranging from 2-8 inches across eastern Tennessee.
The higher accumulations were concentrated across
extreme northeast sections of the state.

1/20/2001

Winter Storm

1/5/2002

Winter Storm

1/16/2003

Winter Storm

1/22/2003

A strong upper level disturbance moved southeast
from the northern plains and Midwest states across
eastern Tennessee producing significant snowfall
Winter Storm
amounts. Snowfall amounts ranged from 2-5 inches
in the lower elevations while higher elevations across
the region picked up totals ranging from 5-8 inches.

2/9/2003

1/9/2004
2/26/2004

1/29/2005

Three to six inches of snow was reported across most
of the Cumberland Plateau, with up to 4 inches of
Heavy Snow
snow reported across portions of the far eastern
Tennessee mountains.
The storm produced snowfall amounts ranging from
Winter Storm 1-4 inches. Most of East Tennessee averaged 2-3
inches of snow.
Heavy Snow 3-6 inches of snow.
A mixture of freezing rain and sleet across the lower
elevations and a mixture of sleet and snow across the
higher terrain. Much of the region ended up with ice
Ice Storm
accumulation around one quarter inch with some
locations measuring as much as one half inch of ice.
Trees and power lines were downed across parts of
the region due to ice accumulation.
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which some believe caused his mental instability. This incident led a movement
toward the creation of modern SWAT teams.
Oak Ridge, Tennessee—On November 12, 1972 three men hijacked a Southern
Airlines plane and demanded $10 million. They threatened to crash the plane into
one of the nuclear facilities in Oak Ridge if their demands weren’t met. They
ended up departing to Cuba after being promised $2 million. In Cuba they were
arrested and convicted of their crime. No one was hurt and no damage was done
from this event (Beavers 7 Aug 2007).
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill-On January 26, 1995 a schizophrenic
law student killed two and injured two others with a rifle.
Columbine High School-On April 20, 1999 two students went on a shooting
rampage in Colorado, killing 13 people and wounding 24 others before both
committing suicide. They used various shotguns, handguns, rifles, and bombs
during their massacre. The cause of the rampage is thought to be due to many
things including feelings of isolation, being outcasts and bullied, depression, and
previous violent natures.
University of Arizona-On October 28, 2002 a 41-year-old nursing student who
was failing the nursing program shot and killed three nursing professors before
committing suicide.
West Nickel Mines Amish School-On October 2, 2006 a 32-year old milk-tank
truck driver went on a shooting rampage in this one-room school house. He
injured 5 girls and killed 5 more girls between the ages of 7 and 13 and then
committed suicide. He was thought to have had mental problems and have been a
sexual deviant.
Virginia Tech University-On April 16, 2007 23-year-old South Korean immigrant
and Virginia Tech student Seung-Hui Cho killed 32 people and wounded 25
others before committing suicide while on a shooting massacre. This was the
deadliest shooting in modern U.S. history. It is unclear as to why Cho went on his
killing rampage, but some speculate his tendency to be a loner, his hatred of the
wealthy, and his past occurrences of mental illness (he had undergone psychiatric
treatment previously) contributed to his decision to go on a killing rampage.
School shootings that have occurred in Tennessee are as follows:
Richland High School-On November 15, 1995 in Lynnville a 17-year-old male
student went on a shooting rampage which resulted in 2 dead and 1 injured.
Campbell County Comprehensive High School-In Jacksboro on November 8,
2005 a 15-year-old student killed 1 and injured 2 others (“List of School-Related
Attacks,” 2007).
No past occurrences of terrorism exist for the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Unlikely
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TORNADO
Since tornadoes are most prevalent in the Midwest, Southeast (region containing UTK),
and Southwest United States, as stated in the FEMA State and Local Mitigation Planning
how-to guide: Understanding Your Risks, tornadoes were considered as an event to
explore more.
The design wind speed for Knoxville was found using FEMA’s Design Wind Speed Map
for Community Shelters, which is based on design wind speeds created by the American
Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). This wind speed map is shown in Figure 17. On this
map, Knoxville is symbolized by the dot. It can be seen from this map that Knoxville is
located within Zone III, meaning that community shelters should be designed for 200
mph winds.
Also, shown in Figure 18 is a map of tornado activity and frequency in the United States.
Knoxville is located within the region of 1 to 5 tornadoes per 1,000 square miles, which
is on the lower end of the frequency spectrum. Knoxville is not located within the
boundaries of “Tornado Alley,” which is an area in the United States that gets
proportionately more tornadoes than anywhere else besides Florida. Tornadoes within
“Tornado Alley” can reach Category F3 and above on the Fujita Tornado Measurement
Scale, which are considered to be strong to violent tornadoes. The ridges and valleys
characteristic of East Tennessee minimize the risk from tornadoes in Knoxville. Since
Knoxville is not located within “Tornado Alley,” its tornadoes can generally be assumed
to be anywhere from Category F0 to F2 on the Fujita Scale (shown in Table 16). In the
United States, 80% of all tornadoes are Category F0 or F1, so the likelihood of a higher
intensity tornado occurring in Knoxville is not high. Category F0 to F2 tornadoes range
from causing light damage to considerable damage (“Tornado,” 2007).
It should be noted that while the Fujita Scale is used for tornado measurement in this
report, the Enhanced Fujita Scale (EF-Scale) has currently been adopted in order to
improve tornado measurements and provide a more consistent measurement of tornado
damage. This scale was only recently adopted; therefore, all measurements previously
made and included in this report were done using the Fujita Scale and were kept that way
for practicality and accuracy purposes. The EF-Scale and its relation to the Fujita Scale
can be seen in the appendix.
Past Occurrences
A list of all tornadoes occurrences in Knox County (the county where Knoxville and the
UTK campus are located) occurring for the years 1950 to 1995 can be found in Table 17.
As seen from this table, only seven tornadoes occurred in Knox County for that 45 year
interval, which is not a significant amount. Of these tornadoes, most caused only light to
moderate damage, and hardly any fatalities occurred (Tornado Project Online, 2007 and
National Climatic Data Center, 3 Aug 2007).
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Figure 17: Design Wind Speed Map
(Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency)
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Figure 18: Tornado Activity in the United States
(Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)
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Tornado
Category

F0

F1

F2

F3

F4

F5

F6-F12

Table 17: Fujita Tornado Measurement Scale
Maximum
Typical Effects
Wind Speeds
Gale Tornado. Light Damage: Some damage to
chimneys; breaks twigs and branches off tress;
40-72 mph
pushes over shallow-rooted trees; damages
(35-62 kt)
signboards; some windows broken; hurricane wind
speed begins at 73 mph.
Moderate Tornado. Moderate damage: Peels
surfaces off roofs; mobile homes pushed off
73-112 mph
foundations or overturned; outbuildings demolished;
(63-97 kt)
moving autos pushed off the roads; trees snapped or
broken.
Significant Tornado. Considerable damage: Roofs
torn off frame houses; mobile homes demolished;
113-157 mph
frame houses with weak foundations lifted and
(98-136 kt)
moved; boxcars pushed over; large trees snapped or
uprooted; light-object missiles generated.
Severe Tornado. Severe damage: Roofs and some
walls torn off well-constructed houses; trains
158-206 mph
overturned; most trees in forests uprooted; heavy
(137-179 kt)
cars lifted off the ground and thrown; weak
pavement blown off roads.
Devastating Tornado. Devastating damage: Well
constructed homes leveled; structures with weak
207-260 mph
foundations blown off some distance; cars thrown
(180-226 kt)
and disintegrated; large missiles generated; trees in
forest uprooted and carried some distance away.
Incredible Tornado. Incredible damage: Strong
frame houses lifted off foundations and carried
261-318 mph
considerable distance to disintegrate; automobile(227-276 kt)
sized missiles fly through the air in excess of 300 ft
(100 m); trees debarked; incredible phenomena will
occur.
Gtr than 319
The maximum wind speeds of tornadoes are not
mph
expected to reach the F6 wind speeds.
(277 kt)

74

Date

April 15, 1965

April 3, 1974
May 27, 1981
February 21,
1993
June 30, 1993
June 30, 1993

May 18, 1995

May 23, 2000

May 15, 2003

May 15, 2003

Table 18: Knox County Tornado Occurrences
#
#
Fujita
Time
Damage
Dead Injured Scale
$2.5 million; concrete
block house and
5:30 pm
0
6
F2
church destroyed;
metal roofing blown
off.
$25,000; mobile
11:30 pm
2
21
F1
homes destroyed
6:40 pm
0
0
F0
$25,000
$5 million; 50 houses
and 10 businesses
4:05 pm
0
3
F3
damaged; 6 mobile
homes and 2
businesses destroyed
6:00 pm
0
1
F0
--6:45 pm
0
0
F0
--Parts of houses blown
off; at least a dozen
8:00 pm
0
0
F1
homes damaged; many
trees and power lines
down
Mobile home was
ripped off its
4:05 pm
0
1
F1
foundation. Winds
estimated to be 75-80
mph
$150,000; Many power
lines and about 100
4:10 pm
0
0
F1
trees down; parts of a
country club damaged
$200,000; Many power
lines and traffic signals
4:15 pm
0
0
F1
down; several
buildings including 6
condos damaged
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The entire state of Tennessee has an average of five tornadoes per year; however, the
likelihood of a tornado occurring exactly inside the area of the UTK campus is a
1×10-4 % chance or once every 10,000 years (Beavers, 12 June 2007).
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Unlikely

TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE
Toxic chemical release is an event of concern due to the various quantities of chemicals
stored in the many research and engineering buildings throughout campus, as well as the
existence of several railroads located on the perimeter of campus used to haul chemicals
and dangerous substances.
The chemicals stored in the buildings throughout campus mostly consist of flammable
liquids and gases. This type of chemical is the most hazardous because it consists of the
largest volume of chemicals stored in the buildings. The second most hazardous type of
chemicals stored in the buildings are corrosives, which are chemicals with very high or
very low pHs (strong acids or bases). The third most hazardous type is toxics, which are
any chemicals that could be harmful to the human body if they were to come into contact.
These types of contact might be inhalation (causing lung irritation or neurological
disorders), dermal contact (causing skin or eye irritations) or ingestion (causing liver
failure or other internal organ dysfunctions). The least hazardous type of chemicals on
campus include reactives, which are explosive or react in some other negative way when
exposed to certain things, such as water or air. Some reactives on campus consist of
radionucleides and biohazards, but relatively low levels of these substances are present
on campus.
Chemical spills are usually categorized by three severities and taken care of differently
according to the circumstances. Small spills are usually contained and the lab workers
clean up the spill on their own. These types of spills are not reported. Larger spills are
reported to the Office of Environmental Health & Safety and are handled by their
personnel. The largest types of spills are reported to and handled by the local HazardousMaterials squad.
As far as chemicals in transport are concerned, most of the chemicals coming through
Knoxville are hauled by railroad instead of truck because railroads are much safer than
vehicles. Railroad cars are less likely to experience collisions (due to built in signals for
that purpose) and are traveling at much lower speeds (usually a maximum of 40 mph
through campus, but generally closer to 10 or 15 mph) than a vehicle on the interstate.
Also, many precautions are taken to safely package dangerous materials for transport in
the event that a railcar is accidentally derailed, so even if a train were to derail the
contents would not likely be punctured. However, the quantities hauled on railroads are
quite large and would be very dangerous if a mishap were to occur. Chemicals hauled on
the railroads are widely varying, but the ones hauled in close proximity to the UTK
campus are inhalation hazards, explosive hazards, and other freight.
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The toxic inhalation hazards are generally spilled liquid chemicals. Most of the liquid
chemicals hauled around Knoxville are chlorine and a little sulfuric acid. Chlorine is very
dangerous to humans. If any of chlorine was to be released and wind conditions were just
right, the campus would probably have to be evacuated because exposure to this toxic
inhalation hazards can be fatal, and university officials would most likely not want to
take any chances. If sulfuric acid was spilled, it could also form toxic vapors, but the
effects would not be as bad as those of chlorine. The Knoxville and Holston River
Railroad runs from North Knoxville around the UTK campus and out to Forks of the
River. This railroad mostly picks up and delivers railcars to local rail customers, and
operates only a couple of trains a day. It also serves KUB’s wastewater treatment plant
and travels along Neyland Drive to do so, as well as a wastewater treatment plant east of
the South Knoxville Bridge. The Knoxville and Holston River Railroad may or may not
carry chlorine to and from these plants at any given time. This railroad also serves
Holston Gases in South Knoxville, which also receives hazardous materials. The Norfolk
Southern Railroad to the north of campus also hauls chlorine to a paper plant in Bowater,
but chlorine does not comprise the majority of the chemicals hauled on this railroad.
Other inhalation hazards of concern that may be hauled on these trains include hydrogen
fluoride, anhydrous ammonia, sulfur dioxide, and ethylene oxide. These chemicals are a
small fraction of the hazardous materials traffic in Knoxville, but they are dangerous in
the event of an accident.
Far more commonly hauled on Knoxville railroads are explosive hazards rather than
inhalation hazards. Explosive hazards are generally solid chemicals. The Norfolk
Southern railroad, which runs along the north side of campus, has a very large amount of
chemical traffic because it serves Kingsport, which is where the Eastman chemical plant
is located, as well as Chattanooga, which is where a Dupont chemical plant is located. It
generally has 14 to 16 freight trains a day that could carry hazardous materials. One
specific solid chemical of concern hauled on this rail is ammonium nitrate. This chemical
is a huge explosive if ignited and is generally used to make bombs. If a railcar full of
ammonium nitrate was to explode, buildings within a half a mile (which includes
campus) would be damaged, the very least being broken windows. However, this act
would have to be deliberate, which has an even lower likelihood of occurrence than an
accident. The CSX railroad, which runs between the main and Agricultural campuses,
handles 18 to 22 trains per day, 8 to 10 of which could carry hazardous flammable and
explosive materials. The most common of these explosives are ethanol, propane, and
ammonium nitrate, and are also hauled on the Norfolk Southern Railroad.
Other freight hauled on the railroads around campus consists of generally non-hazardous
materials, such as asphalt, coal, metal scraps and grain.
Past Occurrences
Not many major chemical spills originating in the campus buildings have ever occurred.
An average of one or two minor chemical spills a month occur, minor meaning the spill is
small and well-contained. The usual cause of chemical releases is accidental lab fires.
Also, the usual result of a chemical spill is a lab fire, since most of the chemicals on
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campus are flammable liquids and gases. Most of these chemical spills (occurring once or
twice a month) are small and do not cause any personal injuries. However, a few past
occurrences of chemical spills in campus buildings have been noteworthy. Some of the
more recent spills are as follows:
Dougherty Engineering Building-A fuel line failed, which spread gasoline
throughout a lab, creating a large fire. This in itself was a chemical spill, but also
thousands of gallons of water were dumped on the building (which has the third
largest supply of chemicals on campus). Dumping all of this water in the building
inevitably caused some chemicals to spill. No injuries were reported, but
evacuations of the building for days were necessary, and property damage was
caused.
A researcher blew away part of his hand about 10 years ago with an accidental
chemical reaction.
Walters Life Sciences Building-A student spilled alcohol, which ignited near a
Bunsen burner. The student sustained minor burns to the hands.
Dabney-Buehler Hall-3-5 years ago the building was evacuated.
All past toxic chemical releases in buildings have been accidental and were caused by
students and researchers being clumsy or neglectful, such as knocking things over or
discarding of chemicals in trash cans, down drains, and not following safety guidelines.
Almost no injuries have occurred from the majority of the spills due to the fact that most
of the chemicals on campus are stored in small containers so spills won’t be as disastrous
if they were to happen.
In the future it is expected that the current trend of one to two minor spills a month along
with a 50% chance of a major spill occurring in 5 years will continue to be the case,
unless an unexpected event, such as an earthquake, was to occur. Not enough chemicals
are present in any of the buildings to possibly cause a need for evacuation of the
dormitories. The only area that might have to be evacuated in the event of intentional
chemical release would be “The Hill,” which is an area of campus classrooms, labs, and
offices located next to the majority of chemical locations.
Railroad spills are even rarer on and around the campus. The only time a major railroad
spill has occurred in Knoxville was on September 16, 2002 in Farragut. A 141-car train
derailed causing 10,600 gallons of oleum, a type of sulfuric acid, to spew into the air.
About 3,000 people were forced to be evacuated from their homes for two days, and an
area of contaminated soil measuring 6 feet deep by 25 feet wide was dug up and disposed
of. The only damages were some skin and eye irritations to people.
No events of toxic chemical release from railroad cars have ever occurred on campus in
the past.
The railroad system is difficult to secure due to the number of people available to guard
and check railroad cars. People are currently on duty to keep an eye on idle railroad cars
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to keep people from tampering with them and releasing chemicals, but there aren't
enough personnel to spend their time guarding railroad cars when an event of sabotage
has a low likelihood of occurrence. They mostly spend their time concentrating on theft
because that is what most often happens to sitting railroad cars. Railroads could be very
dangerous if terrorists were to use them, but are less dangerous if an accident were to
occur. Currently, precautions are taken to discourage terrorist sabotage during UT
football games. This is a tempting target, considering around 110,000 people are located
in the concentrated area of the stadium at one time, and a railroad runs directly next to it.
Rail traffic is discouraged from moving during any of these football games. Railroads
have a higher likelihood of experiencing an unintentional accident rather than terrorist
activity, but both of these events have quite an unlikelihood of occurrence (Clarke, 2007).
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Occasional

WILDFIRE
A wildfire is a large, rapidly spreading fire that is difficult to extinguish. It destroys the
vegetation that fuels it and exposes and possibly destroys structures as well. FEMA states
that areas most likely to experience wildfires are those that contain large amounts of
wooded, brush, and grassy areas. The states most at risk for wildfires due to these factors
are California, Colorado, New Mexico, Montana, Kansas, Mississippi, Louisiana,
Georgia, Florida, the Carolinas, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and the national forests of the
western United States. Since FEMA declared that Tennessee is a state of high risk for
wildfires, this hazard event was included in the Multi-Hazard Mitigation DRU Plan for
UTK. Predicting whether a wildfire is likely to occur or not is problematic because
wildfires depend on several factors—available fuel (vegetation), topography, and weather
and wind conditions.
What can be predicted is the general type of vegetation covering the area of interest, and
then determining if this is considered heavy, medium, or light fuel for a wildfire. Using
the fuel model key from the National Fire Danger Rating (NFDR) System, 1978, U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Forest Service the fuel model type was estimated to
be Model F based on the campus consisting of predominately brush, shrubs, tree
reproduction or dwarf tree species, average height of woody plants being 6 feet or
greater, and woody plants occupying less than two-thirds of the site. Table 18 shows fuel
models based on the fuel model key and type of fuel for each fuel model. The UTK
campus has Model F, or medium fuel.
The topography of the campus also plays a role in whether the campus is more
encouraging for a wildfire spread. The steeper the slope of land, the faster a fire will
usually spread. Slopes and their defined risk are in Table 19.
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Fuel Model
G, I, J, K, U
B, D, F, H,
O, Q, T
A, C, E, L,
N, P, R, S

Table 19: Fuel Models
Fuel Type
Fuel Description
Vegetation consisting of round wood
Heavy
3 to 8 inches in diameter
Vegetation consisting of round wood
Medium
1/3 to 3 inches in diameter
Vegetation consisting of herbaceous
Light
plants and round wood less than ¼
inch in diameter

Table 20: Slopes and Corresponding Wildfire Spread Risk
Slope
Wildfire Spread Risk
< 40%
Low
41% - 60%
Moderate
> 61%
High

Most areas on campus have a low slope being less than 40%. As discussed in the
“Landslide” section of this report, the campus mainly consists of areas with a low slope
Two primary areas on campus that do have moderate slopes include a natural slope
beside the Pasqua Nuclear Engineering Building (45°) and some steep fill soil slopes on
the west side of campus near the tennis courts (45°). These areas of steep slope can,
again, be seen in the “Landslide Vulnerability” section of this report as circles on the
topographic map of the UTK campus in Figure 28.
Using the current weather and fuel (vegetation) conditions, the National Interagency Fire
Center provides an up-to-date map of Fire Danger Class. For the date of July 9, 2007, the
Wildfire Danger Class for Knoxville is shown by Figure 19 to be low.
Past Occurrences
Small wildfires occur in the Knoxville area at least once a year. Usually at least one fire
per year occurs in Sharps Ridge (North Knoxville) and sometimes in South Knoxville,
but these do not cause extensive damage like wildfires in western states. However,
wildfires have never occurred on the UTK campus. Since the campus has a medium fuel
type, mostly low sloping landscapes, and also is about halfway surrounded by a river
(which will prevent any surrounding wildfires from that direction to enter the campus)
the Knoxville Fire Marshal states that the campus area is considered a low risk area for
wildfires (Byrd, 2007).
Likelihood of Future Occurrences: Unlikely
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Figure 19: Wildfire Danger Class
(Source: United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service)
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HAZARD PROFILING SUMMARY
A summary of all the events and their estimated likelihood of future occurrences are in
Table 20.

Table 21: Estimated Frequency of Likelihood Occurrence of Hazard Events
Event
Likelihood of Occurrence
Severe Storm (Lightning, Heavy Rains)
Highly Likely
Drought
Occasional
Earthquake (MW of 4-5)
Occasional
Extreme Heat
Occasional
Hurricane
Occasional
Land Subsidence
Occasional
Severe Storm (Hail, High Winds)
Occasional
Severe Winter Storm
Occasional
Toxic Chemical Release
Occasional
Dam Failure
Unlikely
Earthquake (MW of 5-6)
Unlikely
Expansive Soils
Unlikely
Flood
Unlikely
Landslide
Unlikely
Tornado
Unlikely
Wildfire
Unlikely
Radiation Fallout
Unlikely
Terrorists
Unlikely
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4.2 Vulnerability Assessment
An assessment for campus vulnerability due to the various hazards identified in Section
4.1—Hazard Identification was completed in order to determine a hazard’s potential for
damage to buildings and life. Vulnerability is defined for this report as how daily life and
processes on campus would be impacted if a hazard event were hypothetically to occur.
As a summary, these hazards are as follows:
Dam Failure
Drought
Earthquake
Expansive Soils
Extreme Heat
Flood
Hurricane
Land Subsidence
Landslide
Radiation Fallout
Severe Storm
– Hailstorm
– Heavy Rains
– Lightning
– Windstorm
Severe Winter Storm
Terrorists
Tornado
Toxic Chemical Release
Wildfire
A scale used in quantifying the possible vulnerabilities of each of these hazard events
follows. (The same scale has been used by the University of Colorado, Boulder’s MultiHazard Mitigation DRU Plan).
Extremely High: Very widespread and catastrophic impact.
High: Widespread potential impact. This ranking carries a high threat to the
general population and/or built environment. The potential for damage is
widespread. Hazards in this category may have already occurred in the past.
Medium: Moderate potential impact. This ranking carries a moderate threat level
to the general population and/or built environment. Here the potential damage is
more isolated and less costly than a more widespread disaster.
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Low: Minimal potential impact. The occurrence and potential cost of damage to
life and property is minimal.
Extremely Low: The occurrence and potential cost of damage to life and property
is very minimal to non-existent.

CAMPUS PROPERTIES AND LIVES AT RISK
Various values to be considered are at risk on the UTK campus. These values were
broken down into the following categories:
Total Values of Structures Based on Use Type-Includes structure replacement
cost and contents value of various categories of building uses.
Critical Facility Values-Includes structure replacement cost and contents value
for those facilities deemed critical to the campus’ daily operation.
Life Values of Structures Based on Use Type-Includes quantities of populations
at risk in various categories of building uses.

Total Values of Structures Based on Use Type
The various categories of building uses, or use type, were created based on the uses that
buildings at UTK are primarily used for. These categories for use type include:
Administration
Athletics/Physical Education
Class/Lab/Office
Communications
Dining
Farm Buildings
Housing
Library
Mechanical
Medical Care
Office
Parking
Physical Plant
Student Center
A summary of the different usages of buildings along with how much they are worth is
shown in Table 21. The replacement values of the buildings are as estimated by UTK’s
Space & Facilities Services. The content values are the value of the insurable contents in
the buildings. Shown in Figure 20 is a summary of the percent of total values each
building type is worth. One can see that Class/Lab/Office facilities comprise almost half
the total value for buildings and contents values on campus. This is followed by
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Athletics/Physical Education facilities and then Library and Housing facilities at about
the same percentage.

Critical Facility Values
Those facilities deemed critical were classified into various categories depending on their
reason for criticality. These various reasons for criticality include:
Emergency Operations
– Medical Care
– Police
Information Storage
– Student Records
– Student Services
– Accounts Payable Offices
– Payroll Offices
Communications
– Landline Communications
– Radio Station
– Internet Facilities
– Mail Services
Utilities
Cultural Resources
– Irreplaceable Collections
Historic
A more detailed discussion of the critical facilities on campus can be viewed in the
following section Critical, Cultural, & Historical Resources Inventory. A figure
depicting the various critical facilities broken down into Type of Use categories including
how much each type is worth is shown in Figure 21. It should be noted that these values
are also included in the table for Total Values of Structures Based on Use Type. One can
see from this figure that the most monetarily valuable critical structures are
Class/Lab/Office facilities and Athletic facilities, accounting for almost 75% of the total
value of critical structures on campus and over $1.2 billion.

Life Values of Structures Based on Use Type
Using the same “Use Type” categories as used previously, the amount of people at risk in
each one of these categories was determined using the average occupancy during the
peak hour of each building. This information was tabulated both with and without
populations from sporting events. This was done because the inclusion of populations
during sporting events significantly skews the data to show that a massive amount of
people occupy Athletics/Physical Education facilities compared to the other types when
this is only true during a sporting event. The data not including populations from sporting
events gives more realistic data for every day populations on campus. Data for both of
these situations can be seen in Table 22, and corresponding graphs are shown in Figures
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Type of Building
Administration
Athletics/Physical
Education
Class/Lab/Office
Communications
Dining
Farm Buildings
Housing
Library
Mechanical
Medical Care
Office
Parking
Physical Plant
Student Center
Totals

Table 22: Total Values of Structures Based on Use Type
# on
% on
Replacement
Total Building
Contents Value
Campus Campus
Value
Value
2
0.9
$8,385,980.00
$334,288.00
$8,720,268.00
29
65
5
2
20
31
3
4
1
21
10
9
10
212

13.7

$519,060,055.00

30.7
$949,499,731.00
2.4
$76,577,819.00
0.9
$23,530,333.33
9.4
$7,147,332.00
14.6
$277,248,606.00
1.4
$125,505,500.67
1.9
$801,900.00
0.5
$1,912,500.00
9.9
$89,285,030.00
4.7
$95,545,799.50
4.2
$100,922,800.00
4.7
$63,075,900.00
100.0 $2,338,499,286.50
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$19,805,596.00

% of Total
Value
0.3

$538,865,651.00

18.3

$273,623,500.33 $1,223,123,231.33
$36,193,057.00
$112,770,876.00
$1,674,551.67
$25,204,885.00
$1,122,330.00
$8,269,662.00
$10,291,838.00
$287,540,444.00
$211,431,455.00
$336,936,955.67
$5,500,000.00
$6,301,900.00
$543,099.00
$2,455,599.00
$27,351,112.00
$116,636,142.00
$1,496,000.00
$97,041,799.50
$12,621,870.00
$113,544,670.00
$4,655,163.00
$67,731,063.00
$606,643,860.00 $2,945,143,146.50
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0.9
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4.0
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Total Values of Structures
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Figure 20: Total Value of Structures
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Value of Critical Facilities By Type of Use

Parking, $32,957,925

Physical Plant,
$97,878,300

Student Center,
$41,252,250
Administration,
$8,385,980

Medical Care,
$1,912,500
Mechanical, $801,900

Athletics, $494,967,038
Library, $121,584,000
Housing/Dining,
$11,832,260
Housing, $62,512,640

Farm Buildings,
$1,431,600
Dining/Lab/Office/Stude
nt Center, $54,111,000

Communications,
$76,577,819
Class/Lab/Office,
$757,596,065

Figure 21: Critical Facility Values By Type of Use
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22 and 23. As shown in these graphs, during a sporting event, particularly a football game
when Neyland Stadium is occupied, Athletics/Physical Education facilities comprise the
vast majority of populations at UTK. If sporting events are not considered, a more
realistic breakdown of occupancies shows that Class/Lab/Office facilities, followed by
Housing and then Athletics/Physical Education comprise the top three building types for
occupancies, which is almost the same as the top three highest total values of building
types.

CRITICAL, CULTURAL, & HISTORICAL RESOURCES INVENTORY
In order to better assess the approximate vulnerability for various hazard events, it is
helpful to know which buildings are considered the most important (meaning being
critical, cultural, or historical resources) and where these buildings are located in order to
determine if they would be affected by any of the hazard events, thus making the
vulnerability of the event higher. A list of these buildings considered critical, culturally
important, or historically important is shown as follows along with the reason for being
critical:
11th Street Parking Garage
(Emergency Operations)
907/909 21st St Duplex (Historic)
908 21st Street (Historic)
Administration Parking Garage
(Information Storage and
Communications)
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity House
(Historic)
Andy Holt Tower (Information
Storage, Communications, and
Historic)
Animal Science Laboratory
(Historic)
Art and Architecture Building
(Historic)
Austin Peay Building (Historic)
Auxiliary Services Building
(Communications and Historic)
Ayres Hall (Historic)
Berry Hall (Historic)
Brehm Animal Sciences Building
(Historic)
Carolyn Brown University Center
(Information Storage and Historic)

Carriage House (Historic)
Ceramics Annex (Historic)
Child Development Center (Historic)
Claxton Education Building
(Historic)
Communications and University
Extension Building
(Communications)
Conference Center Building
(Information Storage and Historic)
Crops Genetic Laboratory (Historic)
Dabney-Buehler Hall (Historic)
Dougherty Engineering Building
(Historic)
Dunford Hall (Historic)
Earth and Planetary Sciences
Building (Historic)
English Language Institute-2019
Terrace (Historic)
English Language Institute-907
Mountcastle (Historic)
Environment and Landscape
Laboratory (Historic)
Environmental Health and Safety2111 Terrace (Historic)
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Table 23: Life Values of Structures Based on Use Type
Including Populations at
Not Including Populations
Sporting Events
at Sporting Events
Occupancy
Occupancy
% of Total
% of Total
Type of Building
During Peak
During Peak
Occupancy
Occupancy
Hours
Hours
Administration
56
0
6
0
Athletics/Physical
144,910
85
3,509
12
Education
Class/Lab/Office
10,810
6
10,810
38
Communications
2,682
2
2,682
9
Dining
2,400
1
2,400
8
Farm Buildings
5
0
5
0
Housing
6,238
4
6,238
22
Library
387
0
387
1
Mechanical
3
0
3
0
Medical Care
42
0
42
0
Office
788
0
788
3
Parking
53
0
53
0
Physical Plant
390
0
390
1
Student Center
1,328
1
1,328
5
Totals
170,092
100.0
28,641
100.0
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Life Values of Structures, Including Sporting Events
Library
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Figure 22: Life Values of Structures, Including Sporting Events
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Life Values of Structures, Not Including Sporting Events

Parking
0%

Office
3%

Physical Plant
1%

Student Center
5%
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0%
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Education
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1%
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22%

Class/Lab/Office
39%
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0%
Dining
8%
Communications
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Figure 23: Life Values of Structures, Not Including Sporting Events
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Environmental Health and Safety22nd Street (Historic)
Estabrook Hall (Historic)
Facilities Services and Operations
Building (Utilities and Historic)
Facilities Services Maintenance
Shops and Warehouse (Utilities)
Facilities Services Utilities
Maintenance Building (Utilities)
Ferris Hall (Historic)
Fiber Optics (Communications)
Food Safety and Processing Building
(Historic)
Forestry Fertilizer Storage Building
(Historic)
Glocker Business Administration
(Historic)
Greenhouse TVA (Historic)
Greve Hall (Historic)
Henson Hall (Historic)
Hesler Biology Building and
Greenhouse (Historic)
Hess Hall (Historic)
Hopecote (Historic)
Hoskins Library Chiller Building
(Utilities)
Humanities and Social Sciences
Building (Communications)
Humanities and Social Sciences
Parking Garage (Communications)
Interior Design Resource Center
(Historic)
James D Hoskins Library (Cultural
Resources and Historic)
Jessie Harris Building (Historic)
John C Hodges Library (Cultural
Resources)
Knoxville W.A.V.E. (Historic)
Law Complex: George C Taylor
Wing (Historic)
Law Complex: Law Library and
Classroom Addition (Cultural
Resources)
Massey Hall (Historic)

McClung Museum (Cultural
Resources and Historic)
McClung Tower and Plaza
(Communications)
McCord Hall (Historic)
Mcleod Food Sciences Building
(Historic)
Melrose Hall (Historic)
Metron Building (Communications)
Morgan Hall (Historic)
Music Building (Cultural Resources)
Music Chiller Building (Utilities)
Music Department Annex (Historic)
Neyland Stadium (Historic)
Nielsen Physics Building (Historic)
Office of Equity and Diversity
(Historic)
Panhellenic Building (Historic)
Parking and Transit Services
(Information Storage)
Pasqua Nuclear Engineering
Building (Historic)
Pediatric Language Clinic (Historic)
Perkins Hall (Historic)
Plant Sciences Biotechnology
Building (Historic)
Radiological Safety (Historic)
Reese Hall Chiller (Utilities)
Sophronia Strong Hall and Cafeteria
(Historic)
South College (Historic)
Steam Plant and Addition (Utilities)
Steam Plant Gear Switching
Building (Utilities)
Steam Plant Turbine Building
(Utilities)
Stokely Athletics Center (Historic)
Stokely Management Center
(Communications)
Student Counseling Services
(Historic)
Student Health Clinic (Emergency
Operations)
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Student Services Building
(Information Storage)
Student Success Center (Historic)
Temple Court (Historic)
Thornton Athletics Student Life
Center (Cultural Resources)

Tyson Alumni Center (Historic)
ULA Love Doughty Carousel
Theatre (Historic)
Visitors' Center (Historic)
White Avenue Building (Information
Storage)

Critical, culturally important, and historically important buildings comprise 48% by
number of total buildings, 72% by monetary value of total buildings, 72% of total
building occupancy taking sporting events into account, and 67% of total building
occupancy not taking sporting events into account. From these numbers it can be seen
that critical buildings comprise almost half of the total number of buildings on campus
and over two-thirds of the monetary and life values of all the structures.

VULNERABILITY OF UTK FROM SPECIFIC HAZARDS
Vulnerability of the campus was estimated for some events based on known information
and more precisely quantified for other events where more information was known. Some
of the events that were more precisely quantified, for example, were dam failure for
which resulting flood maps were available, as well as flooding for which FIRMs were
available. In order to quantify vulnerability of various hazards, different types of
information were taken into account. The different types of information included in
quantifying vulnerability include:
Number of buildings damaged
Types of buildings damaged
Monetary damage value (building and contents values)
Critical resources damaged
Cultural or historic resources damaged
Estimated life loss
Putting an estimated figure on the extent of damages included above, if a hazard event
were to occur, is an event’s vulnerability or impact. An assessment of each hazard’s
vulnerability to the UTK campus is included in the following sections.

DAM FAILURE VULNERABILITY
As discussed in the Dam Failure component of Section 4.1—Hazard Identification, two
failure scenarios exist for a dam failure event. A dam failure will create a flood in either
Zone A or Zone B with Zone A reaching to farther extents than Zone B and Zone A
encompassing all of the buildings in Zone B along with more buildings. The buildings
that are encompassed by Zone B are listed as follows:
Animal Science Laboratory
Brehm Animal Sciences Building

Ceramics Annex
Engineering Annex
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Equine Animal Building
Estabrook Hall
Forest Genetics Greenhouse (17)
Forestry Fertilizer Storage
Building
Fulton Bottoms and Storage Shed
Greenhouse #10
Greenhouse #11, 12, 13
Greenhouse #14 (Plastic)
Greenhouse #15 (Hydroponic)
Greenhouse #16 (Plastic)
Greenhouse #8
Greenhouse #9
Growth Chamber Laboratory
Neyland Drive Biology Annex
Pasqua Nuclear Engineering
Building
Plant Propagation Building

Plant Sciences Annex A
Plant Sciences Annex B
Plant Sciences Laboratory
Publications and Services
Building
Shade House
Storage Building
Tyson Field and Storage Shed
Tyson Park-Women's Softball
Dugout #1
Tyson Park-Women's Softball
Dugout #2
Tyson Park-Women's Softball
Pressbox
Tyson Park-Women's Softball
Ticket Booth
Veterinary Teaching Hospital

A summary including the monetary and life values of the buildings encompassed by Dam
Failure Zone B broken down according to Type of Use is shown in Table 23. As shown,
Zone B dam failure affects 14.5% of all of the structures on campus, the majority of
which are sparsely populated and non-monetarily valuable farm buildings. Also, Zone B
dam failure affects 6 historically critical structures (out of a total of 102 critical facilities)
and no buildings containing hazardous materials.
Zone A comprises of those buildings previously described in Zone B as well as the
following buildings:
2111 Stephenson Dr Butler Building
Warehousing Offices
Construction Industry Research
907/909 21st St Duplex
and Policy Center
Alumni Memorial Building
Crops Genetic Laboratory
Auxiliary Services Building
Dougherty Engineering Building
Berry Hall
Ellington Plant Sciences
Biosystems Eng. And
Building
Environmental Sci Lab
English Language Institute-907
Biosystems Eng. And
Mountcastle
Environmental Sci Office Bld
Environment and Landscape
Boathouse
Laboratory
Table 24: Dam Failure Zone B Assets & Populations at Risk
% of Total in Hazard Area
Monetary
Population
Population Not
# of
Type of Use
Value of
Including
Including
Buildings
Buildings Sporting Events Sporting Events
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Type of Use
Administration
Athletics/Physical
Education
Class/Lab/Office
Communications
Dining
Farm Buildings
Housing
Library
Mechanical
Medical Care
Office
Parking
Physical Plant
Student Center
Total

% of Total in Hazard Area
Monetary
Population
Population Not
# of
Value of
Including
Including
Buildings
Buildings Sporting Events Sporting Events
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
2.7%

0.02%

0.08%

0.54%

4.1%
0.0%
0.0%
6.8%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
0.0%
14.5%

3.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.05%
0.0%
0.04%
0.0%
3.7%

0.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.002%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.00%
0.0%
0.003%
0.0%
0.5%

3.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.015%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.00%
0.0%
0.019%
0.0%
3.5%

Environmental Health and
Safety-22nd Street
Ferris Hall
Food Safety and Processing
Building
Forestry Products
Greenhouse Quonset (Plastic)
Greenhouse TVA
McCord Hall
Mcleod Food Sciences Building
Metron Building
Morgan Hall
Music Department Annex
Neyland Stadium
Office of Research and
Information Technology
Parking and Transit Services
Perkins Hall

Plant Sciences Biotechnology
Building
Plot Barn
Racheff Research Building
Science and Engineering
Building
Soccer Field Pressbox
Soccer Field Restrooms
Soccer Team Building
Stadium Drive Parking GarageG10
Steam Plant and Addition
Steam Plant Gear Switching
Building
Steam Plant Turbine Building
Thompson-Boling Assembly
Center and Arena
Visitors' Center
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A summary including the monetary and life values of the buildings encompassed by Dam
Failure Zone A broken down according to Type of Use is shown in Table 24. As shown,
Zone A dam failure affects 37.6% of all of the structures on campus, the majority of
which are Class/Lab/Offices, Farm Buildings, and Athletics/Physical Education
Facilities. Dam failure in this zone also affects 43.6% of all the monetary value of
structures on campus as well as 78.9% of all populations on campus if sporting events are
included. This is due to Neyland Stadium being flooded in this event, which comprises
most of the population if sporting events are included. If sporting events are not included
17.5% of the population on campus is affected. Also, Zone A dam failure affects 38
critical structures (out of a total of 102 critical facilities) and 7 buildings containing
hazardous materials. A breakdown of these critical facilities is shown in Table 25. Most
of the critical buildings located within Zone A are historically important, although 3
extremely critical facilities—Steam Plant Facilities—are also affected along with 1
information storage facility and 2 communications facilities. Six buildings housing
hazardous materials are affected (out of a total of 11 buildings housing hazardous
materials on campus).
It should be noted that one of the most critical facilities on campus, the electrical
substation, is not located in either Flood Zone A or B.
Vulnerability: Medium

DROUGHT VULNERABILITY
Drought is one of the events that is not able to be precisely quantified due to the fact that
drought is a more broad occurrence that will affect the campus as a whole, rather than
only specific parts. It is also an event in which the onset is gradual, rather than occurring
suddenly, such as an earthquake would. Therefore, the vulnerability impact that a drought
would have on campus can only be estimated based on data from past occurrences.
Data has been gathered only since 1998 for drought conditions in Knoxville. Data is
gathered for every week since 1998, and from all of this data only 3% of the time did a
severe or extreme drought exist. Even in the event of an extreme or severe drought
occurring, TVA has surplus water storage when a drought is anticipated to remedy the
potential problems. Therefore, while the effects of a drought may include cosmetic
damage to campus greenery or the issuance of water restrictions, they are not likely to be
life-threatening or affect campus operation in any way.
Vulnerability: Extremely Low

EARTHQUAKE VULNERABILITY
An earthquake event can affect campus in several ways including causing unreinforced
masonry crumbling, cosmetic damage, broken utilities, and even structural damage or
failure if severe enough. An earthquake has many variables that affect campus
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Table 25: Dam Failure Zone A Assets & Populations at Risk
% of Total in Hazard Area
Monetary
Population
Population Not
# of
Type of Use
Value of
Including
Including
Buildings
Buildings Sporting Events Sporting Events
Administration
0.9%
0.28%
0.03%
0.22%
Athletics/Physical
8.1%
17.90%
76.29%
0.08%
Education
Class/Lab/Office
12.7%
20.95%
2.54%
16.72%
Communications
0.0%
0.00%
0.0%
0.0%
Dining
0.0%
0.00%
0.0%
0.0%
Farm Buildings
9.0%
0.27%
0.003%
0.02%
Housing
0.0%
0.00%
0.0%
0.0%
Library
0.0%
0.00%
0.0%
0.0%
Mechanical
0.0%
0.00%
0.0%
0.0%
Medical Care
0.0%
0.00%
0.0%
0.0%
Office
3.6%
0.17%
0.01%
0.06%
Parking
0.5%
0.74%
0.000%
0.00%
Physical Plant
2.3%
3.11%
0.03%
0.22%
Student Center
0.5%
0.19%
0.02%
0.15%
Total
37.6%
43.6%
78.9%
17.5%
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Table 26: Dam Failure Zone A Critical and Hazardous Facilities
Critical
Reason for
Notes
Hazardous Materials
Structure
Criticality
907/909 21st St
Historical
----Duplex
Animal Science
Historical
----Laboratory
Historical and
Auxiliary
Communications:
----Services Building
Mail Services
Berry Hall
Brehm Animal
Sciences Building
Ceramics Annex
Crops Genetic
Laboratory
Dougherty
Engineering
Building
English Language
Institute-907
Mountcastle
Environment and
Landscape
Laboratory
Environmental
Health and
Safety-22nd
Street
Estabrook Hall

Historical

---

---

Historical

---

---

Historical

---

---

Historical

---

---

Historical

---

2nd most hazardous on
main campus
(chemicals)

Historical

---

---

Historical

---

---

Historical

---

---

Historical

---

---

Ferris Hall

Historical

---

---

Historical

---

---

Historical

---

---

Historical
Historical

-----

-----

Historical

---

---

Food Safety and
Processing
Building
Forestry Fertilizer
Storage Building
Greenhouse TVA
McCord Hall
Mcleod Food
Sciences Building
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Table 25, cont.
Critical
Structure

Reason for
Criticality

Notes

Metron Building

Communications:
Telecommunications

Morgan Hall

Historical

---

---

Music
Department
Annex

Historical

---

---

Neyland Stadium

Historical

---

---

Parking and
Transit Services
Pasqua Nuclear
Engineering
Building

Information
Storage: Records

---

---

Historical

---

---

Perkins Hall

Historical

---

6th most hazardous on
main campus
(chemicals)

Plant Sciences
Biotechnology
Building

Historical

---

2nd most hazardous on
Ag Campus
(chemicals/fertilizers)

Steam Plant and
Addition

Utilities

Steam Plant Gear
Switching
Building

Utilities

Steam Plant
Turbine Building

Utilities

Visitors' Center

Historical

Important for
Logistics of
Campus

Hazardous Materials

Source of almost
all heat on
campus;
Extremely
Critical Facility
Source of almost
all heat on
campus;
Extremely
Critical Facility
Source of almost
all heat on
campus;
Extremely
Critical Facility
---
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---

---

---

---

---

Table 25, cont.
Critical
Structure

Reason for
Criticality

Notes

Hazardous Materials

Non-critical

---

3rd most hazardous on
main campus
(chemicals)

Veterinary
Non-critical
Teaching Hospital

---

Most hazardous on Ag
Campus
(chemicals/fertilizers)

Neyland Drive
Biology Annex

---

8th most hazardous on
main campus
(chemicals)

Science and
Engineering
Building

Non-critical
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vulnerability. These variables—timing, location, intensity, depth of epicenter, geological
and soil conditions,—are random and unable to be estimated. Various combinations of
these variables can have varying effects on campus. For example, if an earthquake were
to occur at 4 am with an epicenter in closer proximity to the campus and at a medium
intensity, the structural damages and casualties might not be high due to the fact that most
of the buildings are unpopulated at 4 am. If an earthquake were to occur at 1 pm with an
epicenter farther away from campus and at a high intensity, more structural damage and
casualties might occur due to more people being on campus at 1 pm. Three different
scenarios were analyzed using HAZUS in order to achieve a variety of outcomes and
estimate the damages on campus with varying conditions. HAZUS, which is an
abbreviation for Hazards United States, is a GIS-based natural hazard lost estimation
software package developed by FEMA. This program estimates risk using three steps—
calculating exposure for a specific area, characterizing intensity of the hazard, and
calculating the potential losses based on this area and intensity. HAZUS is currently
widely used by emergency management organizations worldwide. These scenarios, all
assuming the depth of the epicenter to be 10 km, include the following:
Magnitude 6.0 earthquake at the location of the 1974 Alcoa earthquake at
coordinates of 83.96W 35.80N (about 11 miles south of the center of UT’s
campus)
Magnitude 5.0 earthquake at the location of the 1970 Alcoa earthquake of the
same location
Magnitude 6.0 earthquake at the location of Ayres Hall on the UTK campus at
coordinates of 83.93W 35.96N
A HAZUS analysis of Knox County was done by Dr. James E. Beavers based on these
three different scenarios and then scaled down (based on percent monetary damages and
life losses) to the size of UT’s campus in order to estimate the damages done solely to UT
due to an earthquake.

Monetary Damages
Magnitude 6.0 Earthquake at Location of 1974 Alcoa Earthquake
For this scenario $954.5 million in building damages (structural and non-structural) and
building content damages would occur for the entirety of Knox County. This number
does not include income losses (including lost wages, capital, rent, and relocation costs)
because income losses were not included in the scope of the report for UTK, nor does it
include damages to single family residences. Of the total building damages to Knox
County, about half were damages from single family residences. This type of structure is
most likely to be damaged during an earthquake due to its frailty and lack of seismic
design and is not as prevalent on UT’s campus as it is for Knox County. Therefore,
including damages to single family residences would skew the data when scaling the
values down to represent UTK , so in order to make the damage estimates more accurate
single family residences were not included. The total building replacement value for
Knox County, not including residential housing, is $4.609 billion. Therefore, monetary102

wise 20.7% of building values were damaged. It was then estimated that this same
percentage of building and content values would be damaged on UT’s campus if this
earthquake scenario were to occur, which would mean $639.8 million would be damaged
in the event of a magnitude 6.0 earthquake at the location of the 1974 Alcoa earthquake.
Magnitude 5.0 Earthquake at Location of 1974 Alcoa Earthquake
For this scenario $118.5 million in building damages (structural and non-structural) and
building content damages would occur for the entirety of Knox County, again, not
including income losses or damages to single family residences. Of the total building
replacement value for Knox County, not including residential housing, of $4.609 billion,
2.6% of building values were damaged. Using this same percentage to estimate building
and content values damaged on UT’s campus for this earthquake scenario, gives $80.4
million in damages in the event of a magnitude 5.0 earthquake at the location of the 1974
Alcoa earthquake.
Magnitude 6.0 Earthquake at Location of Ayres Hall on UTK Campus
For this scenario $2.159 billion in building damages (structural and non-structural) and
building content damages would occur for the entirety of Knox County, again, not
including income losses or damages to single family residences. Of the total building
replacement value for Knox County, not including residential housing, of $4.609 billion,
46.9% of building values were damaged. Using this same percentage to estimate building
and content values damaged on UT’s campus for this earthquake scenario, gives $1.448
billion in damages in the event of a magnitude 6.0 earthquake at the location of Ayres
Hall.

Injuries and Casualties
Using HAZUS the number of people injured or killed by each earthquake scenario was
done for varying times of the day, but for the purposes of this report, the analysis at 2 pm
is used for this report because this is the time at which the educational, commercial, and
industrial sector loads are at a maximum and would be most harmful to UTK. As is done
previously in the “Monetary Damages” section, injuries and casualties in single family
residences are not included in order to make the scaling of the data more applicable to
UT’s campus. The total population on campus was assumed to be not during a sporting
event because the likelihood of an earthquake occurring during the small time frame that
a sporting event is occurring is quite small.
Magnitude 6.0 Earthquake at Location of 1974 Alcoa Earthquake
Of Knoxville’s total population of 382,032 (2000 Census Bureau data), an earthquake of
this scenario at 2 pm causes 1399 injuries and 69 deaths, which are 0.4% of the
population and 0.0002%, respectively. The total population on campus, not including
sporting events, is about 25,860. This means that about 95 people will be injured and 5
killed during this earthquake scenario.
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Magnitude 5.0 Earthquake at Location of 1974 Alcoa Earthquake
Of Knoxville’s total population of 382,032, an earthquake of this scenario at 2 pm causes
36 injuries and 1 death, which are 0.00009% of the population and 0.000003%,
respectively. Of the total population on campus of about 25,860, scaling down the data
means that about 3 people will be injured and 0 killed during this earthquake scenario.
Magnitude 6.0 Earthquake at Location of Ayres Hall on UTK Campus
Of Knoxville’s total population of 382,032, an earthquake of this scenario at 2 pm causes
3617 injuries and 212 deaths, which are 0.9% of the population and 0.0006%,
respectively. Of the total population on campus of about 25,860, scaling down the data
means that about 245 people will be injured and 14 killed during this earthquake
scenario.
All of the information regarding building damages, injuries and casualties is shown in
Figures 24 and 25.
While pinpointing exact buildings that will be damaged or destroyed or locations of
injuries and casualties cannot be done, determining if any critical structures are safe from
an earthquake can be estimated. Buildings built since 1987 have some seismic design, so
buildings built before this date (about 75% of number of buildings and 84% of total
value) probably have little to no seismic design and will be very vulnerable to damage
from earthquakes. A list of the various types of critical structures that could possibly be
vulnerable to an earthquake follows.

Building Damages for Various Earthquake Scenarios
$5,000

Building Damages
($ million)

$4,500
$4,000
$3,500
$3,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
$0
Total Building
Values

Mag 6.0
Alcoa

Mag 5.0
Alcoa

Mag 6.0
Ayres Hall

Earthquake Scenario

Figure 24: UTK Building Values Damaged from Earthquake
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Injuries and Casualties for Various Earthquake Scenarios
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# Injured/Killed
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# injured
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0
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Mag 5.0
Alcoa

Mag 6.0
Ayres Hall

Earthquake Scenario

Figure 25: UTK Injuries and Casualties from Earthquake

Emergency Operations
Student Health Clinic—Medical care facility
Information Storage
White Avenue Building—Research Records
Student Services Building—Student Records
Conference Center Building—Retirement Services Records and Historic
Carolyn Brown University Center—Student Services
Andy Holt Tower—One of top 3 logistically important buildings. Payroll/Accounts
Payable Offices and Communications and Historic.
Administration Parking Garage—Under Andy Holt Tower and Communications
Communications
McClung Tower and Plaza—Main server location
Stokely Management Center—One of top 3 logistically important buildings
Humanities and Social Sciences Building—One of top 3 logistically important
buildings. Telephone boards located in basement.
Auxiliary Services Building—Mail Services and Historic
Metron Building—Telecommunications
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Humanities and Social Sciences Parking Garage—Telecommunications
Communications and University Extension Building—Radio Satellites
Andy Holt Tower—One of top 3 logistically important buildings. WUTK radio station
and Information Storage and Historic.
Administration Parking Garage—Under Andy Holt Tower and Information Storage
Utilities
Music Chiller Building—Utilities to protect irreplaceable collections in Music Building
Facilities Services Utilities Maintenance Building—Campus utilities
Facilities Services Maintenance Shops and Warehouse—Campus utilities
Steam Plant and Addition—Source of almost all heat on campus (Addition built with
1991 code, meaning it has seismic design)
Facilities Services and Operations Building—Campus utilities and Historic
Cultural Resources
John C Hodges Library—Building of high concern due to logistics and irreplaceable
collections
Music Building—Irreplaceable collections
McClung Museum—Irreplaceable collections and Historic
James D Hoskins Library—Irreplaceable collections and Historic

Historic Buildings
907/909 21st St Duplex
English Language Institute-907
908 21st Street
Mountcastle
Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity House
Environmental Health and SafetyAnimal Science Laboratory
2111 Terrace
Art and Architecture Building
Environmental Health and SafetyAustin Peay Building
22nd Street
Ayres Hall
Estabrook Hall
Berry Hall
Ferris Hall
Brehm Animal Sciences Building
Food Safety and Processing Building
Carriage House
Forestry Fertilizer Storage Building
Ceramics Annex
Glocker Business Administration
Child Development Center
Greenhouse TVA
Claxton Education Building
Greve Hall
Crops Genetic Laboratory
Henson Hall
Dabney-Buehler Hall
Hesler Biology Building and
Dougherty Engineering Building
Greenhouse
Dunford Hall
Hess Hall
Earth and Planetary Sciences
Hopecote
Building
Interior Design Resource Center
English Language Institute-2019
Jessie Harris Building
Terrace
Knoxville W.A.V.E.
Law Complex: George C Taylor Wing
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Massey Hall
McCord Hall
Mcleod Food Sciences Building
Melrose Hall
Morgan Hall
Music Department Annex
Neyland Stadium
Nielsen Physics Building
Office of Equity and Diversity
Panhellenic Building
Pasqua Nuclear Engineering Building
Pediatric Language Clinic

Perkins Hall
Radiological Safety
Sophronia Strong Hall and Cafeteria
South College
Stokely Athletics Center
Student Counseling Services
Student Success Center
Temple Court
Tyson Alumni Center
ULA Love Doughty Carousel Theatre
Visitors' Center

Also, three buildings containing hazardous chemicals are susceptible to damage from
earthquakes and are as follows:
Veterinary Teaching Hospital—Most hazardous on Ag Campus (chemicals/fertilizers)
Walters Life Sciences Building—4th most hazardous on main campus (chemicals)
Engineering Annex—9th most hazardous on main campus (chemicals)
Of all of these buildings, the most vulnerable are unreinforced masonry structures.
Reinforced concrete structures and steel structures are not as vulnerable during an
earthquake as masonry. Of this list of vulnerable buildings, only 17 are masonry
structures, all of which are critical for being historic except two. The Music Chiller
Building is a vulnerable masonry structure that is critical for housing utilities for the
music building, which houses irreplaceable collections. Also, the Facilities Services
Maintenance Shops and Warehouse is a vulnerable masonry structure that is critical for
housing utilities for various parts of campus. None of the masonry structures house large
numbers of people, such as in a dormitory or student center.
As seen from the values of building damage, injury, and life loss due to an earthquake,
this event would be the most devastating to UTK if the right conditions existed.
Vulnerability: High

EXPANSIVE SOILS VULNERABILITY
As discussed previously in the Expansive Soils component of Section 4.1—Hazard
Identification, Knoxville is located within an expansive soils category of “Nonexpansive:
The Occurrence of Expansive Materials Is Extremely Limited.” Therefore, since
expansive soils do not generally occur in the area of the campus, there can be no effects
to create campus vulnerability.
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Vulnerability: Extremely Low

EXTREME HEAT VULNERABILITY
An extreme heat event would likely affect the entire campus uniformly rather than
specific parts of it or in varying conditions throughout campus. Monetary damage to
campus properties would most likely not occur—damage to populations would be the
biggest concern. Most extreme heat events occur during the summer months, when
campus population is at a low. The main effect that extreme heat would have on the
campus operation would be adverse health effects to university employees and students
while either in buildings or walking on campus. Extreme heat is mostly detrimental to the
elderly and children, so since the vast majority of the population on campus is neither
elderly nor very young, most people would not be affected. However, if some people
were affected, the measures need to be taken to remedy these adverse health effects by
ensuring that proper air conditioning is provided and functional.
Vulnerability: Extremely Low

FLOOD VULNERABILITY
While flooding is a significant hazard in the state of Tennessee, causing much of the
state’s federally declared disasters, it is not such a disastrous event at UTK. This is due to
the fact that the campus is located in East Tennessee, with widely varying topography
and much of the campus being built in higher elevations than its surrounding bodies of
water. Flooding can cause cosmetic and structural building damage, contents damage,
and even life loss, but at UTK the only effect likely to occur is building contents damage
and cosmetic damage. As seen in the FIRMs of campus shown in Figures 10 and 11, the
extents of flooding on campus are very minimal. The only facilities that could even be
reached by flood waters would be Fulton Bottoms and Storage Shed (rugby field), Tyson
Field and Storage Shed, Tyson Park Women’s Softball Facilities, and possibly some
various storage sheds on the agricultural campus. None of these facilities are critical or
monetarily valuable, nor do they contain any people or hazardous materials. The flood
zones as shown in the FIRM maps do not reach any potentially important structures near
to the water’s edge, such as the Steam Plant, the electrical substation, Thompson-Boling
Assembly Center and Arena, or Veterinary Teaching Hospital. Flooding on campus will
reach almost no facilities and none that are critical or important.
Vulnerability: Extremely Low

HURRICANE VULNERABILITY
A hurricane event would affect the UTK campus by bringing rain and flooding, along
with possible high winds. The high winds would be uniformly present throughout the
entire campus rather than affecting certain buildings, while the rain-induced flooding
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would target specific low-lying buildings located near bodies of water. This flooding
from a hurricane event would have an equal or lesser (due to the storm being weakened
by distance) vulnerability as a flood event described previously. For a more detailed
discussion of the flooding vulnerability due to a hurricane refer to the “Flood
Vulnerability” portion of this report.
The high winds would also be lessened due to Knoxville’s distance from any hurricane’s
origin, but might still be present. Figure 26 shows the National Hurricane Center’s
estimation of wind speeds throughout the East Coast region for the mildest scenario of a
hurricane storm—a Category 1 moving forward at a speed of 8 knots. For this mildest
scenario, wind speeds of 0 to 35 mph may reach Knoxville. Figure 27 shows an
estimation of wind speeds for a worst case scenario of a hurricane storm—a Category 5
moving forward at a speed of 24 knots. For this worst case scenario, wind speeds of 50 to
65 mph may reach Knoxville. ASCE 7 requires that the design wind speed for Knoxville
buildings is 90 mph, so buildings designed according to the current code will be
structurally sound for the worst case hurricane winds.
During a hurricane, damage to either campus properties or populations would most likely
not occur from high winds, and the flooding aspect of a hurricane would be less than the
effects described in the “Flood Vulnerability” section of this report.
Vulnerability: Extremely Low

LAND SUBSIDENCE VULNERABILITY
Land subsidence should not be a problem at UTK because most newer buildings are built
on drilled shafts, which reach stable bedrock. Older buildings are at a potential risk since
they are not built on drilled shafts; however, differential settlement is usually the failure
mode to occur, giving warning signs such as cracking or tilting of the building. These are
mainly cosmetic problems, not life safety problems, so karst is not a main area of concern
for mitigation due to the fact that the problem is not life threatening, and the solution
(drilling shafts underneath already-constructed buildings) would be quite expensive. The
inclusion of this hazardous event in UTK’s hazard mitigation plan is just to make the
University aware that a land subsidence event holds a small chance of occurrence, and
the problem should be addressed at the time of occurrence, should it ever arise.
The worst case scenario of a karst collapse is that one of the underground caves would
open up adjacent to a building column. However, one column failing would not cause
significant structural damage because most buildings are designed to have redundancy,
which would take care of the load not being able to be taken by the collapsed column. No
buildings or even halves of buildings would be destroyed by karst collapses, and most
damages due to karst on the campus are fairly easy to fix, if there is any damage at all.
Vulnerability: Extremely Low
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Figure 26: Lowest East Coast Hurricane Wind Speeds
(Source: National Hurricane Center)

110

Figure 27: Highest East Coast Hurricane Wind Speeds
(Source: National Hurricane Center)
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LANDSLIDE VULNERABILITY
The occurrence of a landslide can potentially cause damages to structures, utility systems,
roads, and people if they are present at the time of a landslide. Only two locations on
campus exist where it would even be possible for a landslide to occur—a 45° slope by the
Pasqua Nuclear Engineering Building and a 45° slope on the west side of campus near
the tennis courts. This degree of inclination (45°) is not very steep, so if a landslide were
to occur, huge amounts of soil and material would most likely not move. However, if a
landslide did occur at either of these two locations not much damage would occur. If a
landslide occurred at the Pasqua Nuclear Engineering Building location, soil would slide
down the slope towards the north side of the building and cause some windows and doors
to be blocked. However, access to the building would still be available on the other three
sides. No road blockage, utility damage, or structural damage would be present in this
event. If a landslide occurred at the tennis courts location, soil would slide towards the
tennis courts, covering the southern side of the courts. Soil could also slide west towards
Volunteer Boulevard possibly blocking some of the road. The only damages from a
landslide at the tennis courts location would be a mess on the tennis courts to clean up
and possible road blockage of Volunteer Boulevard. (These locations are shown in Figure
28.) Therefore, the potential damages caused by a landslide would be minimal, causing
mainly inconvenience and a necessity to clean up the displaced soil, but no life or large
property and structural damages.
Vulnerability: Extremely Low

RADIATION FALLOUT VULNERABILITY
An event of a radiation release affecting the UTK campus would have effects mostly on
the population of the campus, and not the structures or contents of the buildings. This
event could happen either near the campus, originating at the Y-12 nuclear facility in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee or could happen on the campus resulting from an accidental or
intentional spill while in transport. If a radiation release occurred at the Y-12 nuclear
facility, it would have to be an intentional sabotage event in order for enough radiation to
reach the campus. The wind traveling from Oak Ridge generally travels in a northeasterly
direction, meaning radioactive material would be transported to the north of Knoxville
and probably not reach campus. Also as the wind naturally transports the radioactive
material to campus, it also disperses it, making its effects to the population lessen (Logan,
2007). UTK is located about 30 miles away from the Y-12 facility, so even if the winds
weren’t blowing northeastward and radioactive material did actually reach Knoxville, by
the time the radioactive material reached campus it would be so dispersed that it would
raise radiation levels on campus only slightly higher than the background radiation level,
thus not causing any adverse health effects. If a radiation release occurred closer to
campus, most likely from a “dirty” bomb created from a radiological theft and planted
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Figure 28: High Slopes at UTK
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anywhere, or possibly a radiation release while radioactive material is in transport on the
Interstate, more health effects on campus would be seen. An average of over 26,000
people are present on campus at any given time in the day, and an average of over
110,000 people are present on campus during a football game. A significant radiation
release could affect most of these people if the event were to occur. The typical effects of
radiation exposure to the human body are shown in Table 26.
The radiation doses on campus would likely be much less than 100 REM for the majority
of people on campus, so the effects would likely not be noticeable, much less severe or
fatal. Of course, any people located very near to ground zero would experience higher
effects, but these effects would be very localized and would not drift far. During the
Chernobyl nuclear accident, the only radiation doses greater than 100 rem were located
directly in and around the nuclear reactor in which the explosion occurred. Any radiation
release at UTK would likely not be as catastrophic as the Chernobyl accident, therefore,
any radiation being accidentally or intentionally released on the campus would most
likely not have the size and/or strength to cause any effects greater than those seen above
a dose of 100 REM (Flanagan, 2007).
Vulnerability: Low

SEVERE STORM VULNERABILITY
The vulnerability that a severe storm could create on campus would be due to a
combination of four components—hail, heavy rains, high winds, and lightning. Each of
these components would have different effects on campus, and, thus, affect campus
vulnerability differently. The heavy rains component of a severe storm has the same
vulnerability effects as a flooding event. For a more detailed discussion of heavy rains,
refer to the “Flood Vulnerability” section of this report. The same is true of high winds.
High winds will have the same or lesser vulnerability effects as a tornado event. For a
more detailed discussion of high winds from a severe storm, refer to the “Tornado
Vulnerability” section of this report.
As far as hail during a severe storm, property damage and power outages are of concern,
while population damage is not. The properties most likely to be damaged are
automobiles (which are not covered in the scope of this report), glass components of
structures, and cosmetic damage to paint and brick. Shown in Table 27 is a listing of
various hail stone size ranges and their typical extent of damages depicted by the shaded
areas. Hail as small as 11 mm (mothball) can cause damage to plastic, glass, paint, and
wood of structures, but generally a hail size closer to 20 mm (cherry) is required before
this occurs. Severe roof damage and risk of serious injuries occurs at hail sizes as small
as 46 mm (hen’s egg), but on an average closer to 80 mm (tennis ball). Extensive
structural damage and risk of fatalities do not occur unless the hail is at least 81 mm
(orange), but most often it is 100 mm (grapefruit). The average size of hail in Knox
County is 29.2 mm, which means that if it were moving at speeds fast enough, hail could
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Dose
5-20 REM
20-50 REM
50-100 REM

Table 27: Radiation Exposure Effects
Symptoms
No symptoms.
No noticeable symptoms. Red blood cell count decreases
temporarily.
Mild radiation sickness with headache and increase risk of
infection due to disruption of immunity cells. Temporary male
sterility is possible.

100-200 REM

Light radiation poisoning, 10% fatality after 30 days. Nausea with
occasional vomiting. General illness and fatigue. The immune
system is depressed with increased risk of infection. Temporary
male sterility is common. Spontaneous abortion or stillbirth will
occur in pregnant women.

200-300 REM

Moderate radiation poisoning, 35% fatality after 30 days. Nausea
with vomiting. Loss of hair all over the body, fatigue and general
illness. Massive loss of white blood cells, greatly increasing the
risk of infection. Permanent female sterility is possible.

300-400 REM

400-600 REM

600-1000 REM

1000-5000
REM

>5000 REM

Severe radiation poisoning, 50% fatality after 30 days.
Uncontrollable bleeding in the mouth, under the skin and in the
kidneys.
Acute radiation poisoning, 60% fatality after 30 days. Female
sterility is common. Primary causes of death (about 2 to 12 weeks
after irradiation) are infections and internal bleeding.
Acute radiation poisoning, near 100% fatality after 14 days.
Survival depends on intense medical care. Bone marrow is nearly
or completely destroyed, so a bone marrow transplant is required.
Gastric and intestinal tissues are severely damaged. Recovery
would take several years and probably would never be complete.
Acute radiation poisoning, 100% fatality after 7 days. Powerful
fatigue and immediate nausea. Cell death in the gastric and
intestinal tissue, causing massive diarrhea, intestinal bleeding and
loss of water, leading to water-electrolyte imbalance. Death sets in
with delirium and coma due to breakdown of circulation. Death is
currently inevitable; the only treatment that can be offered is pain
therapy.
Acute radiation poisoning, 100% fatality after around 48 hours.
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cause destruction of glass, damage to tiled roofs, pitted brick walls, and significant risk
of injuries. Hail in Knox County usually causes lesser damages because it is not always
falling at maximum speeds. While population harm is a possibility, it is not a concern for
this report because everyone on UT’s campus has access to indoor areas in the event of
hail (Tornado and Storm Research Organization, 2007).
Specific properties that might be damaged from hail cannot be pinpointed—damage will
most likely occur uniformly or randomly throughout campus. For this reason, it is
impossible to estimate the monetary damages that might occur from this component of a
severe storm. However, for the entirety of Knox County, total damages of only $56,000
have been reported since 1950 (as given by the National Climatic Data Center’s Storm
Events for Tennessee website), which is only about $980 a year (not much for an area as
large as a county with a population of over 400,000). Therefore, the damages caused on
an even smaller scale of the UTK campus alone can be estimated to be smaller than the
county-wide damages.
As far as lightning during a severe storm goes, property damage and power outages are of
concern, while, again, population damage is not. The reason for this is the same as for a
hail event—all people on UT’s campus have access to indoor areas in the case of a severe
storm onset. The properties most likely to be damaged from a lightning strike could be
any buildings or electrical facilities on campus. It is impossible to estimate which specific
buildings or electrical facilities could be targeted due to the random nature of storms.
However, one specific area is of great concern. If a lightning strike was to occur at UT’s
substation, the primary source of UT’s electricity, UT could be left without power
entirely. The substation is located at the southern-most end of Pat Head Summit Street
near the steam plan and is the source of at least 80% of UT’s power. This would be very
devastating in the heat of the summer or cold of the winter. It also would cause logistical
problems, and basically all operations on campus would be forced to shut down (Sherrell,
2007).
Vulnerability: Medium

SEVERE WINTER STORM VULNERABILITY
A severe winter storm can cause traffic accidents, road blockages, delays in emergency
response, people to be trapped in buildings and cars, frozen pipes, caving of roofs, utility
outages, and disruption of daily activities. A severe winter storm would affect the entire
campus if it were to occur. Traffic accidents and road blockages are not of primary
concern during a winter storm because automobiles are beyond the extent of this report,
and the campus is small enough that traveling anywhere on foot is feasible. Delays in
emergency response, while a concern, are not a huge concern again due to the fact that
the campus is small enough that there would not be massive delays if any were to occur.
People being trapped in buildings is also not of a huge concern because all buildings on
campus have heat and running water, and most likely people would not be trapped for
long due to the availability of emergency services.
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Table 28: Hail Stone Sizes and Corresponding Damages
Diameter
(mm)

Size
Example

Damage Intensity

No
damage

5 to 10
11 to 15
16 to 20
21 to 30
31 to 45

46 to 60

61 to 80
81 to 100
101 to 125
over 150

Slight
damage
to
plants,
crops

Significant
damage to
fruit, crops,
vegetation

Severe damage
to fruit, crops;
damage to
glass/plastic
structures; paint
and wood scored

Widespread
glass
damage;
vehicle
bodywork
damage

Wholesale
destruction of
glass; damage
to tiled roofs;
significant risk
of injuries

pea
mothball,
bean
cherry,
penny
walnut
golf ball,
table
tennis ball
hen' s egg,
billiard
ball
tennis
ball,
orange
grapefruit,
softball
melon
coconut
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Aircraft
bodywork
dented;
brick
walls
pitted

Severe
roof
damage;
risk of
serious
injuries

Severe
damage to
aircraft
bodywork

Extensive
structural damage.
Risk of severe or
even fatal injuries
to persons caught
in the open

Extensive
structural damage.
Risk of severe or
even fatal injuries
to persons caught
in the open

More of concern during a severe winter storm would be frozen pipes, caving of roofs, and
utility outages. Frozen pipes could cause running water to become unavailable to parts of
campus, but the likelihood of all pipes on campus freezing is quite low. This means that
water would still be available in parts of campus; people just may have to travel to
another area of campus to obtain it. Lightweight roofs and awnings are most vulnerable
to snow loads. Failures of lightweight roofs and awnings, however, are usually very
localized failures are very small monetarily and no big risk to people. It is impossible to
discern which buildings on UT’s campus have lightweight roofs without extensive
research, so it is impossible to determine which buildings are most vulnerable to a snow
load. However, it can be stated that none of the critical structures on campus have
lightweight roofs; therefore, the most imperative structures will likely not be damaged by
a snowstorm. Any roof cavings that did occur would likely not harm many people or
cause any severe structural or interior damage other than the need to have the roof
replaced. Utility outages are of primary concern during a severe winter storm. Utility
outages could occur from damaged power lines in an ice storm or from a roof caving in
one of the structures that houses utilities. During a severe snow or ice storm campus
would not be in operation, so the majority of people on campus would be located in the
residence halls. Power outages on campus would cause inconvenience, but would likely
not cause any personal injury or death because if any of the residence halls lost power,
the residents would be moved to other buildings on campus that still retained power. The
primary source of UT’s power, the electrical substation, has not ever been damaged by
ice storms, so the likelihood of the power throughout the entirety of campus going out is
very slim. A severe winter storm would cause logistical problems and inconvenience, as
well as cost to repair power lines, but no severe population harm or extensive structural
damage would occur.
Vulnerability: Low

TERRORISTS VULNERABILITY
An event of terrorism at UTK is quite unlikely, but could have some dire consequences if
it did occur. Acts of terrorism of concern at UTK include plane crashes into structures,
bombings on large congregations of people (such as sporting events, residence halls,
large office buildings, large auditoriums, and student centers), gunfire, and chemical
releases.
Plane crashes into structures and bombings, particularly during a sporting event, could be
devastating in terms of life loss. The ten most populated structures on campus and their
average populations are as follows and include populations during a sporting event
because an act of terrorism would not be random and planning for it to occur during a
sporting event would be likely:
Neyland Stadium: Over 110,000 people
Thompson-Boling Assembly Center and Arena: 25,000 people
Tom Black Track: 7,500 people
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Lindsey Nelson Stadium: 3,700 people
Carolyn Brown University Center: 3,200 people
Intercollegiate Swim Facility: 2250 people
Humanities and Social Sciences Building: 1680 people
Glocker Business Administration: 950 people
Alumni Memorial Building: 930 people
Holt Avenue Apartments Residence Hall: 880 people
A plane crash or bombing could also be devastating in terms of monetary loss to the
campus. The ten most valuable buildings on campus, including replacement value and
contents value, are shown as follows:
Neyland Stadium: $692 million
John C Hodges Library: $237 million
Science and Engineering Building: $109 million
James D Hoskins Library: $96 million
Steam Plant and Addition: $84 million
Dabney-Buehler Hall: $84 million
Veterinary Teaching Hospital: $66 million
Conference Center Building: $62 million
Carolyn Brown University Center: $57 million
Thompson-Boling Assembly Center and Arena: $57 million
A terrorist gunfire event would be more isolated and affecting less people, although no
less significant. Gunfire would not cause any structural damage, but would be one of the
most devastating events at UTK in terms of life loss. A terrorist-initiated chemical release
could also have destructive consequences. This event, toxic chemical release, and its
specific effects on campus are discussed more in detail in the “Toxic Chemical Release
Vulnerability” section of this report. In conclusion, while a terrorist event is not likely, if
it does occur it could have one of the most devastating effects in terms of life loss and/or
monetary loss of all of the events.
Also a likely terrorist target could be the electrical substation, since it is the source of
80% of UT’s electricity. In order for the substation to be damaged enough to severely
affect campus, intentional acts would have to be taken. This is very feasible since the
only protection surrounding the substation is a fence. One would simply have to know the
basic mechanics of a substation in order to damage it.
Vulnerability: Medium

TORNADO VULNERABILITY
Tornadoes are an event of an unpredictable and random nature, so the likelihood of it
occurring at any location on campus is equal. The effects on campus due to a tornado
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could include damages from winds and fallen or uprooted trees, such as cosmetic damage
to buildings, damage to roofs, and damage to weaker, smaller buildings. Tornadoes
occurring in Knoxville are generally a Category F0 to F2 on the Fujita Scale, as discussed
in the “Tornado” section of this report. Category F0 to F2 include light damage, moderate
damage, and considerable damage. The damages are described as following:
Light Damage: some damage to chimneys, broken twigs and branches, pushed
over shallow-rooted trees, damaged signboards, and some broken windows.
Moderate Damage: peeled off roof surfaces, overturned mobile homes,
demolished outbuildings, moving automobiles being pushed off the roads, and
broken trees.
Considerable Damage: torn off roofs of frame houses, demolished mobile homes,
lifted and moved frame houses with weak foundations, pushed over boxcars,
snapped or uprooted large trees, and light-object missiles generated.
Light damage and moderate damage are not of huge concern because mainly cosmetic
damage falls into this category. Cosmetic damage is not life threatening or extremely
expensive to repair, as a destroyed building would be. Also, mobile homes do not exist on
campus and automobiles are not included in the scope of this report, so neither of these
are of concern for moderate damage.
A tornado with considerable damage (most likely a Category F2) would be more
damaging to the campus causing roofs to be torn off of some of the older frame houses,
and even causing some of these older frame houses with weaker foundations to be lifted
from the ground and moved. It also could cause boxcars to be pushed over, which is of
concern due to the fact that many boxcars near to campus contain various toxic
chemicals. For a more detailed discussion of how these toxic chemicals could affect
campus refer to the “Toxic Chemical Release” and “Toxic Chemical Release
Vulnerability” section of this report. A Category F2 tornado could also cause large trees
to be snapped or uprooted, which would be the culprit of most structural damage on
campus. Many smaller, less structurally sturdy buildings would be damaged if any large
trees fell on them, while larger, more structurally sturdy buildings may be damaged less
intensely. Also of concern due to uprooted trees would be damaged power lines. These
snapped or uprooted trees could cause many of the power lines on campus to be damaged
or destroyed, causing much of the electricity on campus to be out. This would definitely
be negative and have a large impact on campus, but would not be completely disastrous.
Peak tornado season in the southern states is March through May and 3 pm through 9 pm,
so if a tornado occurred it would probably occur when the temperatures aren’t at their
coldest and when classes aren’t at their peak hours. This means that if the power went out
people would not be in dire danger from the cold, and less people would be in the
unprotected outdoors than they would be while in transit to classes. A final concern due
to an F2 tornado would be light-object missiles generated by the high winds, which could
be harmful to people outdoors. As stated previously, a tornado would most likely occur
120

during a time when the population outdoors is not at a maximum, so a lesser amount of
people would be likely to be affected by projectile objects.
A picture depicting one example of damage that a Category F2 can cause is shown in
Figure 29. This figure shows uprooted and overturned trees and a ripped off roof,
characteristic of a Category F2 tornado, but no significant structural damage. This type of
damage would be the most common structural damage on campus if a Category F2
tornado were to occur because most larger buildings are either structural frames or
reinforced concrete, which would hold up during an F2 storm. Some critical, cultural, or
historical wood frame or masonry buildings that might be at risk of being lifted and
moved or even destroyed are shown in Table 28. All of the buildings listed are critical for
being historic except the Hoskins Library Chiller Building (houses utilities to protect
irreplaceable collections), Music Chiller Building (houses utilities to protect irreplaceable
collections), Reese Hall Chiller Building (houses utilities for Reese Hall dormitory),
Facilities Services Maintenance Shops and Warehouse (houses utilities for all of
campus). All of the occupancies of these buildings are low in comparison to the other
buildings on campus. Of all of the masonry and wood frame buildings on campus,
including critical and non-critical buildings, none have irreplaceable collections and two
contain hazardous chemicals (Engineering Annex—9th most hazardous on the
Agricultural Campus; Veterinary Teaching Hospital—most hazardous on the Agricultural
Campus). The total populations in all of these less sturdy buildings is only 3.5% of the
total population on campus (assuming a sporting event is not taking place) and the total
values consist of 5.9% of the total values on campus. This numbers show that large
numbers of people and large monetary values are not present in buildings that are most
likely to be damaged by a tornado on campus. However, four buildings do house utilities
for various buildings on campus and two contain hazardous materials.
A facility of specific importance, the UT electrical substation, is vulnerable during a
tornado or event of high winds. It has been damaged by high winds in the past, and could
be damaged in the future. An F2 tornado could cause over half of the power to be out
throughout campus by damaging the substation (Sherrell, 2007).
Vulnerability: Medium

TOXIC CHEMICAL RELEASE VULNERABILITY
In the event of a toxic chemical release at UTK, the main concern is adverse effects to
human health and fires, rather than severe structural damage. The main concentrations of
toxic chemicals are located in either various research and engineering buildings
throughout campus or on various railroads around campus. Currently, chemical spills in
the engineering and research buildings are either cleaned up by the lab workers, cleaned
up by personnel from the Office of Environmental Health & Safety, or handled by the
local Hazardous-Materials squad, depending on the severity of the spill. In the case of
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Figure 29: Category F2 Tornado Damage
(Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)

Table 29: Critical Buildings Damaged From a Category F2 Tornado
Building
Type of Building
907/909 21st St Duplex
Masonry
Estabrook Hall
Masonry Frame
Berry Hall
Masonry Frame
Ceramics Annex
Masonry Frame
Austin Peay Building
Masonry Frame
Child Development Center
Masonry Frame
Temple Court
Masonry Frame
Carriage House
Masonry Frame
South College
Masonry Frame
Greenhouse TVA
Masonry Frame
Animal Science Laboratory
Masonry Frame
Tyson Alumni Center
Masonry Frame
Visitors' Center
Wood Frame
English Language Institute-2019
Wood Frame
Terrace
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Building
Environmental Health and Safety2111 Terrace
Pediatric Language Clinic
Hopecote
Knoxville W.A.V.E.
English Language Institute-907
Mountcastle
Environmental Health and Safety22nd Street
Music Department Annex
908 21st Street
Interior Design Resource Center
Office of Equity and Diversity
Radiological Safety
Student Counseling Services
Student Success Center
ULA Love Doughty Carousel
Theatre
Environment and Landscape
Laboratory
Hoskins Library Chiller Building
Music Chiller Building
Reese Hall Chiller Building
Facilities Services Maintenance
Shops and Warehouse
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Type of Building
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame/Masonry
Veneer
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame

any of these spills the most likely effects would be burns to the skin or damage to lungs
from inhalation and/or fires, due to the fact that most of the chemicals stored throughout
campus buildings are flammable. In the event of a fire, the local Knoxville Fire
Department would handle the situation. The various buildings throughout campus that
contain hazardous chemicals are shown in Table 29. These buildings contain 12% of the
total population on campus (not during a sporting event) and 16% of the total building
and content values on campus. Also, over half of these buildings are critical, but they are
critical for being historical buildings rather than communications or utilities (Smith,
2006).
Toxic chemicals hauled on railroads have a greater potential to do damage to the
University than the chemicals stored in the buildings due to the large quantities stored
and hauled on the railroads. Most of the dangerous chemicals hauled in close proximity
to the campus are inhalation hazards and explosive hazards. The inhalation hazards can
consist of chlorine, sulfuric acid, hydrogen fluoride, anhydrous ammonia, sulfur dioxide,
and ethylene oxide. Chlorine is the most dangerous of these chemicals with the potential
to be fatal. If any were to be spilled, with correct wind conditions, the campus would
probably have to be evacuated. The other chemicals can also form toxic vapors, but the
effects of these kinds of spills would not be as bad as those of chlorine and might call for
smaller, more concentrated evacuations. The explosive hazards hauled in close proximity
to the campus are more common than the inhalation hazards. One specific chemical of
concern is ammonium nitrate hauled on the Norfolk Southern railroad, which is a huge
explosive and common bomb material. If a railcar full of ammonium nitrate was to
explode, buildings within a half a mile (which includes campus) would be damaged, the
very least being broken windows. Other explosives of concern are ethanol, propane, and
ammonium nitrate, also hauled on the Norfolk Southern Railroad, which would have less
explosive effects than ammonium nitrate, but could still do damage to parts of campus
(Clarke, 2007).
Vulnerability: Low

WILDFIRE VULNERABILITY
The University of Tennessee is located in a fairly urban area with medium fuel vegetation
in areas where vegetation is present. Much of the campus is covered in non-vegetative
matter, such as buildings, roads, and parking lots, which is not conducive to wildfire
spread. It is very difficult to estimate which buildings would be most affected by a
wildfire because the location of a wildfire’s origin is unable to be predicted. However, it
can be reasonably assumed that a wildfire would not approach campus from the north or
east sides because both of these areas are very urbanized with little vegetation to fuel the
fires. While the south and west sides of campus have quite a bit more vegetation to fuel a
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Table 30: Campus Buildings Containing Toxic Chemicals
Building Name

Ranking

Veterinary Teaching Hospital

Most hazardous on Ag Campus

Plant Sciences
Biotechnology Building

Critical
Facilities
Non-critical

2nd most hazardous on Ag Campus

Critical
(Historical Bldg)

Most hazardous on main campus
(chemicals)

Critical
(Historical Bldg)

Dougherty Engineering
Building

2nd most hazardous on main
campus (chemicals)

Critical
(Historical Bldg)

Science and Engineering
Building

3rd most hazardous on main
campus (chemicals)

Non-critical

Walters Life Sciences
Building

4th most hazardous on main
campus (chemicals)

Non-critical

Hesler Biology Building and
Greenhouse

5th most hazardous on main
campus (chemicals)

Critical
(Historical Bldg)

Perkins Hall

6th most hazardous on main
campus (chemicals)

Critical
(Historical Bldg)

Jessie Harris Building

7th most hazardous on main
campus (chemicals)

Critical
(Historical Bldg)

Neyland Drive Biology
Annex

8th most hazardous on main
campus (chemicals)

Non-critical

Engineering Annex

9th most hazardous on main
campus (chemicals)

Non-critical

Dabney-Buehler Hall
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wildfire, the Tennessee River stands between this vegetation and campus, thus blocking
any wildfire spread. Wildfire spreads the most rapidly in areas of higher slopes, and the
only areas of higher slopes on campus are a 45° slope by the Pasqua Nuclear Engineering
Building and a 45° slope by the tennis courts. Therefore, wildfire would more likely be
most damaging and uncontrollable in these areas, likely damaging the Pasqua Nuclear
Engineering Building, Estabrook Hall, Berry Hall, Goodfriend Tennis Center Building,
and Outdoor Tennis Center the most before the fires were able to be extinguished. Of
these properties, the only ones of a critical, cultural or historic value are Estabrook Hall
(historic), Pasqua Nuclear Engineering Building (historic) and Berry Hall (historic) All of
the buildings together comprise of only 0.85% of the total monetary property values on
campus and only 3.2% of the campus population (not during a sporting event). In the
event of a wildfire it is unlikely that any buildings housing emergency operations,
information storage, communications, utilities, cultural resources, large amounts of
hazardous materials or irreplaceable collections would be vastly affected, therefore a
wildfire would not make the campus very vulnerable.
Vulnerability: Low

VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
A summary of all the events and their vulnerability on the UTK campus are in Table 30.

Table 31: Vulnerability of Hazard Events
Event
Vulnerability
Earthquake
High
Dam Failure
Medium
Terrorists
Medium
Tornado
Medium
Severe Storm
Medium
Radiation Fallout
Low
Severe Winter Storm
Low
Toxic Chemical Release Low
Wildfire
Low
Drought
Extremely Low
Expansive Soils
Extremely Low
Extreme Heat
Extremely Low
Flood
Extremely Low
Hurricane
Extremely Low
Land Subsidence
Extremely Low
Landslide
Extremely Low
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FINAL SUMMARY
All of the events have been quantified in terms of likelihood of occurrence and
vulnerability. In order to determine which events are the most important overall, a
numerical rating was given to each scale category described as follows:
Likelihood of Occurrence
Highly Likely: 4
Likely: 3
Occasional: 2
Unlikely: 1

Vulnerability
High: 4
Medium: 3
Low: 2
Extremely Low: 1

Rating each event’s likelihood of occurrence and vulnerability and then summing them
gave an event’s total (also known as impact rating) with the higher the number meaning
an event was more important and will have more of an impact on UTK. This process is
shown in Table 31, which also shows that the events that affect the campus the most are a
severe storm and earthquake.
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Event
Severe Storm
(Lightning,
Heavy Rains)
Earthquake
(MW of 4-5)
Severe Storm
(Hail, High
Winds)
Earthquake
(MW of 5-6)
Severe Winter
Storm
Toxic
Chemical
Release
Dam Failure
Terrorists
Tornado

Table 32: Rating of Events at UTK
Likelihood
Numerical
Numerical
of
Vulnerability
Total
Rating
Rating
Occurrence
Highly
Likely

4

Medium

3

7

Occasional

2

High

4

6

Occasional

2

Medium

3

5

Unlikely

1

High

4

5

Occasional

2

Low

2

4

Occasional

2

Low

2

4

Unlikely
Unlikely
Unlikely

1
1
1

3
3
3

4
4
4

Drought

Occasional

2

1

3

Extreme Heat

Occasional

2

1

3

Hurricane

Occasional

2

1

3

Occasional

2

Medium
Medium
Medium
Extremely
Low
Extremely
Low
Extremely
Low
Extremely
Low

1

3

Unlikely

1

Low

2

3

Unlikely

1

2

3

Unlikely

1

1

2

Flood

Unlikely

1

1

2

Landslide

Unlikely

1

Low
Extremely
Low
Extremely
Low
Extremely
Low

1

2

Land
Subsidence
Radiation
Fallout
Wildfire
Expansive
Soils
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4.3 Assessment of Existing Mitigation Plans and
Policies
All of the natural hazards posing a threat to UTK have been identified and quantified for
both the likelihood of occurrence and vulnerability it may have on the campus. This
section briefly discusses what loss prevention methods the university currently has in
place. Assessing the current mitigation plans and policies helps to determine which areas
in the university’s mitigation plans are lacking and need to be elaborated on or entirely
created. UTK’s current mitigation plans exist in the university document Campus
Emergency Management Plan in which emergency plans for critical facilities as well as
specific disasters exist. For the critical facilities each plan contains basic information that
would be useful in the event of an emergency, such as emergency contact numbers (those
of personnel in charge of facilitated operations), evacuation procedures, options for
relocations if necessary, and other details specific to each facility. These critical facilities
with existing emergency plans are as follows:
Housing
Dining Services
Institute of Agriculture
Environmental Health and Safety
Facilities Services
Public Relations
Student Health Services
Office of Information Technology
Telephone Services
Police
Transportation Services
Other facilities with important or special natures that aren’t deemed critical are identified
as “special units.” These facilities also have existing emergency management plans and
are as follows:
Fraternity Affairs
McClung Museum
University Center
Athletics (Have entire separate plan for athletics not included in Campus
Emergency Management Plan)
For specific disasters contained in the Campus Emergency Management Plan refer to
“Attachment B: Incident Commander Action Steps” within the document, which
identifies different emergency events, their expected impacts and consequences to UT,
and suggested action steps in the case of each.
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Dam Failure
No current mitigation plan exists.

Drought
No current mitigation plan exists.

Earthquake
After the event
– EMP (Emergency Management Plan) Activated
– IRT (Incident Response Team) Contacted
– EMT (Emergency Management Team) Notified
– Activate the EOC (Emergency Operations Center)

Expansive Soils
No current mitigation plan exists.

Extreme Heat
No current mitigation plan exists.

Flood
No current mitigation plan exists.

Hurricane
For heavy rains associated with hurricane:
At the Alert (48-hour) Point
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
At the Watch (36-hour) Point
– Secure the campus
– Secure building contents (flood damage)
– Test all backup environmental equipment
Within the Warning (24-hour) Point
– If not already accomplished, activate the EOC
– University Police and critical personnel take cover at secure location
before situation becomes dangerous
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Land Subsidence
No current mitigation plan exists.

Landslide
No current mitigation plan exists.

Radiation Fallout
For Release Inside a Building:
After the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– Activate the EOC
– Eliminate a terrorist attack as a possibility
– Consider evacuating campus
– All entrances closed
– Ventilation systems in affected buildings shutdown
– Personnel in affected buildings are quarantined
For Release Outside a Building on Campus:
After the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– Activate the EOC
– Eliminate a terrorist attack as a possibility
– Campus not evacuated/everyone remains indoors
– All entrances closed
– All ventilation systems shutdown
– Personnel in affected buildings are quarantined
For Release Off Campus:
After the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– Activate the EOC
– All ventilation systems shutdown
– Eliminate a terrorist attack as a possibility
– All entrances and exits closed
– All individuals may be instructed to leave the campus grounds and to seek
shelter inside buildings
Note: These mitigation plans for a radiation release assume an accidental non-terrorist
event.
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Severe Storm (Hailstorm, Heavy Rains, Lightning, Windstorm)
For heavy rains:
At the Alert (48-hour) Point
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
At the Watch (36-hour) Point
– Secure the campus
– Secure building contents (flood damage)
– Test all backup environmental equipment
Within the Warning (24-hour) Point
– If not already accomplished, activate the EOC
– University Police and critical personnel take cover at secure location
before situation becomes dangerous

Severe Winter Storm
For a severe winter storm including severe snow and ice conditions the following
suggested action steps exist:
At the Alert (48-hour) Point
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
At the Watch (36-hour) Point
– Activate EOC
– Secure the campus
– Test all backup environmental equipment
Within the Warning (24-hour) Point
– Close the University long before travel conditions become dangerous
– University Police and critical personnel take cover at secure location
before situation becomes dangerous

Terrorists
For Airplane Crash:
After the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
For Armed Hostile Intruder:
After the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
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–
–
–
–
–
–

EMT Notified
EOC Activated
Eliminate a terrorist attack as a possibility
Security establishes a perimeter around the affected areas
Consider an emergency lockdown of the immediate area
If the threat is outside, cancel all outdoor events
For Bomb, Chemical, Radiation, or Biological Release Inside a Building:
During the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– EOC Activated
– Eliminate hoax as a possibility
– Affected buildings evacuate
– Consider a campus-wide evacuation
– All entrances closed
– Ventilation systems in affected buildings shut down
– Personnel from affected buildings are quarantined
For Bomb, Chemical, Radiation, or Biological Release Outside on Campus:
During the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– EOC Activated
– Eliminate hoax as a possibility
– Campus not evacuated/everyone remains indoors
– All entrances closed
– Ventilation systems in affected buildings shut down
– Personnel from affected buildings are quarantined
For Bomb, Chemical, Radiation, or Biological Release Off Campus:
During the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– EOC Activated
– Eliminate hoax as a possibility
– All entrances and exits closed
– All individuals may be instructed to leave grounds and to seek shelter
inside buildings
– Ventilation systems may be shut down

Tornado
At the Watch Point
– Facilities Services assigns someone to continually monitor weather reports
At the Warning Point
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–
–

Weather reports continually monitored
Facilities Services assignments someone with communication equipment
to observe weather conditions
After the Storm
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– Activate the EOC

Toxic Chemical Release
For Release Inside a Building:
After the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– Activate the EOC
– Eliminate a terrorist attack as a possibility
– Consider evacuating campus
– All entrances closed
– Ventilation systems in affected buildings shutdown
– Personnel in affected buildings are quarantined
For Release Outside a Building on Campus:
After the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– Activate the EOC
– Eliminate a terrorist attack as a possibility
– Campus not evacuated/everyone remains indoors
– All entrances closed
– All ventilation systems shutdown
– Personnel in affected buildings are quarantined
For Release Off Campus:
After the Event
– EMP Activated
– IRT Contacted
– EMT Notified
– Activate the EOC
– All ventilation systems shutdown
– Eliminate a terrorist attack as a possibility
– All entrances and exits closed
– All individuals may be instructed to leave the campus grounds and to seek
shelter inside buildings
Note: These mitigation plans for a toxic chemical release assume an accidental nonterrorist event.
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Wildfire
No current mitigation plan exists.
Also existing for each department at the University of Tennessee is a Continuity
Operations Plan (COOP), which includes inter-departmental procedures for handling
hazardous materials, emergency communications systems, emergency access to
information and systems, mitigation strategies, schedule for annual updates, principal
assignments, and recovery procedures, among other things. For an example of what each
department’s plan includes refer to an example of the COOP for Civil and Environmental
Engineering in the appendix.
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5.0 Mitigation Strategy
The University of Tennessee Mitigation Plan includes recommendations for how UTK
can lessen the vulnerability of people, infrastructure, property, and cultural resources to
potential disasters. For this plan, it was decided that all events with an impact rating of 4
are medium and 3 or less are low priority and are not addressed in the scope of this report
due to the reality that all events will not be able to be mitigated due to lack of university
funds. Focusing on those events with the most impact is a more practical way to mitigate
events at UTK. Therefore, this section will include mitigation strategies for the event of a
severe storm and earthquake. Shown in Table 32 is a list of all the events, their total
impact rating, and if a mitigation plan in the Campus Emergency Management Plan
exists. This table shows that for all high priority events (those with an impact rating of 5
or greater), a mitigation plan does currently exist in the Campus Emergency Management
Plan, however, the plans are not extremely detailed. The purpose of this section is to
elaborate on the existing mitigation plans.

Table 33: Summary of Mitigating Events
Impact
Rating

Event
Severe Storm (Lightning, Heavy Rains)
Earthquake (MW of 4-5)
Severe Storm (Hail, High Winds)
Earthquake (MW of 5-6)
Severe Winter Storm
Toxic Chemical Release
Dam Failure
Terrorists
Tornado
Drought
Extreme Heat
Hurricane
Land Subsidence
Radiation Fallout
Wildfire
Expansive Soils
Flood
Landslide
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7
6
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2

Existing
Mitigation
Plan
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No

SEVERE STORM MITIGATION ACTIONS
In order to mitigate potential losses to the specific aspect of lightning during a severe
storm, this plan recommends that lightning rods are put up in certain critical locations,
specifically the electrical substation (the source of 80% of UTK’s electricity). Lightning
rods could also be of use at the fiber optics vault location (the source of all computer
systems, security systems, most telephones, and some heating and lighting on campus) as
well as the Steam Plant Turbine Building, Steam Plant Gear Switching Building, and
Steam Plant and Addition (the sources of almost all the heat on campus) (Sherrell, 2007).
A lightning strike at any of these locations without a lightning rod could currently
paralyze campus operation.
Also, on a more specific note of the electrical substation, a different plan needs to be
devised in order to allow for redundancy of campus power supply so that the electrical
substation, or any other location, is not the primary source of power. This means that if
an event were to occur that did take down one of the power locations, the majority of
power throughout campus would not be lost because the power would be coming from
several locations, thus would have redundancy.

EARTHQUAKE MITIGATION ACTIONS
In order to mitigate potential losses to various intensities of earthquakes, several
suggested actions exist. First and foremost, to prevent any future buildings from being
vulnerable to earthquakes, this report recommends that all new buildings constructed on
campus are designed to the most current seismic code. As far as already-existing
buildings go, the buildings shown in Table 33 are the most vulnerable to seismic damage
due to the fact that masonry frames and wood frames are the most vulnerable during an
earthquake. Some of these buildings are critical and some are not. Those that are critical
are mostly all critical for being historical, in which case not much can be done to protect
the entire building from earthquake damage without extensive time and funds. However,
four buildings, the Hoskins Library Chiller Building, Music Chiller Building, Reese Hall
Chiller Building, and Facilities Services Maintenance Shops and Warehouse are all
critical for housing utilities. It is recommended for these structures that all important
utilities and mechanical equipment be secured and/or protected as best as possible so that
in the event of an earthquake the equipment is not thrown, broken, or damaged in a way
to disrupt utilities flow to campus. For all other facilities vulnerable to an earthquake, it is
recommended that any items deemed valuable either not be stored in these buildings in
the future, moved to another more secure location if they currently are stored there, or
secure these items to a wall or floor in order to minimize movement during an earthquake
that would damage valuables.
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Table 34: Buildings Most Vulnerable to Earthquake
Building
907/909 21st St Duplex
Tom Black Track Facilities Building
Tom Black Track Pressbox
Tom Black Track Pressbox 2
Tom Black Track Storage Building
Fulton Bottoms and Storage Shed
Tyson Field and Storage Shed
Child Development Center
Temple Court
Ceramics Annex
Austin Peay Building
Veterinary Teaching Hospital
Berry Hall
Estabrook Hall
Biosystems Eng. And Environmental Sci
Lab
Carriage House
South College
Forestry Products
Shade House
Equine Animal Building
Animal Science Laboratory
Greenhouse TVA
Forest Genetics Greenhouse (17)
Laurel Apts Pool House
Sigma Chi Fraternity House
Sigma Phi Epsilon Fraternity House
Hoskins Library Chiller Building

Music Chiller Building
Reese Hall Chiller
Tyson Alumni Center

Critical (Historic)
Non-critical
Non-critical
Non-critical
Non-critical
Non-critical
Non-critical
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)
Non-critical
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)

Type of
Construction
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame

Non-critical

Masonry Frame

Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)
Non-critical
Non-critical
Non-critical
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)
Non-critical
Non-critical
Non-critical
Non-critical
Critical (Utilities to
protect irreplaceable
collections)
Critical (Utilities to
protect irreplaceable
collections)

Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame

Critical/Non-critical

Critical (Utilities for
residence hall)
Critical (Historic)
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Masonry Frame

Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame

Table 33, cont.

Engineering Annex
Lake Avenue Parking Garage
Publications and Services Building
Facilities Services Maintenance Shops
and Warehouse
International House

Non-critical
Non-critical
Non-critical

Type of
Construction
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame
Masonry Frame

Critical (Utilities)

Masonry Frame

Non-critical

Neyland Stadium

Critical (Historic)

Visitors' Center
English Language Institute-2019 Terrace
Environmental Health and Safety-2111
Terrace
Pediatric Language Clinic
Growth Chamber Laboratory
Hopecote
Knoxville W.A.V.E.
Radiological Safety
908 21st Street
English Language Institute-907
Mountcastle
Environmental Health and Safety-22nd
Street
Interior Design Resource Center
Music Department Annex
Office of Equity and Diversity
Construction Industry Research and
Policy Center
Architecture Research Annex
Student Success Center
Student Counseling Services
ULA Love Doughty Carousel Theatre

Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)

Masonry Frame
Steel Braced
Frame/Masonry
Wood Frame
Wood Frame

Critical (Historic)

Wood Frame

Critical (Historic)
Non-critical
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)

Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame

Critical (Historic)

Wood Frame

Critical (Historic)

Wood Frame

Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)

Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame

Non-critical

Wood Frame

Non-critical
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)
Critical (Historic)

Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood Frame
Wood
Frame/Masonry
Veneer

Building

Associate Provost for Faculty and
Student Diversity

Critical/Non-critical

Non-critical
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Table 33, cont.
Building

Critical/Non-critical

Office of Research and Information
Technology

Non-critical

Phi Delta Theta

Non-critical

1821 Andy Holt Avenue

Non-critical

Environment and Landscape Laboratory

Critical (Historic)

2106 Terrace Avenue

Non-critical
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Type of
Construction
Wood
Frame/Masonry
Veneer
Wood
Frame/Masonry
Veneer
Wood
Frame/Masonry
Veneer
Wood
Frame/Masonry
Veneer
Wood
Frame/Masonry
Veneer

Also of concern during earthquakes are toxic chemical spills in storage locations. These
locations are as follows:
Veterinary Teaching Hospital
Plant Sciences Biotechnology Building
Dabney-Buehler Hall
Dougherty Engineering Building
Science and Engineering Building
Walters Life Sciences Building
Hesler Biology Building and Greenhouse
Perkins Hall
Jessie Harris Building
Neyland Drive Biology Annex
Engineering Annex
It is recommended that all cabinets containing toxic chemicals be anchored to the wall
and/or floor so that during an earthquake, movement of these chemicals is minimized and
the likelihood of spillage is decreased.
A further, more detailed analysis of possible earthquake scenarios and how they would
affect each building on campus is recommended, but is beyond the scope of this report.

DAM FAILURE MITIGATION ACTIONS
While dam failure is not an event of high impact rating, it is notable because it is of
medium impact rating and does not currently have a mitigation plan. Not much can be
done to protect buildings and their contents in the event of a dam failure. Measures can
be taken to protect some contents and buildings from flooding due to dam failure, but
these measures are not practical or economically feasible. However, one thing of most
importance during dam failure is human life, which is able to be protected. In the event of
a dam failure, the waters would likely take 15 to 20 minutes to reach campus from the
upstream breach, giving enough time to warn those people located in lower elevation
areas to quickly move to higher elevations away from the Tennessee River. This alert
could be feasibly given via text message, as is done all over many campuses throughout
the United States in the event of a terrorist or gunman. Also, for those people on campus
who do not have access to text messages, an “in-person” warning system would be
beneficial in those areas located closest to the Tennessee River, such as emergency
personnel driving throughout these areas while broadcasting a warning over a
loudspeaker.

TORNADO MITIGATION ACTIONS
A tornado event already has a basic mitigation plan included in the Campus Emergency
Management Plan. However, elaborating on that basic plan, this plan suggests that in
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order to better protect lives during this event, preventative educative actions should be
taken. This includes identifying “safe” locations in highly populated buildings, such as
residence halls, student centers, and buildings containing large numbers of offices and
classrooms and then educating faculty, staff, and students on the whereabouts of these
locations and emphasizing the necessity to go to them in the event of a tornado.
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6.0 Plan Adoption, Implementation and
Maintenance
The purpose of adopting this Multi-Hazard Mitigation DRU Plan is for the University to
maintain its eligibility for FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation and Hazard Mitigation Grant
Programs, raise public awareness of the plan, and formalize the plan’s implementation.
The adoption of this plan completes the Formal Plan Adoption step in the plan
development process.
Implementing this plan and maintaining its goals is necessary for success of the hazard
mitigation planning process. This involves taking various actions based on priority. This
plan provides recommendations for actions and priorities, but the ultimate decision will
be up to Facilities Services and the members of this project’s advisory committee at the
University of Tennessee, Knoxville. Some actions may be of higher priority due to
vulnerability of campus, however, actions requiring low funding will more than likely
take precedence over those requiring greater funding.
A recommended implementation mechanism is to incorporate this hazard mitigation
plan’s recommendations into other university plans, such as campus master plans and/or
capital improvement budgeting. Along with these efforts, it is recommended to maintain
a regular attempt at obtaining funds in order to accomplish some of the more expensive
recommended actions.
Plan maintenance requires a continuing effort to monitor and evaluate the implementation
of this plan, and to update the plan based on progress or changing circumstances. In order
to better monitor the implementation of this plan UTK should review this plan yearly or
after a hazard event. Evaluation of this progress can be attained by monitoring changes in
vulnerability (due to implementing recommended actions, failed mitigation actions, or
new development). Plan updates should include, if applicable, the following subjects:
Changes in vulnerability due to project implementation
Documentation of effective and/or non-effective mitigation actions
Documentation of new hazards
Incorporation of new data on hazards and campus risk
Incorporation of new mitigation plans and policies
Incorporation of growth and developmental changes to UTK
The update process provides an opportunity to make successes of the plan public and to
allow for public input and comments.
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APPENDIX A: RAW DATA
Drought Raw Data
Date
1/3/98
1/10/98
1/17/98
1/24/98
1/31/98
2/7/98
2/14/98
2/21/98
2/28/98
3/7/98
3/14/98
3/21/98
3/28/98
4/4/98
4/11/98
4/18/98

Condition
near
normal
unusual
moist spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell
very moist
spell
unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell
very moist

Date
1/2/99
1/9/99
1/16/99
1/23/99
1/30/99
2/6/99
2/13/99
2/20/99
2/27/99
3/6/99
3/13/99
3/20/99
3/27/99
4/3/99
4/10/99
4/17/99

Condition
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near

Date

Condition

Date

1/1/00

near normal

1/6/01

1/8/00

near normal

1/13/01

1/15/00

near normal

1/20/01

1/22/00

near normal

1/27/01

1/29/00

near normal

2/3/01

2/5/00

near normal

2/10/01

2/12/00

near normal

2/17/01

2/19/00

near normal

2/24/01

2/26/00

near normal

3/3/01

3/4/00

near normal

3/10/01

3/11/00

near normal

3/17/01

3/18/00

near normal

3/24/01

3/25/00

near normal

3/31/01

4/1/00

near normal

4/7/01

4/8/00

near normal

4/14/01

4/15/00

near normal

4/21/01
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Condition
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
moderate

Date
1/5/02
1/12/02
1/19/02
1/26/02
2/2/02
2/9/02
2/16/02
2/23/02
3/2/02
3/9/02
3/16/02
3/23/02
3/30/02
4/6/02
4/13/02
4/20/02

Condition
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
unusual
moist spell
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near

4/25/98
5/2/98
5/9/98
5/16/98
5/23/98
5/30/98
6/6/98
6/13/98
6/20/98
6/27/98
7/4/98
7/11/98
7/18/98
7/25/98
8/1/98
8/8/98
8/15/98
8/22/98
8/29/98

spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal

4/24/99
5/1/99
5/8/99
5/15/99
5/22/99
5/29/99
6/5/99
6/12/99
6/19/99
6/26/99
7/3/99
7/10/99
7/17/99
7/24/99
7/31/99
8/7/99
8/14/99
8/21/99
8/28/99

normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal

4/22/00

near normal

4/28/01

4/29/00

near normal

5/5/01

5/6/00

near normal

5/12/01

5/13/00

near normal

5/19/01

5/20/00

near normal

5/26/01

5/27/00

near normal

6/2/01

6/3/00

near normal

6/9/01

6/10/00

near normal

6/16/01

6/17/00

near normal

6/23/01

6/24/00

near normal

6/30/01

7/1/00

near normal

7/7/01

7/8/00

near normal

7/14/01

7/15/00

near normal

7/21/01

7/22/00

near normal

7/28/01

7/29/00

near normal

8/4/01

8/5/00

near normal

8/11/01

8/12/00

near normal

8/18/01

8/19/00

near normal

8/25/01

8/26/00

near normal

9/1/01
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drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
severe
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
near
normal
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal

4/27/02
5/4/02
5/11/02
5/18/02
5/25/02
6/1/02
6/8/02
6/15/02
6/22/02
6/29/02
7/6/02
7/13/02
7/20/02
7/27/02
8/3/02
8/10/02
8/17/02
8/24/02
8/31/02

normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
near
normal
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought

9/5/98
9/12/98
9/19/98
9/26/98
10/3/98
10/10/98
10/17/98
10/24/98
10/31/98
11/7/98
11/14/98
11/21/98
11/28/98
12/5/98
12/12/98
12/19/98
12/26/98
Date
1/4/03
1/11/03

moderate
drought
moderate
drought
severe
drought
severe
drought
severe
drought
moderate
drought
severe
drought
severe
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
near
normal
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
Condition
very moist
spell
unusual

9/4/99
9/11/99
9/18/99
9/25/99
10/2/99
10/9/99
10/16/99
10/23/99
10/30/99
11/6/99
11/13/99
11/20/99
11/27/99
12/4/99
12/11/99
12/18/99
12/25/99
Date
1/3/04
1/10/04

near
normal
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
Condition
extremely
moist
extremely

9/2/00

near normal

9/8/01

9/9/00

near normal

9/15/01

9/16/00

near normal

9/22/01

9/23/00

near normal

9/29/01

9/30/00

near normal

10/6/01

10/7/00

near normal

10/13/01

10/14/00

near normal

10/20/01

10/21/00

near normal

10/27/01

10/28/00

near normal

11/3/01

11/4/00

near normal

11/10/01

11/11/00

near normal

11/17/01

11/18/00

near normal

11/24/01

11/25/00

near normal

12/1/01

12/2/00

near normal

12/8/01

12/9/00

near normal

12/15/01

12/16/00

near normal

12/22/01

12/23/00

near normal

12/29/01

Date

Condition
extremely
moist
extremely

Date

1/1/05
1/8/05
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1/7/06
1/14/06

near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
Condition
near
normal
near

9/7/02
9/14/02
9/21/02
9/28/02
10/5/02
10/12/02
10/19/02
10/26/02
11/2/02
11/9/02
11/16/02
11/23/02
11/30/02
12/7/02
12/14/02
12/21/02
12/28/02
Date
1/6/07
1/13/07

severe
drought
severe
drought
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
Condition
near
normal
near

1/18/03
1/25/03
2/1/03
2/8/03
2/15/03
2/22/03
3/1/03
3/8/03
3/15/03
3/22/03
3/29/03

4/5/03

moist spell
unusual
moist spell
near
normal
unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell
very moist
spell
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
near
normal

1/17/04
1/24/04
1/31/04
2/7/04
2/14/04
2/21/04
2/28/04
3/6/04
3/13/04
3/20/04
3/27/04

4/3/04

4/12/03

very moist
spell

4/10/04

4/19/03

very moist
spell

4/17/04

4/26/03
5/3/03

unusual
moist spell
unusual
moist spell

4/24/04
5/1/04

moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
very
moist
spell
unusual
moist
spell
unusual
moist
spell
unusual
moist
spell
near
normal
near
normal

1/15/05
1/22/05
1/29/05
2/5/05
2/12/05
2/19/05
2/26/05
3/5/05
3/12/05
3/19/05

moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
very moist
spell
unusual
moist spell

1/21/06
1/28/06
2/4/06
2/11/06
2/18/06
2/25/06
3/4/06
3/11/06
3/18/06
3/25/06

normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal

1/20/07
1/27/07
2/3/07
2/10/07
2/17/07
2/24/07
3/3/07
3/10/07
3/17/07
3/24/07

normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal

3/26/05

unusual
moist spell

4/1/06

near
normal

3/31/07

moderate
drought

4/2/05

very moist
spell

4/8/06

near
normal

4/7/07

moderate
drought

4/9/05

unusual
moist spell

4/15/06

near
normal

4/14/07

near
normal

4/16/05

unusual
moist spell

4/22/06

near
normal

4/21/07

moderate
drought

4/23/05

near normal

4/29/06

4/30/05

unusual
moist spell
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5/6/06

near
normal
near
normal

4/28/07
5/5/07

moderate
drought
moderate
drought

5/10/03
5/17/03
5/24/03
5/31/03
6/7/03
6/14/03
6/21/03
6/28/03
7/5/03
7/12/03
7/19/03
7/26/03
8/2/03
8/9/03
8/16/03
8/23/03
8/30/03
9/6/03
9/13/03

extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
very moist
spell
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely
moist
extremely

5/8/04
5/15/04
5/22/04
5/29/04
6/5/04
6/12/04
6/19/04
6/26/04
7/3/04
7/10/04
7/17/04
7/24/04
7/31/04
8/7/04
8/14/04
8/21/04
8/28/04
9/4/04
9/11/04

near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near

5/7/05

near normal

5/13/06

5/14/05

near normal

5/20/06

5/21/05

near normal

5/27/06

5/28/05

near normal

6/3/06

6/4/05

near normal

6/10/06

6/11/05

near normal

6/17/06

6/18/05

near normal

6/24/06

6/25/05

near normal

7/1/06

7/2/05

near normal

7/8/06

7/9/05

near normal

7/15/06

7/16/05

near normal

7/22/06

7/23/05

near normal

7/29/06

7/30/05

near normal

8/5/06

8/6/05

near normal

8/12/06

8/13/05

near normal

8/19/06

8/20/05

near normal

8/26/06

8/27/05

near normal

9/2/06

9/3/05

near normal

9/9/06

9/10/05

near normal

9/16/06
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near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
near
normal
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
moderate
drought
near
normal
near
normal
near

5/12/07
5/19/07
5/26/07
6/2/07
6/9/07
6/16/07
6/23/07
6/30/07
7/7/07

moderate
drought
moderate
drought
severe
drought
severe
drought
severe
drought
extreme
drought
extreme
drought
extreme
drought
extreme
drought

9/20/03

moist
extremely
moist

9/18/04

normal
extremely
moist
very
moist
spell
very
moist
spell
very
moist
spell
very
moist
spell

9/17/05

near normal

9/23/06

9/24/05

near normal

9/30/06

near
normal

10/1/05

near normal

10/7/06

near
normal

10/8/05

near normal

10/14/06

near
normal

10/15/05

near normal

10/21/06

near
normal

9/27/03

extremely
moist

9/25/04

10/4/03

extremely
moist

10/2/04

10/11/03

extremely
moist

10/9/04

10/18/03

extremely
moist

10/16/04

10/25/03

extremely
moist

10/23/04

extremely
moist

10/22/05

near normal

10/28/06

11/1/03

extremely
moist

10/30/04

extremely
moist

10/29/05

near normal

11/4/06

11/8/03

extremely
moist

11/6/04

extremely
moist

11/5/05

near normal

11/11/06

11/15/03

extremely
moist

11/13/04

extremely
moist

11/12/05

moderate
drought

11/18/06

11/22/03

extremely
moist

11/20/04

extremely
moist

11/19/05

near normal

11/25/06

11/29/03

extremely
moist

11/27/04

extremely
moist

11/26/05

near normal

12/2/06

12/3/05

near normal

12/9/06

12/10/05

near normal

12/16/06

12/6/03
12/13/03

extremely
moist
extremely
moist

12/4/04
12/11/04

extremely
moist
extremely
moist

normal
near
normal
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unusual
moist
spell
unusual
moist
spell
unusual
moist
spell
unusual
moist
spell
unusual
moist
spell
unusual
moist
spell
near
normal
near
normal

12/20/03
12/27/03

extremely
moist
extremely
moist

12/18/04
12/25/04

extremely
moist
extremely
moist

12/17/05

near normal

12/23/06

12/24/05

near normal

12/30/06

156

near
normal
near
normal

APPENDIX B: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION
Fujita Scale and EF Scale
Fujita Scale
F Number
0
1
2
3
4
5

Fastest 1/4mile (mph)
40-72
73-112
113-157
158-207
208-260
261-318

EF Scale
3 Second
Gust (mph)
45-78
79-117
118-161
162-209
210-261
262-317
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EF
3 Second
Number Gust (mph)
0
65-85
1
86-110
2
111-135
3
136-165
4
166-200
5
Over 200
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Head
Operations

Developer
Dayakar Penumadu, (Interim Department Head)
Jane Taylor (Business Manager)
of
Name
Phone Number
Dayakar Penumadu
865-974-2503
dpenumad@utk.edu

Date Plan Finalized
October 26, 2007
Alt. Phone Number
865-974-7700

Email Address

A.

Department’s Critical Functions

Critical Function:
People Responsible
Phone Numbers
Critical Function:
People Responsible
Phone Numbers
B.

Teaching
Primary
Richard Bennett
865-974-7540
Research
Primary
Dayakar Penumadu
865-974-2503

Second Alternate
Dayakar Penumadu
865-974-2503

Alternate
Chris Cox
865-974-7729

Second Alternate
Richard Bennett
865-974-7540

Phone Number &
Email Address
865-974-2503
dpenumad@utk.edu
865-974-7540
rmbennett@utk.edu

Alt Phone Number
& Email Address
865-974-7700

Department’s Leadership Succession

Department Head

Name

First Successor

Dayakar Penumadu

Second Successor

Richard Bennett

C.

Alternate
Chris Cox
865-974-7729

Employees with Special Skills/Knowledge

Name

Skills/Knowledge

Current Position

Jane Taylor
Marion Dills
Sharon Hale
Ken Thomas

IRIS
IRIS
Chemical Inventory
Ability to make emergency
repairs

Business Manager
Accounting Spec. III
Senior Res. Assistant
Electrical & Instrumentation
Shop Superintendent
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Contact
Information
865-974-7727
865-974-7702
865-974-7719
865-974-2329

D.

Department Objectives
The mission of the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering is three-fold: (1)
to educate the engineers of tomorrow such that they are prepared to practice in a global
economy; (2) to contribute to state and national economic growth through effective and
visible research; and (3) to serve the public through the efforts of individual faculty and
students.
E. More Contact Information

COOP
Contact

Name

Phone Number

Address

Dayakar Penumadu

865-966-4859 (H)

UTK: Perkins Hall, Room
223

865-335-5980 (C)

Home: 12800 Big Horn
Lane, Knoxville, TN 37922
Email address

Richard Bennett

865-693-6550 (H)

Dept.
locations

dpenumad@utk.edu

rmbennett@utk.edu

Perkins Hall, Room 221

Perkins Hall, Room 223

Principal nature of department:
Instruction
Laboratory Research
Administration
Research Support
A list of hazardous chemicals and supplies stored/used in department is listed at this
website: http://www.pp.utk.edu/ChemInv/default.htm.
V.

Emergency Communication Systems
To rapidly communicate with employees in an emergency, the Department of Civil and
Environmental Engineering will maintain a phone number and e-mail list and insure
personnel contact information is updated in the IRIS system. The department will use the
following communication systems for backup, after hours, when not on campus, or for
other contingencies.
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Telephone
Email
Departmental web site
A.

Emergency Access to Information and Systems
Remote access to Blackboard is available to all faculty from their home computers which
will give them the ability to e-mail all the students in classes being taught in our
department.
The department head and associate department head has a list of all the faculty and staff
e-mail addresses and have the ability to send e-mails from their homes.
The department head and associate department head has a telephone list of all the faculty
and staff and have the ability to telephone from their homes.

B.

C.

Key Internal (Within UT) Dependencies
Dependency

Approval on documents

Provider

College of Engineering

Dependency

Research Proposal Approval

Provider

Office of Research and Grants/Contract

Dependency

Human Resource document approval

Provider

Human Resources

Key External Dependencies
Dependency (Product or service)

Gases for labs
Primary

Alternate

Supplier/Provider

Airgas

Holston Gas

Phone Numbers

865-584-6390

865-573-1917
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Dependency (Product or service)

Office Supplies
Primary

Supplier/Provider

Staples

Office Depot

Phone Numbers

865-560-3150

865-558-6024

Dependency (Product or service)

Computer Supplies
Primary

Alternate

Supplier/Provider

CompUSA

Newegg

Phone Numbers

888-782-7334

800-390-1119

Dependency (Product or service)

Laboratory Supplies
Primary

Alternate

Supplier/Provider

Fisher Scientific

Cole Parmer

Phone Numbers

800-766-7000

800-323-4340

Dependency (Product or service)

Miscellaneous Supplies
Primary

VI.

Alternate

Alternate

Supplier/Provider

Lowe’s

Home Depot

Phone Numbers

865-690-9770

865-691-9500

Mitigation Strategies
The Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering will keep in stock the following
supplies to last approximately 2 to 4 weeks:
Gases used in laboratories
Most commonly used laboratory supplies
Most commonly used office supplies
Supplies used frequently for repairs

VII.

Exercising Plan & Informing Staff
162

The Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Emergency Management of
Operations Plan will be shared with the faculty and staff and an exercise to test the plan
and maintain awareness will be implemented annually at the first faculty and staff
meeting in the fall.

Scheduled Test

Scheduled Test Dates

Staff orientation meeting

November 20, 2007

Interdepartmental exercise

January 15, 2008

Emergency communication test

December 14, 2007

Off site information access test

Spring Semester

Unscheduled work at home day

December 14, 2007

Annual Update Activities
PERSON RESPONSIBLE

Completion

ANNUAL UPDATE ACTIVITIES

Primary

Alternate

DATE

Attend Annual Training Meeting

Dayakar
Penumadu

Jane
Taylor

10/18/07

Schedule Unit Review Meeting

Dayakar
Penumadu

Richard
Bennett

11/20/07

Update Unit Plan

Dayakar
Penumadu

Jane
Taylor

October
2008

Notify Facilities Services of any building
leaks or breaches in building integrity in
your area.

Ken Thomas

Larry
Roberts

11/01/07

Establish a list of supplies & vendors for
specialized recovery operations

Jane Taylor

Marion
Dills

11/01/07

Distribute copies of the updated Unit Plan

Jane Taylor

Dayakar
11/01/07
Penumadu

Forward an electronic copy of the updated
Unit Plan to the Emergency Management
Coordinator

Dayakar
Penumadu

Jane
Taylor
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11/01/07

VII.

Recovery After the Emergency
The plan for the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering to fully resume
operations as soon as possible after an emergency will be to immediately have a faculty
and staff meeting of all who are available. At the meeting individuals will be identified
to contact appropriate people to accommodate the department’s needs. Faculty will be
assigned to contact faculty who are not available to teach and make arrangements for all
classes to be held and for all students in classes to be contacted through BlackBoard.
Staff will make a list of the department’s immediate needs and assigned staff will be
responsible accordingly. If faculty and staff have emotional needs they will be
encouraged to contact the Employee Assistance Program (800-308-4934) which offers
UT employees six free counseling sessions.

A.

Special Considerations for Department
In the event of a pandemic influenza, faculty and staff will be asked not to report to work
if they are sick. Employees will be encouraged to communicate through telephone or
email as much as possible to avoid transmitting the disease.
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Vita
Kelli Taylor was born in Nashville, Tennessee, on August 17, 1984. She was raised in
Hermitage, Tennessee and attended elementary school there at Tulip Grove Elementary.
At the beginning of middle school she then moved to Pleasant View, Tennessee and
attended Coopertown Middle School and Springfield High School, where she graduated
in 2002. She then moved on to the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and received a
B.S. in Civil Engineering in 2006. She is currently pursuing her M.S. in Structural
Engineering, also at the University of Tennessee.
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